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SEBASTIEN RALE VS. NEW ENGLAND:

A CASE STUDY OF FRONTIER CONFLICT

By Kenneth M. Morrison
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (in History).
June, 1970.

A study was made of the Jesuit missionary, Sebastien Rale, and

his role in New England-New France relations.

French and English

primary and secondary materials were examined to give the broadest
possible view of the man and to place him in historical context.

It was found that Sebastien Rale was not an agent of New France.

The conflicting opinions surrounding the mission of Norridgewock and

the border war of the 1720's were traced to the problems of
Massachusetts-Abnaki

relations.

Rale's frequent and testy letters to

the government of the Bay Colony were blunt reactions to what he

viewed as religious and territorial threats against his mission.
The frontier conflict between 1713 and 1722 was not the result

of French Imperial policy.

The French insisted that the Abnakis were

allies but refused active participation in the Indians' quarrel with

New England.

Policy was developed in Maine by the Jesuits.

The

missionaries were only secondarily interested in Quebec's desire to

prevent Massachusetts' settlement of the Kennebec.
tion of war in July,

With the declara

1722, however, the Jesuits left the Abnakis in

the hands of the governor and the intendant of New France on whom the

Indians relied for vital war supplies.
Finally, the controversial attack on Norridgewock was appraised.

It was found that no secondary account had fully evaluated the sources.
Examination led to the discovery of crucial

inconsistencies in the

primary accounts of New England.

The French sources were found to be

based on the understandably confused impressions of the fleeing
Indians.

In large measure the English sources present the more valid

picture:

the sudden attack, the panicked confusion, and Sebastien

Rale dying with gun in hand.

close.

After Rale's death the war drew to a

Without Sebastien Rale's persuasion and determination, the

Abnakis were not able to present a united front against colonial
expansion.
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PREFACE

Since his death at the age of seventy-two on August 23,

1724,

Sebastien Rale's life has fascinated the historians of New England and
New France.

Both basic approaches are understandable.

The French-

Canadians with their historical tradition of remarkable frontier

priests can hardly be censured for championing a similiar view of
Rale.

Then too, New England's equally fervent denunciation of the

man as a foXmentor of cruel

Indian wars is as comprehensible.

are, nonetheless, exceptions to this simple dichotomy.

There

Many New

England, American, and Canadian historians have insisted on a middle

ground and have repudiated the emotional judgements of their country
men.
What is unfortunate is that Rale has been too long considered

apart from the tragic events for which he has been held responsible.
It is futile to separate Rale from the rapidly deteriorating relations
between the Abnakis and colonial Massachusetts.

Effectively buffered

from the French colonists by the rugged forests of northern Maine,

the Abnakis'

relations with them were free of conflict, but the same

cannot be said of Massachusetts.
It is dangerous to judge the Abnakis by their actions after
European contact.

It is equally misleading to accuse the English

settlers of intentional wrong-doing.

In reality, no single race was

responsible for the frontier conflict of the 1720's.

At the same

time, attitudes on the part of both red and white races can be

identified as contributory causes.
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European notions of superiority in confronting a native culture
which was, by all standards of western progress,

understood.

inferior, can be

Yet it was that very attitude which caused much of the

subsequent cultural conflict.

The Indian, existing in what soon

became an archaic context-in European phraseology 'savage’-was denied
absorption into the dominant culture.

confused and often,

This left the Indian bewildered,

in the final analysis, fighting mad.

Unfortunately,

the colonists found that extermination, whether planned or unintention

al, was an immediate, prompt, and effective solution to the Indians’
opposition.

The Indians themselves were not to learn complacent

acceptance of their equivocal position in relation to the European
colonization until

it was much too late.

Indian culture became a

pre-eminently reactive one, conditioned not only by any given quarrel
but by bitter experience.

Sebastien Rale must be seen in the middle

of that conflict.
For too long, Rale has been censured as being a major cause

of the animosity between New England and New France without placing
him in the context of Imperial

relations.

The fact that he was French

and Catholic explains much of the tension underlying the conflict

between Massachusetts and the Abnakis.

It does not justify condemna

tion of the man as a French partisan, or for that matter, a French
agent.

A case can be made,

in fact, that he caused severe headaches

for the administrators of New France.

If he relentlessly reminded

the Governor and Council of Massachusetts of their roughshod treatment

of the Kennebecs, he was no less tireless in badgering Vaudreuil and
Begon into activating their supposed alliance with the Abnakis.

Though Rale was French, his sentiments were clearly and irrevocably on
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the side of the Abnakis.
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CHAPTER I

OF FRENCH AND INDIANS

In 1689 a struggle began between England and France for the
control of the North American continent.’
ly through various phases.

That contest went erratical

It began with King William's War and did

not end until the surrender of Quebec in 1763.

Queen Anne's War, a

highly virulent outbreak of the Imperial conflict, ended in 1713 with
the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht.

For a time the great powers

suspended their more aggressive designs and peace seemed to be a

tangible reality.

By the early 1720's the borders between New England

and New France exploded into a bloody Indian war that threatened to

fracture the delicate balance.

England and France skirted the issues,

however, and avoided a major confrontation.

New England was not so happily spared.

Her relations with the

Abnaki nation on her northern frontier had never been good.

During

both King William's and Queen Anne's Wars those Indians allied them
selves with the French in a terrifying confederacy.

After the Peace

of Utrecht the Abnakis approached the Massachusetts settlers hoping to

end the war.

But despite the propitious peace, the wounds of the pre

vious wars did not heal.

Discussion and compromise failed and both

sides finally again had recourse to war.

’On the Imperial conflict see:

Francis Parkman, A Half-Century

of Conf 1ict (Boston:
Brown, Little and Company, 1905); Douglas E.
Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763 (New York:
Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966); Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars,
1762 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1964).

1689-
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A central

issue between New England and New France throughout

the Imperial wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries was the three Jesuit missions among the Abnakis on the

Kennebec, Penobscot and St. John rivers.

among all others.

One missionary stands out

Sebastien Rale, stationed on the Kennebec at

Norridgewock, was not only closest to Massachusetts but her most

vigorous opponent as well.

Rale's role in King William's and Queen

Anne's Wars remains largely undisputed because of a lack of primary
materials.

As an impediment to Massachusetts-Abnaki reconciliation after
Queen Anne's War, however, Rale's mission has aroused considerable
controversy.

There are several

important, underlying issues.

Did

the Treaty of Utrecht cede the northern colonial frontier to Great
Britain?

Were the Kennebecs and later the Penobscots caught in a

power struggle between England and France or was the conflict merely
local?

Did the Jesuits violate the terms of the peace to preserve the

area for France?

Although the official purpose of Rale's mission was

the christianizing of the Abnakis, he was necessarily 'man on the

scene' for New France.

Though far removed in time, few historians

have been able to approach him with more than a nominal degree of

objectivity.

His mission has frequently been evaluated on racial,

national, or religious premises.

warfare, or was he a holy,

Was he in fact an agitator of Indian

if not saintly, man who lived in loneliness

for thirty years only to meet his death at the hands of the English
while protecting his

Indians?

Sebastien Rale was born in Portalier, France, on January 4,
1652.

He received his early education from the Jesuit fathers and on

10
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September 24,

1675, he entered that order as a novice at Dole.

Eventually Rale became an instructor of grammar and humanities first
A

at Carpentras, and later at Nimes and Lyon.

1

Thus, Sebastien Rale was

equipped for a life of luxury and intellectual attainment among the

elite of Louis XIV's France.

His destiny lay elsewhere, however, where

he was to earn fame as a notable political

intriguer.

At an age when most men have chosen their life careers,

Sebastien Rale dedicated himself to the Canadian missions.

Rale was

thirty-seven years old when he embarked for New France on July 23,
1689.

Arriving at Quebec in mid-autumn, he was assigned to the mission

of the Reverend Fathers Bigots whose Indians had largely come from

Maine after King Philip's War.

2

Here he set about acclimatizing

himself-both to the weather and to the Indians.

Their food disgusted

him, and though he found snowshoes cumbersome, he astounded the

savages with his adeptness in their use;

indeed,

they hardly believed

Georges Goyau has discovered Rale's baptismal certificate
which has corrected what has traditionally been held to be his birth
date.
"Le P. Sebastien Racle," Revue d'Histoire des Missions, I
(Sept., 1924), p. 163; Thomas Charland, following older views, gives
the date as Jan. 4, 1657.
"Rale, Sebastien," Dictionary of Canadian
Biography, II, 1701-1740, David M. Hayne and Andre Vachon, eds. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 542. There are many spellings
of the Jesuit's name;
Ralle, Rasies, Racle, and even Rawley.
I have
chosen Rale.
It is most commonly used, and he used that form himself.

Q
Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien Racle," pp. 164-65; James Phinney
Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England (Albany:
John Munsell's
Sons, 1894), p. 35; Arthur Melanjon, Liste des Missionaires-Jesuites;
Nouvelle France et Louisiane, 1611-1800^ (Montrea1:
Co 11fege Sa i n teMarie, 1929), p. 65; For a sketch of the Fathers Bigot see: Thomas
Charland, "Bigot, Jacques," and "Bigot, Vincent," Dictionary of
Canadian Biography, II, pp. 63-65.
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that it was his first attempt.’

It was there,

Abnaki

language.

in 1691, that he began his dictionary of the

He spent hours in the smoky quarters of the Indians

trying to master their difficult gutterals.

Though his admirers assure

us of his proficiency in Indian languages, the Indians laughed up

roariously at his faltering efforts.

These early days were undoubtedly

frustrating, uncomfortable, and probably characterized by what today

is called cultural shock.
Sebastien Rale's apprenticeship under the Bigots was consistent

with the aims of the Society of Jesus.

Realistically, the Jesuits

emphasized that the Indian could not absorb Catholicism in European
They had learned from bitter experience that "knowing the

forms.

physical, political, social and moral

necessary prerequisite to conversion,

conditions of Indian life" was a

Typically, the Jesuits recog-

nized the importance of their classic theologi cal-philosophical
preparation for the ministry but they coupled this with rigid study

of native languages and cultures.

"Their success depended," J. H.

Kennedy believes, "upon their ability to transcend their natal
inheritance while retaining their inspiration and then to bridge the*2

See Rale's description of his first years. "Letter from
Father Sebastien Rasies, Missionary of the Society of Jesus in New
France, to Monsieur his Brother, Oct. 12, 1723',1 Reuben Gold Thwaites,
ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (New York:
Pageant
Book Company, 1959), LXVI I, pp. 133-77.
2

Rale's manuscript dictionary was taken by Captain Westbrook
during his sudden attack on Norridgewock in the winter of 1721/22.
It
is now in the possession of Harvard University.
It has been published
by John Pickering, ed., Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, I, New Series (Cambridge, 1833), pp. 370-574.
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broad abyss between European and Indian culture."^

This almost surprised appreciation was similiar to Rale's

reaction to the Indians.

He believed that their oratorical abilities

surpassed that of "most able Europeans."

2

Rale's acute observations

of Indian folkways enabled him to become as expressive.

He noticed

that there was nothing to "equal the affection of the Savages for their
children"^ and he used the image not only to explain his own relation
ship to them, but that of his God as well.

After being introduced to missionary life among the Abnakis,

Rale was then ordered to the Illinois mission to assist Father Jacques

Gravier.

Having gone about half-way he was forced to winter at

Mi chi1imackinac.
the wilds.

With the spring thaw he was again trudging through

The Illinois welcomed him with a feast of roasted dog

flesh, a tid-bit reserved for the most festive occasions.

remained for two years, until

Here he

in 1694, he was assigned to the village

of Norridgewock, the major town of the Abnakis on the Kennebec river.^

J. H. Kennedy, Jesuit and Savage in New France (New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 61, 91; see also George R. Healy,
"The French Jesuits and the idea of the Noble Savage," William and
Mary Quarterly , XV (April, 1958), pp. 143-67.

2

Rale to Brother, Oct.
LXV1I, p. 163.

12,

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

Ibid., p. 139, pp. 185-91.
Rale impressed the Indians when he
put this paternalism to practical use. The Indians had captured and
adopted a young English child.
Sebastien Rale took her into his care
"and he taught her as did later Father Aubery...." She'u1timate1y be
came an Ursuline sister.
Emmas Lewis Coleman, New England Captives
Carried to Canada (Portland: The Southworth Press, 1825), II, pp. 38990.
^Baxter, Pioneers of New France, pp. 36-39; Rale to Brother,

Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I, pp. 14-9-77; Charland, "Rale,
Sebastien," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, II, p. 543.
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Norridgewock was the most important of the Abnaki villages
because of its strategic location rather than its size.^

It was there,

within the bounds of the present town of Madison, that the Society of
Jesus maintained,

New France.

in Massachusetts' estimation, a notorious outpost of

Prior to the 1690's, however, Massachusetts had ignored

the French missionaries on the northern frontier.

Soon afterward the

two Bigots, and then Sebastien Rale, became embroiled in the
Norridgewock Abnakis'

relations with Massachusetts Bay.

Maine-Acadia had been a legitimate ground for the Jesuits since

the early seventeenth century.
and Masse to Port Royal.

In 1607 Henry IV assigned Fathers Biard

By 1613 they had begun their own mission,

St. Sauveur, on Mt. Desert Island.

Within months, however, Samuel

Argali had destroyed the fledgling colony on an expedition patrolling

Virginia's northern waters.

2

Norridgewock was never large.
In 1708 the number of warriors
was given as 25. At the same time, the Penobscot village had 78 men.
Census of the Indians, 1708, Acadia, Public Archives of Canada, M. G.
18, F 18, p. 26.
Later, during Rale's War the number increased when
the Abnakis' Indian allies came to their aid.
In September, 1722,
there were 160 warriors at the village.
Rapport de Messieurs de
Vaudreuil et Begon, Oct. 17, 1722, Collection de Manuscripts contenant
lettres, Memoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs a la
Nouvelle-France (Quebec:
Legislature de Quebec, 1884), 111, p. 87.

^Rev. P. F. X. de Charlevoix, History and General Description
of New France, J. G. Shea, ed. (New York:
Francis P. Harper, 1900),
I, pp. 260-83; John Fiske, New France and New England (Cambridge,
Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1902), pp. 7^-78; J. Bartlet
Brebner, New England's Outpost, Acadia before the Conquest of Canada
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1927), pp. 19-20; cf. Lucien
Campeau, Monumenta Novae Franciae, La Premfere Mission d'Acadie,
(1602-1616) (Quebec:
Les Presses de L'Universite Laval, I967).
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The Jesuits were more successful

in the 1640's and their work,

though well known to the English, was not contested.

Gabriel

Druillettes, the first missionary on the Kennebec, left Quebec in
August,

1646.1

The [nc|ians on the rjver were pleased with his arrival

though he demanded that they repudiate liquor, their petty jealousies,
as well as their sorcerors.

He returned to Quebec the following year

with high praises from the Kennebecs.

"This man is not like our

Sorcerors and medicine men," they marveled, "they always demand some
thing for regard, he never; they spend no time with our sick; he is

with them night and day."
Druillettes was soon to return to Norridgewock.

Kennebec in 1650 and 1651.

He was on the

On both occasions he had another duty in

He was sent to Boston and Plymouth

addition to his missionary ones.

to sound out the authorities on a proposed alliance between New France
and New England against the Iroquois.

Though his career as a diplomat

was notable for its failure, his presence on the Kennebec was decisive
for the future of the Abnakis.

Druillettes gained the Abnakis1 con

fidence and they remembered the Kennebec-Chaudiere route to Quebec

and the black-robes.

Significantly, Massachusetts had not opposed

Druillettes? presence on the river.

By the time of Sebastien Rale's arrival on the Kennebec in 1694,

however, the Bay Colony had begun to view the missions with more

Ijohn Marshall Brown, "The Mission of the Assumption on the

River Kennebec, 1646-1652," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ections, 2nd ser.
(Portland: The Society, 1890), I, pp. 87-99; Lucien Campeau,
"Druillettes, Gabriel," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, I, pp. 281-82.
2Brown, "The Mission of the Assumption on the River Kennebec,
1646-1652," pp. 92-94.
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Bearing the full brunt of the colonial wars, Massachusetts

hostility.

consistently attempted to convince the Abnakis that they should oust

the Catholic missionaries, though she was invariably unsuccessful.
In I698, for example, the Abnakis told the commissioners from

Massachusetts that "the good missionaries will not be driven away."^
On the other hand, Rale's task was made immensely more difficult because

the Abnakis knew that the English despised the Jesuits.

The Indians

were not above using a political asset to good advantage, and, on one
occasion, they told the commissioners that they wished the priests
removed.

When the Indians reversed their position,

that the English accused the Jesuits of political

it is understandable
intrigue.

"We will

do nothing of the kind," the Abnakis answered on another occasion.

3
"You may try to make us pray as you do, but you will not succeed."J
The English were determined to strike at what they saw as the cause of

the Abnakis1

refusal to accept their authority and passed a law in 1700

to effect the French priests removal.

In the same year the Jesuits built a new chapel at
Norridgewock which Massachusetts inevitably viewed as "a French

encroachment.Recognizing the Abnakis1 tardiness in carrying out

Days,

1Quoted by John Gilmary Shea, The Catholic Church in Colonial
1521-1763 (New York: John G. Shea, 1886), p. 596.

^Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," in Charles H. Lincoln,
ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699 (New York:
Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 273.
^Letter by Jacques Bigot, Oct. 26,

1699, Thwaites, Jesu i t

Relations, LXV, pp. 93-95.

^Mass. Arch.

Sto

11:

148-14-9A.

Mr. Stoughton, Oct. 30,

1700, Mass. Arch. 28;

80.
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her law against the priests, Massachusetts resolved that "Three able
Learned Orthodox ministers should be sent speedily to the Eastern
Indians and those of Merrimac River...."’

But the Abnakis had accepted

Catholicism and they were determined to preserve it.

an Abnaki

"I assure you,"

representative told Governor Callieres, "that I wish to pray

to God like the French.

The Abnaki spokesman underscored the fact that it was the
missionaries who tied the Indian so strongly to the French.

it was in the Abnakis1

Ironically,

interest to ally themselves with the English

because they depended upon them for trade and often for food.

3

But

the English settlers directly challenged their way of life, and coupled

with the Abnakis1 conversion by the Jesuits caused them to lean heavily

towards the French.
Unlike the Indians of southern New England, the Abnakis were

not sedentary.

While they also maintained permanent villages where

their agriculture centered, these were little more than base camps.

In

the spring and fall, they went to the sea at the mouths of the rivers
where they lived on shellfish.

During the long hard winters their

hunters could be found in the forest around Moosehead and Mt. Katahdin

’Emma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives,

I, pp. 60-61.

^Conference entre les sauvages Abenakis et M. Callieres, Oct. 1,
1702, Arch. Col. Serie F 3, Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2,
PP. 381-83.

^Bomazeen and Skanwenes of Norridgewock requested on one

occasion, for example:
"Supplies of Corne, Meale, White Blankets, white
Stockin cloth, red pennistone, Shirts, Dussils, Hatchets, Kettles, Duck
Shot and Powder. They also asked for some "blew Broadcloth, Tobacco,
Scissors, Needles, and Thread," Message of Indians, Dec. 27, 1701,
Baxter Manuscripts, Documentary History of the State of Maine (Portland:
Lefavor-Tower Company, 1916), XXIII, p. 3^-.
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where game was more plentiful.’
The slowly advancing settlements of Massachusetts threatened to
block the Abnakis'

route to the sea.

heart of Indian existence.

The fur trade also cut to the

English desire for furs led the Abnakis

unwittingly to overhunt moose, deer and caribou to the point where

these animals were faced with extinction and the Indian with starvation.

Massachusetts added insult to unintentional

injury and insisted that

the Indians acknowledge the British sovereign.
confused.
heads.

The Abnakis were left

A great deal of the interracial dialogue passed over their

Those points which conflicted with their interests they con

veniently ignored.

This behavior the Massachusetts government could

not understand and refused to tolerate.
Jesuits, who,

And there were always the

in the eyes of Massachusetts, bore the brunt of the

responsibility for the Abnakis1

intransigence.

Some of the English settlers, however, realized that the
Abnakis had some
in September,

real

complaints.

One settler, writing from Pemaquid

1675, made observations that can be applied to the

Abnakis throughout their relationship with the English.

"Sir," Thomas

Gardner began, "I do not find by any thing I can discerne that the
Indians East of us ar in the least our Ennimies...."

If they fled from

approaching boats or from English men generally, they had "good

Reason," Gardner continued, "for thay well Know it may Cost them their*III,

^Jaimes Phinney Baxter, "The Abnakis and their Ethnic Relations,"

Me. His. Soc. , Col lections, 2nd ser. (Portland: The Society, 1892),
III, pp. 13-4-0; Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Indians of Maine," in L. C.
Hatch, ed., Maine: A History (New York: The American Historical
Society, 1919), I, pp. 4-3-64.
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Lives if the wild fisherman meet with them".’

A more acute assessment of Massachusetts'

impact on the Abnakis

was made by Thomas Bannister in his testimony before the Council of
Trade and Plantations In July 1715.

Bannister thought the English

settlers had "untaught them (the Abnaki0 the genuine dictates of

Nature and...simplicity wch. was verry remarkable at our arriveall,
and instead thereof implanted our own vices and follies."

Thus, while

he believed that French machinations among the Abnakis made
Massachusetts'

task more difficult, he noted that the "repeated

injuries and provocations" of the settlers were also responsible for
bad relations.

"No wonder then," he said, "that they have conceiv'd an

opinion that our design is wholly to exterminate and destroy them; and
to this our faithlessness in Treatys has verry much concur'd...."

was a sorry picture he sketched before the Council:

It

"We villifie them

with all manner of names, and opprobrious language, cheat abuse and
beat them, sometimes to the loss of limbs, pelt them with stones and

set dogs upon them."

2

Contemporary English opinion was not, however, always so
generous to the Indians.

Samuel Penhallow said the Abnakis were "as

implacable in their revenge, as they are terrible in the execution
of it....

No courtesy will ever oblige them to gratitude; for their

greatest benefactors have frequently fallen as victims to their fury."^

’Letter Thos Gardner to Gov. Leverett, Sept. 22,

1675, Baxter,

VI, pp. 92-93.
n
Thomas Bannister to the Council of Trade and Plantations,
July 15, 1715, Cal, of St. Pap. XXVIII, pp. 233-35.
^Samuel Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England with

the Eastern Indians (Cincinnati:

J. Harpel,

1859),

13.
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Penhallow's and Bannister's assessments differed, perhaps, because

their objectives were different.

Penhallow was determined to resettle

Maine after Queen Anne's War; Bannister pleaded for reasonable limits
to those settlements.

But Penhallow correctly noted that the Abnakis

pursued their wars with single-minded fervor.

Both Bannister and LaPotherie mention an incident which in
furiated the Abnakis and reinforced their impressions of English
treachery.

During King William's War several of the Indians had gone

to Pemaquid, under a flag of truce, to parlay with the English about
several of their tribe being held captive in Boston.

Contrary to all

normal conventions of truce the Indians were arrested and four others

under similiar circumstances were "pitilessly killed" at Saco.
LaPotherie was sympathetic to the Abnakis but stoically noted that "in
some cases misfortune is beneficial" in keeping the Abnakis attached

to the French.’
If such incidents could be discontinued as acts of war, they

might be excused as insignificant.

But the Abnakis' trust had been

strained by similar actions long before.

"These Indians are much

attached to us," de Champigny assured Pontchartrain in 1691, "and
irreconciIiable enemies of the English in consequence of a piece of

treachery the latter had perpetrated on them some years ago, killing
and massacring a large number of their people who had visited them in

o
good faith."*'

’Narrative of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada, 1694,
1695, E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial
History of New York (Albany: Weed, Parson and Company, 1855), IX,
pp. 613-16.

2M. de Champigny to M. de Pontchartrain, May 10,
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 498.

1691,
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When Rale arrived on the Kennebec these incidents had created a
situation beyond his control.

Norridgewock's proximity to the English

was in itself responsible for much of the turmoil that marred Rale's
stay among the Abnakis.

Equally important was the legacy of bitterness

between the Kennebecs and Massachusetts Bay.

As Rale was to discover

later, Massachusetts would, on the weakest of evidence, accuse him of

causing that animosity.

In reality, however, Rale's first years on

the Kennebec were innocuous.

It has traditionally been held that

Norridgewock was under his sole care in 1694, but that is not correct.

Rale was, as Lord, Sexton and Harrington discovered, Father Vincent

Bigot's companion.1

Their early relationship was probably excellent, for Bigot had
guided Rale after his arrival

in New France.

But later, during the

short interval of peace between King William's and Queen Anne's Wars

there seems to have been some dispute between Rale and Vincent Bigot.
While their differences are unclear,

it may have been due to Vincent

Bigot's advocacy of Abnaki-Massachusetts conferences to settle out
standing issues.

The problem was resolved by removing Rale and by

sending Jacques Bigot in his place.

The squabble and Rale's removal

seems consistent with Governor Callieres policy at that time.

By 1699

he felt that an entente between the English and the Abnakis was

^For the older view see J. P. Baxter, Pioneers of New France
in New England, pp. 36ff; but see also Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton
and Edward T. Harrington, The History of the Archdiocese of Boston
(New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1944), H P. 56.

2

Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,

I, p. 56.
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des i rable. ’

Father Rale's absence was shortlived.

In 1698 the Fathers Bigot

established a new mission for a group of Indians who had been converted
by Sebastien Rale.

2

By 1701, one of the Bigots was also involved in

difficulties with the authorities.

Brouillan, Governor of Acadia,

noted that Bigot did not give the King's interests the same care as
Father Gaul in had on the Penobscot.

The Bigots were recalled and

Father Rale was sent back to the Kennebec.-^

In view of these and like altercations between the Jesuits and

the King's agents,

it is difficult to make meaningful generalizations

about the priests prior to 1713.

Parkman remarked that "before the end

of the seventeenth century the functions of the Canadian Jesuit had
become as much political as religious...."^

had their own idio syncrasies.

But individual priests

The official government viewpoint is

obvious, as the incident between Rale and Bigot and later the Bigots

and Brouillan indicates.

"If from 1690 an interest is evinced in

thei r Qzhe priests{| work," Shea noted of New France's administrators,

’Lettre de Monsieur de Callieres au Ministre, March 17,

1699,

Collection de Manuscripts, II, p. 312; Governor Lincoln, "Mss. papers:
Account of the Catholic Missions in Maine," Me. His. Soc., Col lections,
1st ser. (Portland: Day, Fraser £- Co., I83I), I, p. 329.
2

Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
LXVII, pp. 183-93; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 67.
^Memoire Joint'a la lettre de Monsieur du Brouillan, Oct. 6,
1701, Arch. Col., C 11 D, vol. 4, part 1, p. 146; Abrege d'une lettre
de Monsieur de Brouillan au Ministre, Oct. 30, 1701 , Col 1ection de
Manuscripts, II, pp. 385-86; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,
I, p. 80.

Parkman, Half-Century of Conflict,

I, p. 215.
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"it was rather to use them as instruments of the government to further

its political, military, or commercial views....11’

Yet it is erroneous

to insist that their sole inspiration was concern for the interests

it is true, subject to God, his superiors,

of Louis XIV.

The Jesuit was,

and his king.

Not surprisingly, these demands sometimes clashed.

The

Jesuits' concern "for the corporate goal of the mission in Canada:

the conversion of the heathens" seems to have been primary, nonethe.
2
less.
The variety of the missionaries' personal viewpoints sometimes
led the priests to see things differently from their political
superiors.

Father Simon, missionary among the Malecites on the St.

John River, was known to have upbraided

against the Engli sh.

"'I

reprehended you many times for

committing barbarities on captives' the franciscan thundered at the
Indians."

John Gyles, an English captive among the Malicites related

that the priest continued his denunciations:

"The English are better

people than yourselves," and he said that "the Almighty thinks kindly
of them, for He forgives the wayward who know no better.

And He will

remarkably punish the wretches who inflict tortures on them."-2
Father Simon was harshly condemned for those words.

The king regarded another incident more seriously.

Fathers

Baudoin and Petit had refused absolution to the Indians who were

’shea, The Catholic Church in Colonial Days, p. 592.

n
Kennedy, Jesuit and Savage in New France, p. 80.

^Stuart Trueman, The Ordeal of John Gyles (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, Ltd., 1966). pp. 68-69: Baxter, Pioneers of New France in

New England, p. 33.
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engaged in warfare against the English.

with the conduct of two priests.

Louis XIV became quite annoyed

The minister wrote a strong note

to the Bishop of Quebec insisting that he "stop the continuation of

these disorders, that these ecc1esiastiques no longer interfere in
temporal affairs...."

Parkman's characterization of the eighteenth

century Jesuit as "half-missionary and half agent of the king"^
requires significant modification.
More often than not, however, the Jesuit in Acadia accepted the

practical

implications of French colonial policy though he attempted

to mold it to his views.

If the colony was at war, the Jesuit was

caught in an even more delicate situation than was usual.

At such times

the Indians worked directly with and under French soldiers.

There

was little that the Jesuit could do but make the best of the situation.
Thus Sebastien Rale's statements as to his role in Queen Anne's War
must be put into their proper context.

Just prior to the outbreak of war, Massachusetts attempted to

assure the Abnakis' neutrality.

According to Rale, Dudley pleaded

with him not to "influence your Indians to make war upon us."

When

Rale suavely replied "My religion and my office of Priest were a
security that I would give them only exhortations to peace,"

2

he was

^Lettre du Ministre a Monsieur L'Ev^que de Quebec, May 8, 1694,
Collection de Manuscripts,
Conf 1i ct, I, p. 217.

II, pp.

2Rale to Brother, Oct. 12,

155-56; Parkman, A Half-Century of

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

LXVII, pp. 197-203.
It should be noted that Rale's presence at this
meeting is not substantiated by English testimony.
Penhallow, who was
present, fails to mention it.
Rale's statement to that effect is
important, nonetheless, because of his later statement to Vaudreuil.
cf. Penha 11ow, History of the Wars of New England, pp. 16-17.
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seemingly accepting the Abnakis1 neutrality.

the Abnakis became actively engaged in war.
revealing:

Soon after, however,

Rale’s comments to them are

"I exhorted them," he later recalled, "...to observe

strictly the Laws of war, to practice no cruelty, to kill no person
except in the heat of combat, to treat humanely those who surrender

themselves prisoners, etc."’

Rale’s insistence that "the only band which has united

AbnakisJ]

£the

to us so closely is their firm attachment to the catholic

Faith" underscores the nature of his influence.

Not long after his

memorable confrontation with Governor Dudley he assured Governor
Vaudreuil that "the Abnakis would take up the hatchet whenever he
pleased.But the contradiction between Rale’s statements to Dudley
and his words to Vaudreuil

is more apparent than real.

It is clear that Rale did not accept war as quickly as his words

suggest.

Rale’s position on English-Abnaki relations had been radically

different in 1702.

Governor Brouillan reported that the Abnakis had

made a treaty of neutrality with the English.

More to the point, he

accused Rale of being responsible for the Indians' capitulation.

3

When the Minister of Marine heard this he reacted vigorously.
"I was very much surprised," he wrote the Superior of the Jesuits,*2

’Rale to Brother, Oct.
LXVII, p.

12,

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

197.

2

Beauharnois et Vaudreuil au Ministre, Nov. 15, 1703, Col 1ection
de Manuscripts, II, pp. 405-06; Arch. Col. C 11 A, vol. 21, ppT 13-16;
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 756.

^Cited by Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,

I, p. 84.
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"to learn that one of your fathers was mixed up in such a business, and

I believe that you will judge it proper to withdraw him from there...,"

He preferred, he said, "some one who knows better how to manage the

interests of religion and those of the King, which are inseparable."’
Nevertheless, by June,

1703, Pontchartrain had decided to inter

pret the Abnakis1 treaty of neutrality as beneficial

the Iroquois could also be persuaded to that course.

to New France if

He stated tersely,

however, that "His Majesty considered it wrong [jnauvai0
missionaries

that their

interfered on the side of this neutrality; and I have

written in his name to Father De la Chaize to have Father Ralle Qs ic]

recalled [retired] and to send another £priestj
Yet Sebastien Rale was not removed.

Casco in June,

in his place.

After the conference at

1703, some Englishmen initiated hostilities by sacking

the home of Castin, an act which the Indians considered an attack
upon themselves.

At this juncture, Governor Vaudreuil turned the

misconceived English attack to his advantage.

He had learned that

the minister was displeased with the Abnakis1 neutrality and unlike

his predecessor, Governor Callieres, he believed that the Abnakis should
be kept involved in warfare.

"Sieur de Vaudreuil’s opinion is,"

the minister commented, "that the English and the Abenakis must be kept

irreconci1iable enemies.To effect that purpose Vaudreuil sent

’Quoted in Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,
2

I, p. 84.

Quoted in ibid.

^Abstract of certain parts of a Despatch from Messrs, de
Vaudreuil and Beauharnois; with Notes by the Minister, Nov.
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 755-56.

15,

1703,
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Frenchmen to Acadia to excite the Indians.

on Casco and Wells in August,

The result was the attack

1703.

Sebastien Rale was not responsible for the outbreak of hostili

ties.

He had,

it can be said, a rather notorious reputation for inde

pendence in thought.

But by November,

encouraged the Abnakis to go to war.

1703, Vaudreuil had already
Rale understandably tried to

absolve himself of the pro-English stigma.

It was for this reason

that he wrote Vaudreuil that "the Abnakis would take up the hatchet

whenever he pleased."

Judging from the reactions of the other missionaries to the
open warfare in Maine it may be safely assumed that Rale had the
interests of the Abnakis in mind.

Throughout the war years the

missionaries carefully exchanged their views on the problems of the

missions.

In 1703 they seem to have decided to thwart Vaudreuil’s

war policy, and more significantly they convinced him of the wisdom

of the change.
Fathers Gaul in and Aubry proposed to Vaudreuil and Beauharnois
that they move the Abnakis to Canada.

The Indians could not live on

territory controlled by the English because they were dependent upon
them for food and ammunition.

They could not remain, the Jesuits

warned, without dying of hunger.

They convincingly noted that the

Indians did not protect Port Royal and that in Canada they could serve
as a buffer against the Iroquois.’

That Sebastien Rale was directly

\ord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,

I, p. 86.

Note

that the authors ignore Rale's statement that he would excite the
Indians to warfare. Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to M. de
Pontchartrain, Nov. 17, 1704, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial
Documents. IX, p. 7^2.
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involved in the planned move is seen from the fact that the priests
"and the Indians met at Norridgewock and told the Indians that they
must look out for some other country, for that it was impossible for

them to live there."’

In May,

1704, the Abnakis of the Androscoggin hurried to assure

Beauharnois that they would move.

anxious to leave.

But not all of the Indians were so

In June another group told the French governor

that they served French interests better in Maine and that they did

not want to move elsewhere.

2

It is not known who these Indians were.

It is certain that

Penobscots and Kennebecs were among those who went to Canada.

In 1705,

Colonel Church's expedition to the Penobscot carefully "made diligent
search in those parts for the enemy; but could not find, or make any
discovery of them...."

Another group of 260 men under Captain Hilton

was sent against Norridgewock in the winter of 1705.

They "found that

the enemy was gone and had left their rough household stuff, and corn
behind them."^

Hilton's men had to be satisfied with burning the chapel

and wigwams to the ground.

1 Thomas Church, The Old French and Indian Wars, from 1689 to

1704, in Benjamin Chur ch, The History of the Great Indian War of 1%75
and 1676, Commonly Called Philip's War, Samuel G. Drake, ed. (Hartford:
Silas Andrus & Son, 1851), p. 283.
2

Consil entre les sauvages d'Amesoquenty et Monsieur de
Beauharnois, May 12, 1704, Collection de Manuscripts, II, pp. 411-13.

^Thomas Church, The Old French and Indian Wars, p. 284, Lord,
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 87.
Boston News-Letter,
March 5, 1705.
Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p. 38.
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Though the surviving records are highly unsatisfactory,

it is

significant that the Jesuits persuaded most of the Abnakis to leave

The retreat dramatically underlines the peculiar problems of

Maine.

the Abnaki missions.

To insist that these men were more politically

active than their seventeenth century predecessors is not wholly
correct.

Unlike the earlier missions, those of the Kennebec and

Penobscot were unavoidably involved in the affairs of New England.
Furthermore the location of the villages made it necessary that the
Abnakis look to the English, rather than to the French, for material

ass i stance.
When involved in war, however, the Abnakis became totally
dependent upon the French for food and ammunition.

the Jesuits' problems.

War simplified

In time of conflict, the Abnakis were directed

by the officials of New France.

In peacetime it was the Jesuits who

had to cope with the complications of English-Abnaki relations.

In Sebastian Rale's case it has been his peacetime role that
has been correctly emphasized.

ting.

Queen Anne's War proved to be devasta

The French lost, for all practical purposes, their whole southern

coastline.

With the English firmly entrenched to the south and east

of the Abnaki villages the Jesuits' task became far more difficult.
It was this geographic context that caused Rale's outspokenness.

In 1703 he was censured for encouraging peaceful relations between
the English and the Abnakis.
learned.

He never forgot the lesson so painfully

Caught in the struggles of New England and New France, the

Jesuit was faced with a difficult decision.

able that the priests kept the Abnakis'

It is all the more remark

interests in mind.

As

Sebastien Rale had discovered, he had to offer the administrators of
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New France practical policies or submit to their direction.

Rale and

the other Jesuits never faltered in their concern for the Abnakis.
They became the constant factor which provided some stability in the
turbulent post-war years.

would be tested by peace.

Tempered in war, Sebastien Rale's mettle
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CHAPTER II

THE DAWN AND DUSK OF PEACE:

1712 - 1716

After the Treaty of Utrecht terminated Queen Anne's War in 1713,

tension on the frontier grew unabated.

The Jesuit priest, Sebastien

Rale, soon came to symbolize to Massachusetts the duplicity of the

hated French and Indians.

That one name, Sebastien Rale, would by the

1720' s sum up the collective frustration of thirty years of conflict

with the French for the control of the continent.

By 1720, the English

believed that he alone prevented them from controlling the Maine fron
tier.
The English of Massachusetts had always viewed the French
Jesuits with serious misgivings, but at first they had little direct

knowledge of Rale's work among the Abnakis.

By 1716, they had begun

to realize what was happening on their frontier.

Much to their dismay,

the Abnakis opposed their efforts to assert their authority.
letters to the Massachusetts'

Governor and Council showed that he

encouraged the Indians' opposition.

the Abnakis'

Rale's

His spirited defense of his and

interests infuriated the authorities of Massachusetts.

In their view, nothing could be more malicious.
Massachusetts'

reaction to Sebastien Rale was oversimplified.

Close examination of the largely ignored issues of the period shows

that Rale's opposition was mainly defensive.

Though he viewed the

Puritans with disfavor, he did not oppose them until they threatened

his Kennebec mission.
are not simple.

Seen in this light, the causes of the later war

The English as well as the French must bear their

share of the responsibility for it.

Peace had dawned auspiciously but
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by 1716 the basic causes of the future conflict had surfaced.
There were definite reasons for Rale's opposition to the

Massachusetts settlers.

Their attempts to settle the Kennebec river

convinced him that the survival of the Abnaki nation was seriously
jeopardized.

He had reason to tell "the Indians

that the intruders

were corrupt land-grabbers who would rob them alike of their property

and their faith."’

His initial suspicions turned to open distrust

when Massachusetts ignored her treaty obligations and failed to set
up satisfactory trading conditions.

When the Bay Colony turned from trade to religion, telling the
Indians to accept an English minister in place of their scheming

French priest, Rale was personally threatened.

He did not need, and

did not receive, directions from Quebec telling him that his mission
rested on keeping the settlers from the Kennebec.

Massachusetts

recognized that her frontier policy threatened the Abnakis.

Governor

Dudley had no hope, he said, of keeping the Abnakis' "fidelity untill

some English settlements be established...to govern them, and their
priests be kept from them...."

2

Neither Rale nor the Abnakis were

much impressed with Dudley's notions of progress.
Nor could Rale forget the basic antagonism between French and
British in America.

In 1710, after Francis Nicholson captured Port

Royal and after the abortive expedition against Q.uebec, Q.ueen Anne's

’George M. Wrong, The Rise and Fall of New France (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1928), I I, p. 662. Wrong implies, however,
that Rale did not have substantial reasons for opposing the English.
2

Gov. Dudley to Council of Trade and Plantations, Dec. 2,
Cal of St. Pap., XXVI, pp. 102-103.

1712,
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War ground to a halt.

The peace treaty made at Utrecht left the borders

between New France and New England undefined; the area adjacent to

each, the present State of Maine, became a bone of contention.

By

the Treaty of Utrecht, Louis XIV ceded to the British all of "Nova
Scotia or Acadia, comprehended within its ancient boundaries...."’

But because there were several notions about the ancient limits of
Acadia, the two crowns agreed that the final settlement would be

decided by a commission.

2

Unlike Sebastien Rale, the French ministry did not appreciate
the importance of the Maine lands.

Pontchartrain, the Minister of the

Marine, tried a variety of tactics to secure the best terms for France.
On August 10,

1712, he told the plenipotentiaries that though Louis

XIV would agree to cede Acadia to England,

it was imperative that the

British receive only present-day Nova Scotia.

If, on the other hand,

Great Britain would allow the French a toehold on the peninsula, Louis
was willing to give them the land between the St. Georges and the

St. John rivers.

When the British representatives failed to take the

bait, Pontchartrain tried a different course.

He wrote to the

plenipotentiaries that His Majesty wanted them "to insist that the

Francis Gardner Davenport, European Treaties on the History
of the United States and its Dependencies (Washington: Carnegie
Institute of Washington, 1934),111, pp. 197-98.
2Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,

I, pp. 91-92;

W. S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces; The Emergence of Colonial
Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), p. 42.

^Lettre de M. de Pontchartrain, August 10,
Etr., vol. 24, part II, pp.

173-76.

1712, Min. Aff.
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limits be regulated after the peace by the commissioners."’
In the early negotiations the French were willing to cede the

Maine lands.

Having failed in his attempt to get better terms on the

fisheries and on Cape Breton, Pontchartrain countered by claiming the
territory as far west as the Kennebec river.

In pressing his claim,

Pontchartain conveniently forgot that the border between New England

and New France had been defined in 1700 as the St. Georges river.
Acadia, he said, was divided into two parts, east and west.

2

He was

willing to relinquish the western part from the Kennebec to the bay of
Fundy, but the eastern section was vital to the French for "their
fishing and navigation towards Canada.Pontchartrain was not to have

his way, nonetheless.

With the understanding that the border was to

be defined by a commission, the French relinquished all claim to Acadia

1713.^

in May,

’Lettre de M. de Pontchartrain aux P. P., December, 21,
Ibid., pp.

1712,

138-39.

2

At that time the arms of the two countries were set up to mark
the boundary.
"Memoire pour servir regler les 1imites....", Oct. 8,
1718, Arch. Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, p. 203; and Baxter, The Pioneers of
New France in New England, p. 342.

^Memoire sur les Pays de l'Amerique que la France doit ceder

aux Anglois par le Paix prochaine, Jan. 13, 1713. Arch. Col., C 11 E,
vol. 2, pp. 7-10; Drake thought the English should have been warned
about future difficulties by France's determination to retain Acadia
in the Treaty negotiations.
Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New
England (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), pp. 290-91.
^Precis de ce que s'est passeTpendant la negoication du Traite

d'Utrecht au sujet de l'Acadie, Juillet 171l...Mai, 1713, Arch, des
Col., c 11 D, vol. 8, pp. 3-48; MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces, p. 12.
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Massachusetts, though aware of the vagueness of the Treaty,
argued that all of the Maine lands were unquestionably hers.’

The

French were frantically searching for documentary evidence to hold
British territory to the peninsula of Nova Scotia.

Governor Vaudreuil

and Intendant Begon heartily concurred in the necessity of that
policy.

Father Aubry, a Jesuit formerly stationed on the St. John

River, wrote an extended memoir in response to a request by Ponchartrain
for more information.

Aubry's point was that the first map of the

area, drawn by Samuel de Champlain, had called only the peninsula of

Nova Scotia by the name Acadia.
by other names.

Champlain had referred to the mainland

Thus, through Father Aubry, the officials of New

France took the position that Utrecht gave the British no rights to
the mainland.

2

Pontchartrain's attempt to barter the Maine lands had far-

reaching implications for Rale's Norridgewock mission.
Britain refused his various offers she said,
had no valid claims to the Kennebec.

When Great

in fact, that the French

After Vaudreuil

learned of the

terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, he defined the border as the St.

Georges River, which is east of the Kennebec, leaving the remainder

Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jan.
31, 1710, Cal. of St. Pap., XXV, pp. 25-26; Address of the Governor
and Company of Rhode Island and Plantations to the Queen, November 21,
1710, Ibid., p. 275; Jeremy Dummer jr. to Lord Dartmouth, Jan. 3, 1711,
Ibid., p. 334.
Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to M. de Pontchartrain, Nov.
1713, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 931.

15,
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to the British.’

Sprague thought that both England and France were

confused about the "whereabouts" of the boundaries.

Actually the

French claim that the Kennebec belonged solely to the Indians was
quite definite and Rale acted on that assumption.

In this manner the

French could maintain at least nominal control of the territory

because the Jesuits would keep the Abnakis in the French alliance.

2

Massachusetts was not impressed with claims of an Abnaki-French

alliance.

Though the Governor and General Court sputtered for years

about the "Eastern Rebels," the Abnakis had never had close ties with
them.

The fact is, Massachusetts'

Indian policy had been and was inept.

Unlike the French, the Boston authorities did not try to understand

the Abnakis1 wishes.
administration.

Nor did they have the advantages of centralized

Indian treaties were ratified by the executive but

depended upon the General Court for execution, and Massachusetts was
prey to the usual feuding between Governor and provincial politicians.J

The legislators of the Bay colony were unreasonably expedient and true

^Mrs. Le marquis de Vaudreuil et Begon A Rambouillet, June 18,
1713, Arch, des Col., Serie B, vol. N-35, p. 156; MacNutt, The Atlantic
Prov i nces, p. 273.

2John Francis Sprague, Sebastien Rale:

A Maine Tragedy of the

Eighteenth Century (Boston: The Heintzemann Press, 1906), pp. 71-72.
"If it is proper to maintain the Abenaquis in our alliance," Father
Charlevoix wrote, "the Governor of Boston must be given to understand
that, if he undertakes to settle any of the lands belonging to our
Indian allies, it will be impossible to refuse assistance to them...."
Memoire respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, O'Callaghan, New
York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 878.

^cf. Oliver Morton Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696—
1765 (New York:
Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), pp. 15^-58.
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to form they subjected Indian policy to the fortunes of partisan

politics.
The Maine frontier had been the scene of almost continuous
warfare for thirty-eight years and by 1713, Rale and the Abnakis
welcomed peace.’

The savages took the initiative and approached

Captain Samuel Moody

2

at Casco Bay saying they were willing to comply

with any terms in settling their differences.
letter written to him by Father Rale.

3

Moody showed them a

The Jesuit had told him that he

would send a runner to Governor Vaudreuil to stop the Indian raids,

if

Moody informed him of any cessation of hosti1itiesThe Abnakis,
viewing themselves as free agents, became greatly alarmed when they

heard this.

They immediately declared "they would wholly renounce the

French interest.

But, Governor Dudley and Captain Moody failed to see the

necessity of easing the Indians' fears of their intentions.

’parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict,

I, p. 220.

2

For a biographical sketch on Captain Samuel Moody (Moodey)
see:
Sybil Noyes, Charles T. Libby and Walter G. Davis, Genealogical
Dictionary of Maine and New Hampshire (Portland Me.: The SouthworthAntheonsen Press, 1928-39), II, (Jefford-Z), p. 487.

^Letter from Capt. Samuel Moody to Gov. Dudley, Jan. 3, 1712/13,
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 315-16; Mass. Arch. 51:
pp. 155-56.
Both Penhallow and Hutchinson agree that peace negotiations were begun
by the Indians.
Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, pp. 7778; Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and Province of
Massachusetts, Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University
Press, 1936), II, p. 150.
^Letter from Sebastien Rale to Capt. Samuel Moody, Nov.
1712, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts,
p. 253.

IX, pp. 334-35; Mass. Arch. 51:

^Letter from Capt. Samuel Moody to Gov. Dudley, Jan. 6,

Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts,

18,

IX, pp. 317-19.

1712/13,
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Dudley began the preliminary negotiations through Moody by

telling the Abnakis that he would ignore them if they remained allies
of the French.

He asked that they

Dudley was taking no chances.

voluntarily surrender several of their chiefs as insurance for their
future peaceful conduct.’

Father Rale disliked that proposition.

fact, the very idea of hostages repelled him.

In

"I had so often and so

strongly talked about it," he reported to Governor Vaudreuil, "that

they Q\bnakisJ agreed with me...."

Evidently Captain Moody heard of

Rale's opposition, for the hostages were not mentioned at the formal
conference.

This conference at Portsmouth, held in July, 1713, faltered

from the start.

Governor Dudley was widely respected for his ability

to confer successfully with the Indians.

"No man,

it was said, was

fit to manage Indians unless he had eaten a bushel of salt; and 'Coll.

Dudley had eat more as two,1 wrote one of his enthusiastic admirers."

3

Dudley began on the wrong foot, nonetheless, by insisting that the

Indians meet him at Portsmouth,

rather than at Casco Bay as they had

u 4
requested.

The resulting treaty emphasized the vagueness of the Treaty of
Utrecht, as well as the problems of the English and the French with

’Letter from Gov. Joseph Dudley to Capt. Samuel Moody, Jan.

17,

1712/13,

Ibid., pp. 317-19.

^Lettre de R. P. Rasle A Monsieur le Gouverneur General, Sept.
9,

1713, Collection de Manuscripts,

11, p. 562.

^Everett Kimball, The Public Life of Joseph Dudley, A Study of

the Colonial Policy of the Stuarts in New England,
Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), p. 129.
^'Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts,

1660-1715 (New York:

II, p. 150.

39

the Abnakis.

Fundamental to Dudley's position was his assertion that

the savages were subjects of Queen Anne.'

The Abnakis were told that

the King of France had surrendered all their lands to Great Britain.
This was incomprehensible and they remarked that the "French never said
anything to us about it and wee wonder how they would give it away

without asking us, God having at first placed us there...."

2

The Abnakis' dismay did not impede the final settlement.

By

the treaty, Massachusetts was confirmed in all her "rights of land and
former settlements" in the eastern parts of the provinces of

Massachusetts-Bay and New Hampshire.

The Abnakis agreed that the

English might settle the Maine lands without "molestation or claim by
us or by any other Indians...."^

They were told, moreover, that as

British subjects they could have no relations with the French.
The Treaty of Portsmouth was no more enlightened than previous
Indian treaties.

It did not represent a mutual understanding between

the English and the Indians.
treaties, so many words.

To an Abnaki

it was, like all other

It was a negative document because it bound

them to refrain from action against the English settlements.

Though

Palfrey called it another of the Abnakis' "untrustworthy pacifications"

'Frederic Kidder, "The Abnaki

Indians and Their Treaties of

1713 and 1717," Me. His. Soc., Col lections,
Society, 1859), VI, p. 251.

1st ser.,

(Portland:

The

2

Journal of Commissioners at Portsmouth, July 13, 1713, Baxter,
Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 4-9.
Rale notes the Abnakis declared:
'"As for me I have my own land, that the Great Spirit has given me on
which to live; as long as there shall be a child of my Tribe, he will
fight to retain it.'" Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites,
Jesuit Relations, LXVI I, pp. 209.
^Kidder, "The Abnaki

Indians and Their Treaties of 1713 and

1717," p. 251; Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p. 79.
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it is clear that only the English benefited from its terms.

The

treaty's basic premise, that the Abnakis were British subjects, was

highly questionable.

Massachusetts had maintained that pretension

throughout the previous war but Parkman truthfully said that "when they
called themselves subjects of Queen Anne,

did not know what the words meant."

it is safe to say that they

John Gilmary Shea contended that

"no intelligent man will believe they understood" the treaty.

Rale

himself remarked that "there is not one savage Tribe that will patiently

endure to be regarded as under subjection to any Power whatsoever...."’
The treaty fully aroused French interest in the affairs of the
Abnakis.

Governor Vaudreuil had returned to Quebec with the intention

of strengthening the new French stronghold in the Gulf of the St.
Lawrence.

The Ministry wished to move all the mainland Indians to Cape

Breton Island.

But Vaudreuil's plans were shattered by the Jesuits.

Father LaChasse, missionary on the Penobscot,
his disdain for the project.

immediately expressed

Such a suggestion showed, he said, that

the authorities "must be ignorant of the extreme attachment that these
Indians bear their country...."

He suggested it would be best to

apply themselves to the settlement of the boundaries of the two

’john Gorham Palfrey, A Compendious History of New England
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), III, p. 265; Parkman,
Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 221; Sebastien Rale to Nephew, Oct.
15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 101-103; Charlevoix,
History and General Description of New France, V, fn. 2, p. 267.

2

Father Joseph Pierre de la Chasse came to New France in 1700.
Born in France in May, 1670, he followed the usual Jesuit practice of
study, profession of vows, and teaching.
Soon after his arrival he
was assigned to the Penobscot until 1718 when he became superior of
the Canadian missions.
He held that post until 1726.
He died at
Quebec on Sept. 27, 1749.
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, p. 346.
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nations. ’
It is important that the suggestion to maintain the Abnakis on

their land came from the Jesuits.

When the English told the Indians

that the French had ceded their land, the Abnakis demanded of the
missionaries:

country?"

"By what right did the King of France dispose of their

Had the Jesuits not appeased them, their alliance with the

French might have ended immediately.

But Rale and LaChasse told them

that the English had been deceived by "an ambiguous expression Qin the
Treaty^] and that their country was not included in that which had been

ceded to the English."

Father Rale's mission, unlike Father LaChasse's,

was not within Vaudreuil's definition of the border as the St. Georges

river.

The geographic location partially explains Rale's outspoken

letters in the later years.

Though LaChasse was relatively unpressured

by the English, he joined with Rale to convince the French authorities,
both Canadian and European, of the necessity of supporting the Abnaki

claim to the Kennebec.
Father LaChasse pointed out that the Kennebec was important as

a route to Quebec, and suggested that New France would be jeopardized

if Massachusetts possessed it.

By coupling his suggestion for the

immediate settlement of the boundary with the interests of New France,

he was assured of getting the Ministry's attention.
time.

In November,

Vaudreuil

lost no

1713, he wrote the Ministry that he had invited the

Indians to come to Quebec in the hope of offsetting the impression made

’Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia,
New York Colonial Documents,
2|bid., p. 879.

IX, pp. 879-80.

1718, O'Callaghan,
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by the English at Portsmouth.’
The Treaty of Portsmouth represented Massachusetts* policy only

until

it was refined and extended in 1714.

Though the English knew

of the tenuousness of their position on the Kennebec, they failed to

appreciate the necessity of altering their attitude towards the Indians.
They underestimated Rale's determination to keep the Indians Catholic.

If Massachusetts had known how much the French feared that the Abnakis

would be attracted by the superior and cheaper British goods, she might
have adapted to the circumstances.

As it was, she missed the point.

Governor Dudley was an exception.

He recognized the need for a

strong trade policy and suggested measures to regulate it.

rigid control, and though the General

Court grumbled,

Governor temporarily to license traders.

it empowered the

This the Council

did in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth.

He wanted

immediately

The traders were

required to present their records of costs and profits to the Governor.

They were, said the Council, "to dispose of their goods so as to under-

sei 1 the French."

4-

'vaudreuil au Ministre, Nov.

14,

1713, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol.

34, p. 49.
z|t was reported in the Council Chamber on Jan. 1, 171^, that
the Indians were becoming restless.
It was suggested that measures
be taken to insure that the Indians did not join with those of Canada
"to comitt fresh hostilities & depredations upon Her Majesty's
subjects" Massachusett's Council Records, Jan. 1, 1713/14, W. S.
Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the United States: A Microfilm
Comp i1 at i on.
^M. Begon au Ministre, Sept. 25,

1715, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol.

34, p. 49.

^The Council attempted to enforce these regulations.

In March,

1714, one Richard Carr was arrested for loading his boat for the
Penobscot trade. Mass. Council, March 22, 1714.

This was a judicious policy.

It guaranteed the good will of the

Indians, who wished some regulation of the trade.’

It also protected

British interests, for it represented the only effective means of
estranging the Abnakis from the French alliance.

it was

However,

ultimately to fail.
When Dudley attempted to renew the policy in May,

severe opposition from the House.

1714, he met

Though he pleaded that the trade

would be lost to the French, the “House voted to admit the Indians to

trade with anyone or in any part of the province."

The trading in

terests in the House were opposed to the Governor's power to control
it.

By usurping centralized control the House made it difficult,

if

not impossible, to control the liquor traffic and it was not long

before the traders were again plying the Abnakis with rum.
The new policy also ignored the Abnakis' wishes.

1714, five Indians appeared before the Council

request was for regular trading houses.

in Boston.

2

In January,
Their first

They also complained of high

and irregular prices, as well as the haughtiness of the traders.

Dudley

could not respond adequately; his hands were tied until the General
Court met in February.

Meanwhile, he told the sachems that they were

to ignore orders from the French Governor.

Dudley also said that he

expected them to convince the Abnakis settled at the Jesuit missions in

Canada to return to "their Own places upon English grounds....

’At a Meeting with the Delegates of the Eastern Indians, July

26, 1714, Mass. Arch.:

29, p. 42; p. 46.

2

On the liquor traffic see:
Gov. Nicholson to Gov. Dudley,
Dec. 25, 1714, Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, p. 262; Kimball, The Public
Life of Joseph Dudley, pp. 130-31.

^A Conference was held with Five of the Eastern Indians, Jan.
11-13,

1713/14, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 51-57.
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But there was little chance that the Indians would obey the governor

once they realized that trade concessions would be denied them.
Thus, the recalcitrant House had stripped the province of the one

ground upon which it could have been truly effective.
Sebastien Rale had some very definite ideas on Massachusetts'
trade policy.

At the end of the year he wrote a blistering letter to

the English authorities.

He deplored the "Disorders and Outrages

committed among the Eastern Indians by interloping Traders selling
them ^RumJ and other Strong Liquors...."’

Scotia heatedly rejected Rale's testimony:

Governor Nicholson of Nova
"I know no business a

French Jesuit has with English subjects," he said.

was concerned:

But Massachusetts

her authority was rapidly slipping away.

Evidently

Rale was able to name the culprits for the Council set about investiga-

ting the matter.

2

The truth was clear enough.

The petty politicians

in the House had sabotaged any hope for a planned, effective trading
policy.

Trade policy was only one part of English bungling.

Although

they stood at least an outside chance of enforcing their will

in

economic matters, when they began talking about religion they were on
very dubious ground.

The Indians had been having difficulty getting workers to

rebuild their chapel which had been destroyed by the English in 1705.
Father Rale needed carpenters, and he wanted his chapel, so he

’Mass. Council, December 27,

171^.

^Governor Nicholson to Governor Dudley, December 25, 171^,

Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, pp. 262-63; Kimball, The Public Life of
Joseph Dudley, p. 132.
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explained to Vaudreuil that he had decided to let the Indians try
to get the workingmen from the English.’

The Kennebec sachem, Bomazeen

asked Dudley for help, remarking that the Indians were willing to pay
for the service.

proposal.

He was told that the governor would consider the

2

But the matter did not rest there.
Dudley said he would build the chapel

Rale later reported that

if the Abnakis would accept a

Protestant minister, and he ordered the sachem to “send back to Quebec
the French minister who is in your village."

preferred him to an Englishman.^

Rale said the Indians

His version of the entire exchange,

however, must be viewed with caution.

The minutes of the conference

make no mention of any comment by the governor on the proposed Church.
Rale's story has caused a minor controversy nonetheless.
torians,

Some his

like Connally, have reported that Vaudreuil "sent workmen to

rebuild" the chapel.

Others deny the French governor's intervention

after Dudley's supposed refusal and correctly point out that English

workingmen constructed the church, though with French funds.’4’

If this particular event is in question, others are not.

During*9

’Lettre du R. P. Rasle A Monsieur Le Gouverneur General, Sept.
9,

1713, Collection de Manuscripts,

II, p. 564.

2A Conference was held with Five of the Eastern Indians, Jan.
13,

1713/14, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 57.

^Rale to Brother, Oct.

12,

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

LXVII, pp. 209-11.

^Rev. Arthur T. Connolly, Fr. Sebastien Rasle, Catholic
Historical Society, Publication
5 (Boston: The Society, 1906),
p. 19; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 97; Parkman,
Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 218.

4-7

the summer of 1714, Governor Dudley held a formal conference with the
Indians at Portsmouth.

behavior.

He expressed his pleasure at the Indians' good

While speaking of the responsibilities of the Christian

faith, Dudley felt moved to offer ministers to the Indians to instruct
His real motive became apparent when

them in the Protestant religion.'

he complained that the Jesuits attempted to keep the Abnakis hostile

to the Engl i sh. 2
The Jesuits would have agreed with Dudley's accusation.

They

realized that the success of their work depended upon keeping the
Abnakis allied with the French.

Father LaChasse had remarked to

Governor Vaudreuil that among the savages the work of God needed the
cooperation of man, and that the temporal

interest served as the basis

for the savages' faith.It is for this reason that Sebastien Rale

took so readily to political tools.

He wrote his brother that "the

only band which had united the [^Abnakis} to us so closely is their firm

attachment to the catholic Faith."^
Governor Vaudreuil worked on more earthly premises.

wrote his annual
that,

When he

report in September, 1714, he assured the minister

in his opinion, war with England was more favorable to France

than peace.

He believed,

in fact, that the Abnakis were wavering in

'Att a Meeting with the delegates of the Eastern Indians on
Tuesday the 27th July 1714, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 75.

2|bid., p. 79.
^Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Sept.
Collection de Manuscripts,

4

16,

1714,

III, p. 5.

Rale to Brother, Oct.
LXVII, p. 197.

12,

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
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the i r aliiance.’
The French fear that the Abnakis would go permanently into the

English camp was misplaced.

shared by the Indians.

Rale's outrage over the rum trade was

By 1715 they realized that Governor Dudley

would not fulfill the promises he had made at Portsmouth.
But it was not only trade policy and insinuations against Rale
that disturbed the frontier.

By 1715, the Bay Colony had begun to

resettle the lower Kennebec river.

At the end of May the General Court

authorized the settlement of two towns, Brunswick and Topsham, one on
each side of the Androscoggin river.
purchase, as the lands were called,

The settlement of the Pejebscot

is a good example of how Indian

policy took a poor second to the wishes of a special

On November 5,

interest group.

171^, the Governor's Council appointed a committee for

the "regular prosecution of new Settlements."

On the same day, a

group of seven men purchased the Kennebec lands from the executor

of the estate of Richard Wharton.3
The seven Proprietors immediately pressed to have their title

validated, for the Wharton land claim was based on old seventeenth

century land patents.

In February,

1715, they addressed the Land

’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Sept. 16,

1714,

Collection de Manuscripts, 111, p. 5.
Intendant Begon also feared the
possibility of an Abnaki-English alliance.
M. Begon au Ministre,
Sept. 25, 1715, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 35, pp. 208-11.
2

The Generali Courts Confirmation of our Purchase, May 25, 1715,
Pejebscot Records, I, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the
United States...., p. 31.

^Robert Earle Moody, "The Maine Frontier,

1607-1763," (Ph.D

dissertation, Yale University, 1933), p. 357; cf. also George A.
Wheeler and Henry W. Wheeler, History of Brunswick, Topsham, and
Harpswell Maine (Boston: A1fred Mudge & Son, I878), pp. 21-30.
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Committee and asked that their land be settled “as may make a Strong
Frontier to the Eastern Parts....11’

The Proprietors did not fear an

adverse decision because three of their members, Oliver Noyes, John

Winthrop and Stephen Minot, sat on the Land Committee.

Further to

persuade the Committee, the Proprietors went to the considerable expense

of taking the members on a tour of the lower Kennebec lands.

Committee reported in the Proprietors1 favor.

The

9

The General Court and the Proprietors realized that the new
settlements would provoke the Indians.

The Proprietors had promised

to build four or five towns, each with fifty or more families, within

seven years, “if Peace continue with the Indians....11
Nicholson commented:

3

Colonel

“If that affair is not very cautiously managed,

it may make ye Eastern Indians jealous....11’*2
4

Then too, the Proprietors

wisely noted that the new towns would “dislodge the Indians from their
Principal Fishery, keep them from Chief carrying Places & be possibly a

Means of removing them further from us,

if another war should happen.

A few English colonials recognized that war, under the circumstances,

was inevitable.

The Proprietors' plan said nothing about the sentiments

of the Abnakis.

“I essay'd," said Supreme Court Justice Samuel Sewall,

’proprietors Proposals to the Committee appointed by the General
Court, Feb.

2

18,

1714/15, Pejebscot Records,

I, p. 36.

Pejebscot account N? 2, Pejebscot Records,

I, p. 31.

^Proprietors Proposals to the Committee appointed by the
General Court, Feb. 18, 1714/15, Pejebscot Records, I, p. 36.
’’’Col. Nicholson to Mr. Popple, Aug. 13,

1715, Cal. of St. Pap.,

XXVIII, p. 261.

^By order & in behalf of the Comittee, May 27,

Records,

I, pp. 38-39.

1715, Pejebscot
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"to prevent Indians and Negroes being Rated with Horses and Hogs; but
could not prevail.11'
It is not surprising, then, that the Council soon took measures
to put the new townships into a state of defense "upon consideration

of the danger of an eruption of the Indians...."

The Proprietors

petitioned in July, asking the House to appropriate

500 and the service

of fifteen men to repair the old stone fort at Brunswick.

They promised

to bear any expense in excess of that amount and said they hoped to

finish the reconstruction by winter, "if not obstructed by the

Indians."

The House agreed and the work went ahead.

Arrowsic and Parker's Islands were also being resettled; the

two were constituted the municipality of Georgetown in 1716.

"It was

a frontier," Williamson said, "more remote than any other place

attempted to be resettled, and might be a barrier in the emergency of
war;—therefore an object of the government's special favor.In
fact, the Council thought the area so vital that it agreed to pay
for the garrisons at Fort George at Brunswick and Fort Menaskoux at*2
4

'Samuel Sewall, "Diary", Mass. His. Soc., Col lections, 5th

ser.

(Boston;

The Society,

1882), VII, p. 87.

2

Mass. Council, June 28, 1715.
Brunswick and Topsham were con
stituted townships on June 7, 1715. W. C. Ford, ed., Journals of the
House of Representatives of Massachusetts (Boston: Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1919), I, p. 19.

o
^Petition to the House of Representatives, July 28, 1715,
Pejebscot Records, I, pp. 48-49; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, I,
July 28, 1715, pp. 62-63; Mass. Council, Sept. 16, 1715, Dec. 5, 1715,
Dec. 24, 1715.

4
William Durkee Williamson, The History of the State of Maine
(Hallowe 11:
Glazier, Master & Co., 1832), II, p. 89.
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Arrows i c. ’

The Abnakis reaction to the settlements was soon evident.

Early in 1716 there were rumors that the Indians were arming against

the English.

The Council

immediately ordered Colonel Partridge to put

the frontiers into a state of defense.

A scouting party was sent out

"under pretence of hunting" to investigate the Indians' movements.
At the same time the Kennebec area was reinforced with men and

supplies.

2

It was reported in May that the savages were "assembling

in great numbers...."^

As if to confirm suspicions, an Indian, John

Hegin by name, told Captain Harmon at the Kennebec river that "it

would not be sage for him to tarry there long."24'
In the midst of this confusion, Bomazeen and Bamegiscog of

Norridgewock, arrived in Boston.

Lieutenant-Governor Vaughan did his

best to find out their business but all he discovered was what they

too wondered what was behind the persistent rumors of war.^

^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal,

I, June 13,

1716, p. 98;

Convers Francis, "Life of Sebastien Rale," in the Library of American
B i ography, Jared Sparks, ed. (Boston:
Charles C. Little and James
Brown, 1848), VII, 2nd ser., p. 245; Mass. Council, Feb. 27, 1715/16;
Henry E. Dunnack, Maine Forts (Augusta:
Charles E. Nash & Son, 1924),
p. 236.
^Mass. Council, March 10,

^Mass. Council, May 28,

1715/16;

1716.

I).

Indian Conference, June 6, 1716, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts,
XXI11, p. 81; Mass. Arch. 29: 53-54; For a biographical sketch on
Captain Johnson Harmon see:
Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, 1, p. 311^Ibid., pp. 80-82; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal,

I, p. 97;

The Lieutenant-Governor decided that the Indians were restless because
of "false Reports of a War likely to break out between Great Britain
and France." Mass. House Journal, I, p. 82.
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It was soon obvious what was happening.

With the onset of

English settlement, the Indians had split into two groups, one for and
one against the English.

Bomazeen understood what was happening but

he was notorious for his pro-English sentiments.

Father Rale wrote

directly to the Massachusetts government, and he minced no words.
He said the sachems were displeased with Bomazeen and Bamegiscog

because they had not told the governor what the Abnakis wanted.’
Bomazeen should have said that the Indians realized the English were
building forts and settlements to drive them from their lands, just

as the French governor had told them.

Rale continued, saying that the

Indians knew that no one could buy their land because they could not
sell

it.

They had to preserve it for future generations of Abnakis.

2

Thus, with bluster, Sebastien Rale attempted to halt English expansion.
In the Council's words, these were "very bold demands."

3

There was another letter to the government before the summer
was over.

It left the English with no doubt as to Rale's role in the
Rale asserted that the English deeds to the land were illegal.

matter.

The English received them, he said, by giving the Indians liquor.

He

said that he constantly reminded the Indians that since they had re
conquered the land three times,

’Mass. Council, July 10,

it made no difference what their

1716.

2Copy of Letter from Sabastian Ralle, 1716, Nathaniel Boulton
ed., New Hampshire Provincial Papers, Documents and Records relating
to the Province of New Hampshire, from the earliest period of its
settlement, 1623-1686 (Concord:
George E. Jenks, State Printer, 1874),
VIII, pp. 753-54.

^Mass. Council, July 10,
Journal,

I, August 1,

1716, p.

1716.
125.

cf. also Ford, ed., Mass. House
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ancestors had done.’
forgetting,

These were interesting arguments, but Rale was

in the heat of the moment, that the Indians had validated

all English titles by the Treaty of Portsmouth, though perhaps he wrote

the letters with that treaty in mind.
By 1716 the stage was set for the larger conflict.

All the

important issues had materialized, and all the participants,—the

English, the French, Rale and the Abnakis,--had taken stands.

Not

yet materialized, though still real, was the misunderstanding between
the English and the French, which would catch the Indians between them.

The French were as sure that the English were deliberately advancing
up the Kennebec valley to possess the lower shore of the St. Lawrence,

as the English were that the French were unjustly attempting to bar them

from their rightful possessions.
It was not English policy alone that determined Sebastien Rale’s

opposition to them.

He wrote his brother that the English knew of his

resistance to them during Queen Anne’s war.

"These Gentlemen," Rale

said, "were rightly persuaded that 1, by upholding my Savages in their
attachment to the catholic Faith, was drawing more and more closely

the bond which unites them to the French."

9

It is important to note that the Jesuits and Rale had not fully

determined their policy in regard to the English, for the period was

a transitional one.

In this sense, English actions were extremely

'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 68; Lord,

History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 11.
Parkman doubted the
validity of the English titles.
Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 214.
^Rale to his brother, Oct. 12,
LXVII, p. 205.

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
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The Jesuits were convinced that the English had nothing

significant.

to offer the Indians.

Rale said,

in fact that; the Bay Colony had

"employed all sorts of wiles and artifices to separate the Abnakis

LaChasse was more moderate in his statements than Rale

from me."’

but his mission was not directly threatened by English settlements.
Rale was not entirely fair in upbraiding Massachusetts for the liquor

traffic.

The Governor and Council were as anxious as he to stop the

practice and they took measures to do so, but the House had not agreed
and the policy had failed.

Rale was not convinced, however, by a mere

show of good intentions.
Sebastien Rale was not, strictly speaking, an agent for the

French political authorities.

As McFarlane noted, "Rale’s position

as a priest depended on keeping...Norridgewock free from English
settlement.

His political activities were a prerequisite to his

spiritual duties."

Because the French appreciated the importance

of barring the English they gave him their moral and financial support.
The Abnakis took a middle position.

They said the land was theirs

They refused to recognize any foreign sovereign though they

alone.

had no aversion to an alliance.

As long as they leaned towards the

French, Sebastien Rale supported their positions.

’Rale to his brother, Oct.

12,

1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

LXVII, p. 205.

2

R. 0. McFarlane, "Indian Relations in New England, 1620-1760:
a study of a regulated f ront ier," (unpub 1 .i shed Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University, 1933), p. 130.
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CHAPTER 1 I I

THE UNCERTAIN YEARS 1717--1718

During the years from 1712 to 1716 the situation on the

Kennebec became serious.

Faced with danger to their Eastern settle

ments, the English attempted to soothe the alarmed Kennebecs with

gifts and assurances of their peaceful
policy seemed to work.
tence of Sebastien Rale.

intentions.

For a time the

Massachusetts misjudged, however, the persis-

His continued outrage at English attempts to

ally themselves with his Indians effectively nullified their seeming

success.

Since 1715 Rale's growing purpose was to halt all English expansion on the Kennebec.

The rum trade, Massachusetts' attempts to

undermine his authority, and above all, the new settlements aroused
his opposition.

Events in 1717 and 1718 underlined the necessity of

his opposition to Massachusetts.

Another treaty, at Arrowsic in 1717,

warned him that the English would not compromise on their land claims.
A Protestant minister on the Kennebec drove him to new, frenzied efforts

against them.

By 1718 it seemed as if his policy would be successful.

The French court, alerted by Rale's tireless efforts, proposed the
immediate settlement of the boundary to ease frontier tensions.

Underlying the story of these years is an issue which has con

fused the evaluation of Rale's influence.

The settlers on the Kennebec

met many Indians who professed to be their friends and, as a result,

James Phinney Baxter concluded that Rale was responsible for the
Abnakis' arrogance.

He and Eckstorm made no distinction, however,
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between the Kennebecs and the other Abnaki villages.'

in the years 1717 to 1718, united in

accounts, the Kennebecs were,

opposition to the settlers.

Despite such

A few notable exceptions, coupled with the

indifference of the Penobscot Abnakis, has obscured the Kennebec's

anger.
Central to the antagonism was the manner in which the English

and the French viewed the Abnakis.

French-Abnaki

relations had, since

1689, represented a vital cornerstone of French Imperial policy.

They

were the only tribe in close proximity to the English colonies on

whom the French could depend.

were,

To the administrators of New France they

if not subjects, then trusty allies.

wishes and disposition were closely heeded.

As such, their conduct,

The Jesuits were the

natural agents of this expedient care.
The Society of Jesus had much influence in the determination
of French policy.

This was especially true of Sebastien Rale.

Annual

reports to the Ministry on the Abnakis were always based on his
recommendations.

The administrators went further:

they usually

included copies of his letters in their annual dispatches.

The

Ministry was in turn influenced by his reports as they were by those

of Fathers LaChasse and Aubry.

'a

When Father LaChasse became Superior

typical statement by Baxter illustrates the point.
"Though
fickle and unreliable, the savages dreaded war with the English whose
power they realized; but Rale was advised by Vaudreuil to urge them
to prevent English settlement." Pioneers of New France in New England,
p. 92.
"The more desperately the priests worked for France," Eckstorm
vaguely referred to Rale and the Norridgewocks, "the more firmly did
their own Indians oppose them." Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Attack on
Norridgewock, 1724," New England Quarterly, VII (Sept., 1934), p. 547.
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of the Jesuits in 1718.

Rale's opinions were reinforced by an in

fl uential voice.’
Massachusetts, on the other hand, viewed the Abnakis as a
problem which warranted a local solution.

Thus, Massachusetts'

reports

to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations were largely limited to

two subjects.

First, all grants of land belonged in the royal domain.

As such, Massachusetts had to convince the Commissioners that the

Treaty of Utrecht had ceded all the French territory below the

St. Lawrence to the British crown.

It had, then, to argue that the

Abnakis were true subjects of the Crown, and that the petitioners for

land from Massachusetts had valid deeds from the Indians.

Secondly,

Massachusetts wished the British government to halt what they saw as
French interference in colonial matters.

They realized that the French

influence among the Abnakis could be forestalled only by Great Britain.
By 1716 the dissatisfaction of the Indians with the Treaty of

Portsmouth was apparent.

Samuel Shute replaced Joseph Dudley as

Governor of Massachusetts in the tense atmosphere of an impending
Indian war.

2

The serious situation on the Kennebec impressed him,

and he soon called a conference with the Abnakis.^

The ensuing meeting

was a dramatic encounter between the English and the Abnakis.

Governor

Shute was not nearly as sympathetic to them as Joseph Dudley had been,

and the tragedy of the conference rests squarely on his shoulders.
his view,

In

Indians were decidedly inferior to the English, and neither

’Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I , p. 346.
governor Shute arrived at Boston on Oct. 4,
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 106.

1716.

Lord,

3Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 68.
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capable of thought or of significant sentiment.

The conference was,

simply, a solution to Massachusetts* alarm at the threat of an Indian

war.’

Shute would overawe the Abnakis with the superior might of the

Engli sh.

The Governor and his attendents waited at Georgetown in a large

tent for the Indians to arrive.

They came down the Kennebec river

with the British flag the governor had sent them in the lead canoe.
After the interpreters John Gyles and Samuel Jordan were sworn in by
Judge Samuel Sewall, the governor addressed the assembled sachems.

He told them that they were fellow subjects of King George.

They

should avoid all contact with the French, he said, and if they did
so they would find "themselves safest under the Government of Great

Britain."
He directed the interpreters to tell the Abnakis that the Bible

was the only guide for their "Faith, and Worship, and Life."

The

English were anxious, he said, to have the Indians of the same religion
as themselves.

They had therefore agreed to support a Protestant

missionary for them.

He then introduced the Reverend Joseph Baxter,

’The Kennebec settlers were still uneasy about the Indians.
Edward Hutchinson and John Watts petitioned the House to continue the
services of the soldiers on Arrowsick Island for another year.
Ford,
ed., Mass. House Journal, I, June 18, 1717, p. 207.
2

Except as otherwise noted, the account of the conference is
taken from a contemporary pamphlet entitled "Georgetown on Arrowsick
Island Aug. 9th, 1717." It is printed in "Indian Treaties," Me. His.
Soc., Col lections, 1st ser., (Portland: The Society, 1853), III, PP361-75.
Convers Francis called it the "original and most valuable
authority concerning this transaction...." "Life of Sebastien Rale,"
p. 24-5.
It was originally printed by order of the House of
Representatives. Mass. House Journal, I, Nov. 18, 1717, P. 251.
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warning them to accept him "with all affection and respect."

Shute explained that the recent English settlements had been
undertaken for the Indians' benefit.

He told them they would profit

by having the "Trade brought so near them, besides the advantage of
the Neighbourhood and Conversation of the English...."

Closing his

remarks with an assurance that he was always at their disposal, he
invited the Indians' comments.

Wiwurna, the appointed Abnaki orator, rose and expressed great
pleasure in attending the governor, saying the Abnakis hoped "the
Angels in Heaven rejoyce with us."

until the following day.

But he asked to defer his answer

This had been expected and Shute gave the

Indians an ox on which to feast.

The delegates reassembled the next morning, August 10.

A hot

exchange almost immediately ensued, for Governor Shute disregarded
time-honored form and continually interrupted Wiwurna.

Each time the

orator begged "leave to go on."

"We have had the same Discourse from other Governors, as from

your Excellency," Wiwurna started, "and we have said the same to them;
Other Governours have said to us that we are under no other Government

but our own."
that?"

Samuel Shute awoke with a start and demanded:

Wiwurna explained he had to be frank.

"How is

"Your Excellency," he

began again, "was pleased to say that we must be obedient to KING
GEORGE, which we shall

if we like the Offers made us."

By this time

the governor had gotten the Abnakis1 point and was steaming:

"They

must be Obedient to KING GEORGE," he retorted.

And so it went, on and on.

As the governor continued to

interrupt Wiwurna became more defensive.

"All people have a love for
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their Ministers,” the Abnaki explained, "and it would be strange if we
should not love them that come from GOD.

And as to the Bibles your

Excellency mentioned, We Desire to be Excused on that Point, God has

given us Teaching Already, and if we should go from that we should
displease GOD.”

The Governor had no comment on this but again inter

rupted Wiwurna to bring him to the point—the land.

The Abnaki

backed off, temporarily delaying his answer.

The exchange that afternoon was even more vital than the
The land question was a delicate one with the Abnakis.

morning's.

Fully realizing that they must accept the status quo, they attempted
to place a limit on further expansion.

"We are willing," Wiwurna

said, "to cut off our Lands as far as the Mills and Coasts to
Pemaquid."

Wiwurna limited Massachusetts expansion, therefore, to

south of Merrymeeting bay and west of the Pemaquid peninsula.

"Tell

them," Shute interjected, "we desire only what is our own, and that

we will have.

Masters of."

We will not wrong them, but what is our own we will be
Wiwurna pleaded that "It was said at Casco Treaty, that

no more Forts should be made."

Cloaking himself with ail the official

dignity he could muster, Samuel Shute again interrupted.

"Tell them

the Forts are not made for their hurt, and that I wonder they should

speak against them, when they are for the security of both, we being
all Subjects of King George."

Expressing his official position, the

governor noted that he expected "their positive Answer and Compliance

in this matter, that the English may be quiet in the possession of

the Lands" they had acquired.

By this time the Abnakis were incensed

with Shute's haughty manner and walked out "without taking leave and

left behind their English Colours."
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Sebastien Rale had accompanied the Indians to the conference.

That evening he sent a letter to the governor, telling Shute that

enquiries had been made on the cession of territory by the Treaty of
Utrecht.

The French king had replied, Rale said, that he had not

ceded the Abnakis1

land.

He had said, furthermore, that he was pre

pared to aid the savages if the English persisted in their encroach
Shute rejected the note outright as "not worthy of his regard."

ments.

The next morning the governor went aboard his ship and "acted
as if he were going away."

Shute had decided,

words, "not to buckle" to the Abnakis.’

in the Reverend Baxter's

Immediately a canoe appeared

with two Indians who begged the governor not to leave.

Shute told

them that he would confer with them again but only "if they quitted

their unreasonable Pretensions to the English Lands, and Complied with
what he said...."

The chieftains returned at six that evening, leaving Wiwurna

behind in evident disgrace.

The remaining chiefs completely repudiated

their spokesman and agreed to all the governor's demands.

On Monday,

August 12, the Indians signed a Treaty confirming all previous agree

ments and "they manifested a desire yt the English might peaceably

enjoy all their lands, and yt they might live in friendship with ye
English as long as the sun and moon endured...."

Their only positive

achievement was getting the governor to promise them supplies and a

good gunsmith.

’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter,

in possession of

Me. His. Soc., Portland, Me., p. 6.
2Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,

pp. 7-8.
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The General Court of Massachusetts was more than pleased with
the outcome of the conference.

Shute had asserted, they believed,

the "just Right and Title11 of the English to the Kennebec lands and
the House judged it "a hopeful Prospect of Quiet and Safety to£the
subjects of] His Majesty who are Resettling in those Parts."'

Shute

himself reported to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations that

the Indians had confirmed all their former treaties "and entred into
some new ons."

He concluded that the conference would guarantee "the

quiet and peace of these Provinces."

2

Despite Shute's self-congratulatory comments many historians

insist that the Abnakis were unjustly used.

Convers Francis thought

that Shute would have done his province better service by fixing the

boundary as the Indians had requested.

"The Indians showed themselves

so eager for peace" John Fiske commented, "that even the insults of

Governor Shute...fai1ed to produce an outbreak."

Sprague found Shute

"haughty in manner and not inclined to be conciliatory."

Herbert

Osgood, called the conference "a classic example" of typical New

England-Abnaki relations and said it showed "the inferiority of the

English to the French in the management of Indian relations...."-^
Opinion is not unanimously anti-Shute, however.

Several

historians have insisted that Rale's influence on the Abnakis had much
to do with the conference's ultimate failure.

They have accepted the

'Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Oct. 26, 1717,

I, p. 226.

2Gov. Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Nov. 9,

1717, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, p. 101.

^Convers Francis, "Life of Sebastien Rale," p. 253; Fiske, New
France and New England, p. 239; Sprague, Sebastien Rale, p. 60; Herbert
L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1924), III, pp. 168-69.
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Reverend Joseph Baxter's view that Rale's intervention by his
"scurrilous Letter" was unwarranted.

Buffington said that the letter

constituted clear evidence that Rale was already "instigating the
Indians to resist."

The most hostile case was drawn up by James Phinney

Baxter, who insisted the letter was "an artful method of influencing

the savages against the English, and in view of the articles ceding
Acadia to the English crown, was unfair in the extreme."

James Phinney

it should be noted, says nothing of the unsettled condition of

Baxter,

the boundary.’
Samuel Shute would have been amazed at the eventual outcome of

his conference.

It was to form the watershed for all subsequent con

flict with the Abnakis.

Shute did not overawe either the Abnakis or

Sebastien Rale; he did convince them, however, that communication with
him was impossible.

Shute had remained impervious to what were, for

them, highly reasonable suggestions.

And Rale now recognized that

there were tractable Indians who would do anything to appease the

English.

Most directly threatening were the new Puritan missionary

efforts.
The English had discussed the possibility of evangelizing the
Abnakis as early as 1715, but they had had difficulty in finding a
minister.

Samuel Moody, the Minister of York, Maine, attempted informal

contact, however.

He suggested to Bomazeen, the Norridgewock sachem,

that they exchange sons, one to 1eamAbnaki, the other English.
According to Samuel Sewall, "Bomazeen could not find it in his heart

’Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Joseph Baxter, Me. His.
Soc., p. 7; Arthur H. Buffington, "External Relations (1689-17^0)," in
Albert B. Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts (New York:
The States History Company, 1928), TT^ P« 87; Baxter, Pioneers of New

France in New England, p. 80.
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to agree with that Noble Offer.11’

When confronted with the success of Rale's mission, Massachusetts
was finally roused into action.*2* The people of the lower Kennebec had

attempted to attract a minister from beginning of their settlement,
but they did not succeed until August, 1716.

At that time, the Reverend

Hugh Adams settled at Georgetown and "’began to learn the language of

the Eastern Indians, with hopes to gain them over from the French
Popish Idolatry by our own True Protestant Gospel.'"3

But Adams

lasted only five weeks.’4
Massachusetts'

legislature was concerned about this consistent

failure and passed positive measures encouraging the ministry among

the Abnakis.|n November, 1716,

it voted "to provide some ordained

minister to go to Fort George, Brunswick to learn the language, to
visit the Indians, to work himself into their friendship, to promise
&

them a meeting house for the worship of God,

if they will attend it."

’Quoted in William Ke 11 away, The New England Company, 164-9-1776:
Missionary to the American Indians (London:
Longmans, 1961), p. 258.
2William Ke 11 away, The New England Company, p. 258.
Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston,

I, p.

105.

^Adams was paid a visit by Sebastien Rale who was troubled by

rheumatism.
"Mr. Adams hoped for the Norridgewock missionary's grati
tude and favor thereafter to the English." Evidently his hopes were
sorely shattered.
Rev. Henry 0. Thayer, "Ministry on the Kennebec.
Period of the Indian Wars," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect i ons, 2nd ser.
(Portland: The Society, 1899), X, p. 265.
^Massachusetts had two reasons to educate the Indians.

First,

it was the "Intention of our Ancestors," and secondly, it was "the
surest way to fix them in our Interest." Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal
Nov. 15, 1716, I, p. 140.
&|bid., Nov. 21,

1716,

I, p. 14-9.

65

It also provided the hoped for minister with a generous salary, and

an assistant.
The legislature unsuccessfully sought a willing minister for some

time.

Finally,

in July, 1717, the Reverend Joseph Baxter received a

years leave of absence from his Medfield, Massachusetts parish and
accepted the call.'

As might be expected, Rale had little charity for rivals and
he scoffed at Baxter’s efforts.

The Jesuit reported that Baxter

"went to see the children, he flattered them, he made them little

presents, he urged them to come to see him;

in short, he worked for

two months with much useless activity, without being able to win a
single child."

Baxter, however, does not mention any such activity

in his journal.

Likewise, English historians largely ignore Rale's

accusation, though French-Canadians generally accept it.
reason for this.

There is a

The French-Canadians wrote religious history and

they were convinced of the correctness of Rale's position.

to some question, nonetheless.

It is open

Rale gives the impression that the*2
3

'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 71-72.
2Rale to Nephew, Oct.

15,

1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

LXVII, p. 97.
3

One exception among the English historians is Lord, H i story
of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 114, but then, that volume is
religious history.
Eckstorm contended that Shea cleared Baxter of the
charge but Shea only noted that Baxter's journal "is silent in regard
to the children." Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock, 1724," fn.
10, p. 547; Charlevoix, History of New France, V, p. 268; cf. also
Goyau, Le. P. Sebastien Racle," p. 177 J N.-E. Dionne, Le Pere Sebastien
Rasies.
Jesuit Missionaire chez les Ab^naquis/Transactions of the
Royal Society, 2nd ser., IX (1903), pp. 117-34; Emile LauvriSre, Les
j£suites en Acadie,11 Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Frangaises,
XVIII (2e Trimestre, 1925), p. 206.
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minister was obsessed with the project even though Baxter spoke with the

Indians only intermittently.

On several occasions he preached to them

but there were never more than four or five present.

Baxter never left

the settlements, though Rale implied that he did, and could not have met
many children.

It was one of his duties, however, to instruct the

Indians and special sums were set aside for gifts for the "Indian
Children, to encourage them to learn...."’

While Rale clearly exag

gerated Baxter's activity, there was some basis for his assertion.

Though Baxter angered Rale in attacking Catholic doctrine by
telling the Indians of the necessity "of confessing our sins to God

& not to men" the Indians seemed "well pleased" with his words.

It

is debatable, nevertheless, how much of Baxter's instructions they

retained.

It hardly seems possible that they understood the nuances

of predestination and sanctification, and certainly Baxter's arguments
against using guns on the Sabbath were not designed to appeal to the
Abnaki mentali ty.

o

In October some Indians at Fort George petitioned Governor Shute

to build a chapel "for the English and us to meet in one Sabath days.'M
They also asked that Baxter, who had been traveling between settle
ments, remain at Brunswick where there was an interpreter.

Baxter

wrote that these Indians were from the Androscoggin river, and not
from Norridgewock.21

And yet Parkman would argue that the incident

’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 21, 1716,

I, p.

149.

^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,

pp.

10-11.
^To the Great Gouarnar at Boston, Oct. 3,

1717, Mass. Arch. 31:

p. 94; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXII I, pp. 82-83.

^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,

p. 14.
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indicates Rale was becoming less popular.’
Fannie Hardy Eckstorm was also surprised that Rale "was dis
liked by many of his own Indians."

She insisted that "the more

desperately the priests worked for France, the more firmly did their

.
2
own Indians oppose them."

While she correctly emphasized the internal

conflict among the Abnakis as a largely ignored fact, her conclusions

must be considerably altered.

A mis-dated document has led her to

believe that the Kennebecs were seriously opposed to Rale as early as
1718, and the identification of the pro-English Indians is more complex
than she supposed.3

Eckstorm does not make the basic distinction

between Norridgewock and the other Abnaki villages.

The evidence

seems to indicate that it was the Penobscot and

who were more seriously pro-English.

Though it cannot be denied that

there were pro-English Indians at Norridgewock,

1717-18 is
The issue which divided the Abnaki s came to the fore at the

Arrowsic conference.

possibility of war.
issue.

Even the anti-Engl is,h savages feared the

Seeing no chance for compromise, they ski rted the

"Without talking at this time about lines and limits, we de-

clare ourselves willing," the Abnakis

Engli sh should

settle and occupy, where their fathers did; though we very much dislike

Iparkman believed that the Indians were from Norridgewock, HalfCentury of Conflict, I, p. 229.

2Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 547.
3The document Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, in
O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 878—81, is misdated.
The same document is found under the title Memoire sur les Limites de
l'Acadie, envoye de Quebec a Mgr le Due d'Orleans, Regent, par le Pere
Charlevoix Jesuite, Oct. 19, 1720, Arch Col, C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 76-85.
It is also correctly dated in the Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 4954.
Charlevoix did not arrive in New France until September, 1720.
William Kingsford, The History of Canada (Toronto:
Rowsell & Hutchinson,
1888), II, fn., p. 174.
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their forts."’

The Abnakis had not repudiated their stated claims or

Wiwurna's contention that the English might not settle on Merrymeeting

Bay.

They merely deferred comment until another opportunity.
Thus it was English expansion which divided the Abnakis at the

Arrowsic Conference.

Father Rale and the English obviously saw the

land issue differently.

Rale led the Abnakis to believe that they

could rely on French aid to maintain their title to the Maine lands.
Grants from the French king for their support and the construction of

their chapel reinforced the impression.

Father Rale had even threat

ened Governor Shute with the inevitability of French aid at the
Arrowsic conference.

unwelcome.

And there is no doubt that the English were

Even the Penobscots and the St. John Indians had rebuffed

English agents when they suggested that they acknowledge King George.
At the same time, they made it clear that English settlements would not

be tolerated.

Such emissaries never visited the Norridgewock mission.

But the Kennebec made themselves equally clear at Arrowsic.

Their

protests were effectively gagged, however, by Governor Shute.
Soon the English were building beyond Pemaquid point, the

Indians' declared eastern boundary.

St. Georges Fort was constructed

near the site of present-day Thomaston in 1719-20.

Another fort was

’Quoted by William Williamson, History of the State of Maine,
H, P. 97.

^Memoire du Roi aux Sieurs de Vaudreuil et Begon, June 15,

and Same to Same, July 15,
18; 28.

1718, Collection de Manuscripts,

1716,

III, pp.

^M. Begon au Ministre, Sept. 25, 1715, Arch. Col., c 11 A, vol.
35, pp. 209-11", P. Camille de Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la Nouvel le
France au XVI Ile Siecle (Paris: Alphonse Pi card et s i1s, 1906), H

pp. 452-55; Council of Trade and Plantations to Mr. Secretary Stanhope,
June 30, 1715, Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, p. 214.
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built at Richmond, opposite Swan Island, on the western bank of the

The Island itself was being settled, as was the eastern

Kennebec.'

shore, where "several hundred families" erected homesteads "in various

locations."

2

Settlers at Cork, on the eastern shore, were Scotch-Irish

"members of a company of 1500 procured by Captain Robert Temple and
Edward Hutchinson."^

It is little wonder that the Kennebecs were

alarmed, and Rale warned them that the English would soon be at
Norridgewock itself.The Indians of the Penobscot and the St. John

were not similiarly outraged simply because they were not in contact
wi th the Engli sh.

On the other side of the action, the Reverend Joseph Baxter had

no idea that the Kennebecs differed in opinion from the other Indians
he met.

When the Indians bitterly condemned Rale, Baxter was misled

into believing that Rale was solely responsible for their agitation.
The mistake is understandable for it was mainly the pro-English
Indians who visited him.

One incident is especially misleading and illustrates how widely

the Indians were divided.

After two Englishmen had killed an Indian

of Father Lauverjat's mission, the Penobscots resolved to inform the

English of their peaceful

intentions, preferring to call the incident

'Williamson, History of the State of Maine,

II, p. 97.

^William Willis, "Scotch-Irish Immigrants to Maine..." Me. His.
Soc., Col lections, 1st ser. (Portland, The Society, 1859), VI, P. 15.

^Moody, "The Maine Frontier," p. 362.

^'Rapport de Monsieur Begon, Nov. 8,

1718, Arch. Col., C 11 A,

vol. 39, pp. 144-4-7; Collection de Manuscripts,

III, p. 33.
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"an accident."

Lauverjat advised them to wait until they learned

Shute's reaction, but they insisted that he write the Governor
immediately.

Vaudreuil

later found it necessary to criticize the

Jesuit for doing so, but the priest explained that if he had refused

the Indians would have had the letter written by Joseph Baxter.’
The Penobscots had not easily adopted this solution.

December,

In

1717, they held a tribal conference at Pemaquid point to

discuss the issue.

The young men were all for war, but they were

stopped by cooler heads who warned them:

"If you do so, you will do ye

Devils work & the Devil will take you."2

Notably, the young, hot

blooded men opposed the English and "Les Anciens," as Vaudreuil called

them, were willing to submit.

at this time of a new war.

Thomas Hutchinson said they "were afraid

The old men were loath to quit their

vi1lages...where they lived at ease...."^

It is clear that Vaudreuil

was more concerned with the inconstancy of the Penobscots than with
that of the Kennebecs.

But the young men did moderate the acquiesence

of "les anciens" to some extent.

The Indians asked Shute to remove

"all those capable of setting them at variance...."’1'

Even the*111

’Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31,

1718,

Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, pp. 127-34; Collection de Manuscripts,
111, pp. 31-32; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 118.
o

Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,
pp. 25-26.

^Hutchinson, History of the Province of Massachusetts, II, p.
166.
Joseph Baxter called the old chiefs "the wise men." Manuscript
Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., p. 26.
Deposition
of Lewis Bane, of York, Dec. 2, 1719, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 36566.

^Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31,

1718,

Arch, des Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, pp. 128-29; Collection de Manuscripts,
111, p. 32.

71

Penobscots did not appreciate the "conversation” of the English.
Another incident surely convinced the English of Rale's dangerous

Captain Westbrook showed the Indians a letter written by

influence.

Rale to the governor.

The Indians listened attentively as he read it

and then told him "the Jesuit Lied, and he was very wicked.The
incident led Eckstorm to declare that "they had come to distrust their
priests and said openly that they lied."

It cannot be determined,

however, that the Indians were from Norridgewock.

On another occasion,

when Westbrook presented the letter to the Indians, they said

"Penobscot men are good men, S- would not hurt the English."

Westbrook

was shrewd enough to point out that some Penobscot sachems had signed
the letter.

Then the Indians admitted that they were not present when

the letter was written and when "they were asked if they desired to
live in love and peace with ye English...they did not readily answer."
Rale's English contemporaries did not make the distinction between

those Indians empowered to speak for the whole tribe and those speaking

only for themselves.
Apparently the establishment of Rale's popularity is more

difficult than Eckstorm would have us believe.

saw only part of the action.

The English settlers

Though they could not have fathomed

Rale's reasons, their judgment that he was working against them was

correct.

Unfortunately, their expressed opinions have misled

commentators to believe that Rale maliciously followed orders from

’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,
p. 40.
^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock, " p. 546.

^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,

pp. 47-48.
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Quebec against the Kennebecs wishes.
Sebastien Rale must have perplexed the English, for throughout

the winter of 1717-18 they received reports about his superstitious

mutterings.

In October Baxter heard that Rale had predicted that the

world would end in forty-nine days.'

Later,

in April,

1718, he was told

that Rale had a vision at night and
felt as it were a hand upon his throat yt almost choaked
him, & saw a great light again, and heard a voice saying
it is in vain for you to take any pains with these Indians,
your children, for I have got possession of them, & will
keep possession of them.^

A man of Rale's education would be most unlikely to worry about an
impending doomsday.

It could be argued,

in fact, that the Jesuit was

so fully occupied with the English invasion that he had no energy for
a contest with Satanic powers.

But it is well known that the savages

were highly susceptible to rhetorical

imagery.

supposed apparitions had on Baxter is unknown.

What effects these

Perhaps he reported

them to the General Court when he made his formal reports in November,

1717, and June,

1718.3

Joseph Baxter and Rale did exchange several letters which did

little to increase either's understanding of the other.

Father Rale

was infuriated by Baxter's attack on Catholic doctrine, and wrote him a

long letter in defense of the Church.
to Boston, wrote a short note in Latin.

Baxter, who was about to return
Rale immediately added more

’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,
pp.

14-15.
2 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

3 Ibid., p.

1718, p.

11.

17.

Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal,

II, June, 4,
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remarks against Baxter's doctrinal position and made the insulting

contention that Baxter's Latin was less than accurate.

Baxter re-entered the argument to defend himself.

In April,

1719,

The Jesuit, Warrior

for the Faith, must have been sorely disappointed, for the minister

avoided all discussion of doctrinal matters.

Certainly Rale was not

pleased with Baxter's disparagement of his personality as choleric,
but then he had been less than tactful himself.’

At this point, Governor Shute entered the fray for his orthodox

proteg^.

ary.

He delivered Rale a long homily on the duties of a mission

He said he had not found Rale's conduct amenable to the

Apostle's exhortation:
What then.
Notwithstanding every way, whether in
pretence or in truth, Christ is preached, and 1 therein
rejoyce, yea and I will rejoyce.

Shute thought it extremely unworthy of Rale to fault Baxter's Latin.
A missionary, he said, should have better things to do.

He included

a copy of the law against Roman Catholic priests, which, he pointed

out in a postscript, Rale would "do well to consider of."
Rale had written Shute in August, 1718.

2

He had warned the

governor of the temper, or rather the distemper of the Abnakis and

noted,

in particular, their "warlike and terrible genius."

The

Indians were thoroughly dissatisfied with the Treaty of Arrowsic.

’some of these letters are preserved in the Massachusetts
Historical Society Archives. They are also printed in Baxter,
Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 85-87; 14-3-53; 397-404.
cf. also Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 114.

^A Letter from Gov. Shute to Ralle’ the Jesuit, Feb. 21, 1718/19,
Mass. His. Soc., Col 1ections,

V, pp.

112-19.

1st ser.

(Boston:

The Society,

1798),
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Shute shrugged off Rale's complaints with a remark that the English
had nothing to fear as long as the Indians were used.’
Nevertheless, the liquor traffic continued unchecked as Rale

had pointed out and as Shute realized.

irritant on the Kennebec.

On May 29,

It was, undeniably, a major

1718, Shute attempted to goad

the House to action by depicting the "fatal Consequences" of the

trade.

2

The resulting bill, "An Act in addition to the Act for pre

venting Abuses to the Indians," was passed on June 21,

1718.Later,

Samuel Moody confirmed the governor's fears when he declared "that
all the disorders which happen amongst them are occasioned by Strong
k

Drink, that is sold to them by Coasters...."

Even Joseph Baxter

had harsh words against the itinerant coasters and trading sloops.

The Indians were in an uproar.

In reaction to Rale's letter

the Council sent forty men "to make discovery of^their] designs...&

if need be to secure the Frontiers from danger....Governor Shute
informed the Council of Trade that "the Indians by the instigation of

their Jesuits have of late been very insolent."
killing cattle on the Kennebec.

Some of them were

When they were accosted by the English

who demanded payment, they made what Governor Vaudreuil called a

vigorous answer:

"Complain all you want to the Governor," they said,

"he is not my judge.

And as for the payment for the cattle, ask

’ibid.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, May 29, 1718,

Ibid., June 21, 1718, p. 37.
Ib id., June 27,

1718, p. 48.

^Mass. Council, Aug. 6,

1718.

II, p. 5.
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whoever told you to settle there."

Shute must have cringed when he

heard that remark, for he had assured the Council of Trade that he
would "be able to prevent a war breaking out."’

The situation was equally tense for the French.

By the end of

1718, the administrators of New France realized that the Abnakis had

nearly reached a crisis.
and more frantic.

Rale's letters and reports had become more

The boundary was still not settled, and the English

were gaining control of the contested area.
Rale advised Vaudreuil that Shute encouraged the expansion on

the orders of the King of England.

He reviewed all the troubles that

must have haunted the French governor's sleep.

The English had the

advantage in times of peace and they put the occasion to good use.
There was only one solution to the problem, according to Rale, and
that was the prompt settlement of the boundary.

2

Sebastien Rale's warning that Shute was sending 200 families

to settle the Penobscot, 500 to the Sieur de St. Castin's Pentagoet
post and 500 more to the St. John, startled Vaudreuil and Begon into
action.

Vaudreuil told the Council of Marine that he could not and

would not refuse the Indians aid if they were attacked by the English.

On the other hand, he softened his strong words with a plea for

di rections.3

'Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31,

1718,

Collection de Manuscripts, 111, p. 32; Governor Shute to the Council
of Trade and Plantations, Sept. 29, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, p.
358; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, June 12, 1718, II, p. 21; Oct.
29, 1718, p. 60.

^Rapport de M. Begon, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, Nov. 8,
1718, pp. 144-47; Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 33-34.

3Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31, 1718,

Collection de Manuscripts,

111, p. 32.
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Begon also took Rale's advice and wrote a long memoir on the
boundary.

Citing historical precedent, ancient maps, and expedience,

he favored holding the English to the peninsula of Nova Scotia.

While

he admitted that the St. Georges river was the true boundary, he main

tained the French claim to the Kennebec.

It was best, he advised the

Council of Marine, to draw a line from the source of the St. Georges

to the source of the Hudson.
the French alliance.

Such a line would keep the Abnakis in

He reminded the Council that though the Abnakis

were Roman Catholics, they would not remain so for long if the English

gained control of the territory.

As Rale pointed out, the Jesuits

would be removed, and the Abnakis once docile would become the scourge
of New France.

They could pillage and destroy all the French habita

tions from the southern coast to the St. Lawrence.’
French agent.

Rale was no

Vaudreuil and Begon used his letters to convince the

minister of their quandry and prayed his predictions would not come
true.

Governor Vaudreuil did his best to maintain the French claim
to the contested area despite an apathetic home government.

He en

couraged the Acadians to move to the St. John which, he said, “is not
part of the English dominion.112

Vaudreuil.

The Acadians were not so eager as

But assurance came easily to the governor's lips and he

tersely replied that he would not “suffer the English to take
possession" of the St. John.

He named Father Loyard as his

’Memoire pour servir^ regler les Limites, Nov. 8, 1718, Arch.
Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 14-29.
2

Marquis de Vaudreuil to M. Louis Al lain at Port Royal, and
Same to Same, Sept. 22, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 406-07.
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representative with powers to give the settlers land grants.

Meanwhile, Governor Vaudreuil had written Lieutenant Governor
Doucett of Nova Scotia that he would do his utmost to maintain the new
treaty of alliance between England and France.

He made it clear,

nonetheless, that the French considered the St. John theirs.

exchange left Doucett shaken.

The

He pleaded with the absentee Governor

Philipps to "put a stop to their proceedings, or el Ice they will claim

everything within cannon shot of this Fort...."'

It was clear that

New France was not going to accept British claims gracefully.

The shrill warnings of Vaudreuil and Begon must have awakened

the Council of Marine, for it replied, despite the newly concluded

alliance with Great Britain, that "Justice seems to require that Acadia
be reduced to the peninsula."

"are exorbitant."

2

"The English pretensions," they noted,

They finally proposed to do something to ease the

s i tuat i on.
Louis XV communicated the good news to Vaudreuil and Begon on

May 23,

1719:

The ambassador to England had proposed the nomination

of commissioners.

He had requested that Governor Shute be prevented

from sending more settlers into the disputed area.

Louis XV also

agreed that the English settlers already there should immediately

be removed.

He added that he could not give Vaudreuil

specific in

structions because he did not know if George 1 had accepted the

'Marquis de Vaudreuil et Lt. Governor Doucett, Sept. 22,

1718,

Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 405-06; Lt. Governor Doucett to Governor
Philipps, Dec. 13, 1718, Ibid., p. 405.
council Deliberations on Vaudreuil's letter of Oct. 31, 1718,
March 14, 1719, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 100.
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proposal.

He noted, nonetheless, that Vaudreuil might use the Indians,

or any other method he saw fit to prevent English settlement.

He

cautioned Vaudreuil to do nothing to jeopardize the alliance with

Britain.’

The British government was amenable to Louis XV's suggestions.
They realized from the reports of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia that

the French would take advantage of the unsettled condition of the
frontier.

By the middle of July,

1719, the British had accepted

France's offer and had appointed Martin Bladen and Daniel Pulteney

commissioners.^

Their instructions sketched the official British

position based on the commission of the last French governor of Acadia.
Such a claim would give Great Britain the land east of the St.

Georges.

Vaudreuil and Begon joyfully greeted the king's decision.
they reported that George I had not stopped Governor Shute.

But

They had

learned from Rale that the governor threatened to send 500 more men
to the Kennebec.
to Quebec.

They were not alarmed as Rale also sent two chiefs

The sachems told Vaudreuil that the Abnakis were determined

to oppose the English and had invited the other villages to aid them.

By 1719 then, Rale, the Abnakis and Vaudreuil were confident that
English expansion on the Kennebec could be thwarted.

’Memoire du Roy a Messieurs de Marquis de Vaudreuil et Begon,
May 23, 1719, Collection de Manuscripts,
New York Colonial Documents^ Fx^ p. 892.

III, p. 40; O'Callaghan,

^Mr. Delafaye, Secretary to the Lords Justices to the Council
of Trade and Plantations, July 16, 1719, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXI,
p. 162; The Boston Gazette, March 7, 1719/20.

^Lords Justices Instructions for Daniel Pulteney and Marten
Bladen, Nov. 4, 1719.
Cal, of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 252-53; Mr. Vaughan
and Mr. Capon to the Council of Trade and Plantations, June 10, 1719,
Ibid., p. 120.
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Since 1716 the Abnakis had moved from vague apprehension to

open hostility to the English.

Ever behind the scene was Sebastien

Rale exhorting both the Indians and the French officials to immediate

action.

His efforts were finally bearing fruit.

were his first recourse.

Diplomatic efforts

But he was fully prepared to inspire both

the French and the Abnakis to grapple with the English to protect
their mutual rights.

’Rapport de M. Vaudreuil et Begon, Oct. 26, 1719, Arch. Col.,

CHE, vol. 2, pp. 34-36; C 11 A, vol. 41, p. 68; Col lection de
Manuscripts, III, pp. 41-42.
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CHAPTER IV

THE IRRECONCILIABLE CONFLICT 1719—1721

Historians have sought a unifying link for the causes of the
conflict after 1718 in a variety of factors.

James Phinney Baxter

stressed the increasing malignity of the savages encouraged by
Sebastien Rale.

Eckstorm followed his lead, but her interpretation

ignores Rale's frantic concern for his Indians.'

Thus, the opposing

view, especially that of the French-Canadian historians, has stressed

the hostility of the English to the person of Father Rale.

A corollary

of their hypothesis is the belief that the New Englanders were primarily
motivated by a religious zeal which found Jesuits a particularly

obnoxious form of popery.
deny either of these views.

Closer examination qualifies but does not

The English did come to regard Rale as

the source of their troubles and the Jesuit did nothing to placate

them.

One factor, however, concerned all the parties involved.

the conflict over the land was basic,

Only

irreconci1iable.

While Eckstorm had viewed the division among the Abnakis as

evidence that anti-English opposition originated with Sebastien Rale,
she had not noticed a similar disaffection among the English.

As the

'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 92ff; “By
his sheer personal domination and by his power of excommunication,
which he threatened to use,11 Eckstorm noted, “Rasies held down the
peace party and imposed his will upon the tribe." "The Attack on
Norridgewock," pp. 559-60.

^Edouard Lecompte referred to the English as "the fanatics of
New England," "L'Apotre des Abenaquis," L'Action Francaise (juillet,
1924), p. 24; see also Dionne, "Le Pere Sebastien Rasies," p. 126;
Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien Racle," p. 178.
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disagreement between the Abnakis and the English reached a crisis it
became apparent that some English men accepted the Indians' complaints.

Nor could Massachusetts' Executive Council and House of Representatives

agree on a course of action in regard to the Kennebecs.
There was an obvious contradiction between what Massachusetts

desired and what she asked.

She insisted,

in the first place, that

if the Indians were wronged, they had the right, as subjects of the

Crown, to petition the government for redress.

Dudley and Shute

assured the troubled sachems that they would be justly used.

The

Indians' complaints were ignored, however, when they conflicted with

provincial

interests.’

Long before 1718, the Indians had lamented the grasping traders,

the flagrant rum trade and the new Kennebec settlements.

Both Dudley

and Shute vowed to regulate the trade and to halt the liquor traffic.
Their efforts were only spasmodic, however, and met the often deter

mined opposition of the House.

There was no hope for negotiation on

the land, and the settlements proved to be the ultimate irritant.

that question the English had nothing to discuss.

On

They contented them

selves with asserting their rights by unearthing moldy patents to prove
their case.

Not surprisingly, Rale remarked:

"There is no Justice

’The material of this chapter is a contradiction of what might
"What emerges from my investigation...",
be called the Vaughn thesis.
Vaughn remarked, "is a conviction that the New England Puritans followed
a remarkably humane, considerate, and just policy in their dealings with
the Indians." Alden T. Vaughn, New England Frontier, Puritans and
L i ttle, Brown and Company, 1965), p. v i i.
Indians, 1620-1765 (Boston:
Vaughn's book carries Indian-Puritan relations only up to 1675.
His
thesis does not explain Abnaki-Massachusetts relations after 1713.
If
anything, Massachusetts was caught between her expressed concern for
Indians and the fact that the policy broke down under partisan political
pressures.
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among'st the English,"’ and there was substance to the assertion.

Like many unseen, unheard minorities, Rale and the Abnakis
resolved to rectify the situation.

They began what was, for the

eighteenth century, non-violent protest.

It was extraordinary that

the Indians restrained themselves in this manner.

They neither scalped

Instead, they killed cattle, for which,

Rale said, the English had only themselves to blame.As long as the
English continued to ignore the Indians'

real or even imaginary com-

plaints there would be no peace

not convince the Abnakis with words, their only recourse was to arms.
Wilcomb E. Washburn,

in a particularly succinct account of

Indian versus European ownership of the land, has made some general

observations that are applicable.
conception of 'right'

expedient rights.

He extrapolates his view from a

involving natural, speculative and finally

Washburn's argument is relevant to the conflict on

the Kennebec after 1715.
right can easily be seen.

The clash between each of his notions of

3

There was, first, the Abnakis' natural

right to the land.

Such

possession was qualified in the eighteenth century by the Indian

grants of the seventeenth.

The Abnakis were caught in a peculiar

situation and remarked upon it.

’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7,
New England, p. 102.

They felt that they could not be bound

1720, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in

2 lb i d., pp. 97-98.
^Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justification for
Dispossessing the Indians," in James Morton Smith, ed., Seventeenth
Century America:
Essays in Colonial History (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1959), PP. 15-32.
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by deeds made by chiefs long since dead.

They were supported in their

argument, surprisingly, by some Englishmen.

Thomas Coram of London,

claimed that Massachusetts had no valid claim to the Indians’

land.

He contended that the deeds, received some sixty years before, were
fraudulent, having been received from rum-plied Indians.’
There was also the conflict over speculative rights.

Both

Great Britain and France claimed the northern colonial frontier by
right of discovery and by formal treaty agreements.

After 1713, that

conflict focused on the settlement of a boundary and on the definition
of what the Treaty of Utrecht meant by the words "Acadia or Nova Scotia.

The question of effective control, or expedient right, was more
basic.

Since Utrecht proved to be so vague, Massachusetts moved to

assert her claims by sending settlers to the Kennebec.

were not less active.

The French

After the missionaries warned them that French

interests were in danger, they encouraged the Council of Marine to

act decisively to save for New France both the land and the Abnaki
al 1iance.

’"General Nicholson said, he had conquered the said land from
the French for her late Majesty; that no place had more controverted
titles than the land now in dispute; to clear which the Assembly of
Massachusets Bay had lately examined into them; as to the unfair
clandestine practices, which Mr. Coram said, were used in obtaining
purchases from the Indians by debauching and making them drunk, Col.
Taylor said, there had been a general treatment with the Indians by
Col. Dudley late governor of the Massachusets Bay, and to prevent such
ill practices for the future, the government of that province allow
no grants, without registering there." Journal of the Commissioners
for Trade and Plantations from March 171^-5 to October 1718 (London:
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924), June 6, 1717, P. 239.
Debauched or no, the government of Massachusetts had accepted the old
Indian titles as legal, and no opposition from Rale or from the Abnakis
could convince them otherwise.
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But the most important conflict over expedient right was between

the English and the Abnakis.

Massachusetts asserted that she would

possess what was hers and built forts to insure her ability to do so.
Utilizing European notions of ownership, the Indians claimed the land

by conquest.

The Abnakis noted that they had driven the English out

three times, and said they could and would do so again.
More realistically, the Indians recognized the claims of the

English to the land already settled.

Thus, the Abnakis, and even Rale

were willing to compromise and to allow the settlements of Brunswick,

Topsham, Georgetown, and Augusta to remain.

They refused to consider

or to permit further expansion up the Kennebec.
Governor Shute made it clear at the Treaty of Arrowsic that he

would contest the Indians* title to the Kennebec.
alternatives open to the governor.

There were two

He could negotiate with the

Abnakis or he could force them to accede to his wishes.

for all concerned, he chose the latter course.

out:

Unfortunately

As Washburn pointed

"Man thinking will continue to tell us what the law ought to be;

man acting will tell us what the law is."’

The implications of Shute's decision were not immediately clear.

For several years the English and the Abnakis sparred over vaguely
defined issues.

The government at Boston, divided politically between

House and Executive Council, was equally split over hard or soft-line
policy.

Time and again, reason won out and the government chose to

send commissioners to treat with the Abnakis.

The commissioners,

’washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justification for Dispossessing
the Indians," p. 32.
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however, did not distinguish between negotiation and assertion of
right.

They did more demanding than discussing.

The result, so

familiar and so seldom avoided, was predictable.

Rale, unlike either the Abnakis or the Massachusetts government,
remained inflexible.

It became apparent that the Jesuit represented

more his own opinions rather than those of Vaudreuil.

was calling the shots, though often recklessly.

Sebastien Rale

With the knowledge

that the French court was working towards a settlement of the boundary,
he became increasingly impatient and arrogant.

When Joseph Heath and John Minot arrived at Norridgewock in
April,

1719, Rale's thinly veiled threats convinced them that he was

"an Incendiary of mischief."’

Rale told them that the Canadian Indians

had written the Kennebecs "that in giving away their lands, they kild

themselves and them to, and that they were Obliged to assist them in
case of any injustice done them by the English...."

The Jesuit was

convinced that letters, remonstrances, and petitions to the English
were futile.

Stronger measures were needed, and he believed a threatened

Indian alliance would frighten Shute.
Rale repeated the Indians' position to Heath and Minot.

He

noted that "rum was the greatest reason of all the disturbances in the

plantations."

The Indians had not given the English permission, Rale

Unless otherwise noted the quotations are from: Joseph Heath
and John Minot to Gov. Shute, May 1, 1719, Mass. Arch. 51: 316-17;
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 446-47; but see also their other
accounts:
Deposition of Lewis Bane, Dec. 2, 1719, and Deposition of
John Minot, Nov. 27, 1719, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New
England, pp. 279-80; Gov. Shute to Council of Trade and Plantations,
Dec. 7, 1719, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 282-83; and Depositions of
Bane and Minot, ibid., pp. 365-66.
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said, to settle above Arrowsic mills, and yet they had pushed on.

He

reminded them that the boundary between New England and France had not

been settled and defiantly added that Vaudreuil had been ordered to
protect the Abnakis.

The Englishmen also spoke with the Indians, who thought the
They said that the Indians who terrorized

disturbances insignificant.

the English were not their "Bretheren.11
less."

The guilty ones were "prayer

It was Sebastien Rale, they contended, who was inciting them by

"telling them that...in two years Qthe E nglish] would be so strong
that they would not be able to remove them."’
Though the Englishmen never realized it, the pro-English Indians

had contradicted themselves.

They accused Rale of engineering the

crisis and yet said the trouble-makers were "prayerless."

not have been true.

It was the pro-English Indians who opposed Rale

and flattered Joseph Baxter.

opposed only the English.

becoming more so.

That could

The others, faithful Catholics all,

And yet the Indians were divided and were

Vaudreuil was beginning to realize that even the

Norridgewocks leaned heavily towards the English.2

’Deposition of Lewis Bane of York, Dec. 2,

1719, Baxter,

Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 279.

^Most obvious among the pro-English Indians was Bomazeen. Heath
and Minot found him "very inclinable" towards the English and sent
their letter to the governor by him. The Council rewarded him and his
companions for the service.
They gave each coats and shirts of "bleu
Cloath." Only Bomazeen, however, received a coat of silver thread.
Later, the Council learned that Bomazeen was quarreling with the other
Indians.
They wondered why. The answer is obvious.
Bomazeen,
resplendent in his new finery, was ridiculed for what he was: proEnglish.
Heath and Minot to Gov. Shute, May 1, 1719, Mass. Arch. 51:
p. 317; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, p. 447; Mass. Council, May 13,
1719, May 17, 1719, and Sept. 11, 1719.
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The Indians' protestations of friendship to Heath and Minot
barely lasted the summer.

On November 4,

House of Representatives.

He could not believe, he said, that the

1719, Shute addressed the

Indians would attempt "an open War with us, so long as the strict

Alliance continues, between His Majesty and the French king...."’
He was not gambling on good will, however.

He had already written

Vaudreuil to remind him of the "strict Alliance" between England and

France.

He also qualified his hopes with a request for legislation

to halt the "Insolent and Injurious" treatment of the "Inhabitants of

the New Settlements...."

2

His opinion was reinforced the next day

when the Pejebscot Proprietors asked to be "Protected from...the
Norridgawog Indians,"*2
3 and it was decided to send commissioners to
talk with the Indians.
In January,

1720, the commissioners went to hear the Abnakis1

complaints and to seek the causes of their conduct.Their report
stressed the objections of the Indians to the settlements above and
north-westward of Merrymeeting Bay, specifically the English on Swan

Island and the town of Cork on the east side of the river.

The

commissioners had produced a deed to the area but the Indians insisted
that "the persons Executing that Deed were all Amriscoggin Indians

’Mass. Council, February 21, 1718/19.
2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 4,

3lbid., Nov. 5,

1719, p.

176; Dec. 2,

1719,

II, pp. 174-75.

1719, p. 206.

William

Tailer and John Stoddard were chosen to represent the government.
Dec. 9, 1719, p. 221.
^For the official minutes see:
Jan., 1719/20, Mass. Arch. 29:
XXIII, pp. 83-87.

In re Conference at Falmouth,

57-63; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts,
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(except one) and never had any Right thereto....11

had been beaten at their own game.

For once, the English

Wiwurna's objections to settlements

"above the Mills" had been confirmed.

The commissioners also advised

the governor that the Abnakis were being encouraged by Vaudreuil and

by the "Cunning Insinuations of that Incendiary the Priest...."

They

had no doubt that "the Priest go's on in his inveterate hatred and Malice

against us."
The commissioners decided the Indians had some valid complaints.

They found that they were often "overcome with Rum and Strong Drink
Supplyed by many of the English...."

To rectify the abuse, they

suggested that trading houses be built and staffed with "Truck masters

under Bond and Oath for their Fidelity...."

Private traders would be

thus discouraged and the Indians would become "more dependent on this
Government...."
It was as though Rale had the results of the commissioners'

investigation before him when he wrote Captain Samuel Moody on Feb. 7,
1720.

The commissioners had suggested through the faithful Bomazeen

that some of the Norridgewocks go to Great Britain as guests of

Massachusetts.

Rale warned Moody that "if they do I shall drive them

forever from the Church."’
Rale had reached the limits of his patience.

His frequent

missives to the Governor, Dudley and Shute had had no effect.

The

English were becoming stronger on the Kennebec, and they were now

’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7,

1719/20, Baxter, Pioneers of New France

in New England, pp. 96-104.
Except as otherwise indicated the quota
tions that follow come from this letter.
Flynt's Manuscript Commonplace
Book in the Mass. His. Soc. Boston, also quotes the letter.
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considering expansion towards the Penobscot.
successfully frightened the English.

Rale's letter was remarkable,
lation from the French.

Nor had the Abnakis

Disgusted with his failure,

its eloquence surviving a rough trans

Rale was so bitingly sarcastic that the

councillors in Boston dubbed it "the railing letter."’
Rale tersely analyzed the Treaty of Arrowsic.

He said that the

Abnakis approved of nothing but what Wiwurna had said; they left only

because there was no ground for further discussion.

made it clear that "it's vain talking" with them.

The English had
The Abnakis had set

limits to the settlements and the English had refused to listen.

Thus,

Rale said that "If the Indians kill Cattle below the Mill towards the

seaside they must absolutely pay for them...."

He added with great

frustration that "Any treaty...particu1 ar1y that of Arrowsic is Null,
If I don't approve it, though the Indians have consented, for I bring

them so many reasons against it that they absolutely condemn what
they have done."

The Jesuit was particularly angered by Shute's attempts to

observe his actions, as Heath and Minot had done.
my words:

"They inquire about

do they intend to unite against me," he asked, "to drive

me from my Mission? that would be a retirement from misery...."

added, however, that "Whatever you may think you can't move me."

He
He

called Shute a "Warrior" and warned him of the disasters of an Indian

war.

He suggested that the English save themselves considerable

embarassment and recall their settlers, "for assuredly, there shall

not one remain there."

’sewall, "Diary", VIII, p. 245.
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The letter bears the evident marks of Rale's personality.
Confident, proud, uncompromising, Rale reacted to the English threat

with single-minded purpose.

James P. Baxter correctly called the

letter threatening, arrogant and vain.’
frustration.

But,

it was vanity born of

Rale proclaimed that "a Missionary is not a Cipher like

a Minister," only because the puritan divines were a conspicuous threat.
He promised to write a book telling the world how "the English treat

the Indians," how they answer his demands by telling him that the
Jesuit "bid you say it."

Rale pointed out, with some reason, that an

underlying cause of the misunderstanding was the interpreters who, he

claimed with characteristic relish, spoke "nothing but Gibberish."

2

Rale also sketched the nature of his influence on the Abnakis.

He couldn't make them declare war; he was, after all, a priest.

In

deed, he declared that he could "absolutely hinder them when they haven't
solid reasons for it...."

But he significantly added that he wouldn't

stop them if that was the only way to preserve their land.

In that

case, he said, "1'11 tell them they may make war."
His contention that he and the Abnakis were taking a moral

stand on the issue is true to character.

In 1720 some of the

Norridgewocks gave Shute Rale's translation of the Lord's prayer.

The

words we "must not think or take revenge" substituted for "we forgive

those who trespass against us," stand out in bold relief.*3

Rale

’Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 104.
^Rale's judgement about the English interpreters can be accepted
for theirs was only a nodding acquaintance with the language.
Rale's
facility came from systematic study, he could read as well as speak
the language.

3"lndian Terms and Definitions," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect ions,
1st ser. (Portland: The Society, 1857), V, pp. 427-28.

91

clearly recognized the vengeful nature of the Abnakis, and instructed
them that revenge was not the 'Christian way.'

He also taught them

that their duty was to protect their lands for future generations of

He told them, moreover, that if they did not do so he "would

Abnakis.

go away from them."’

Rale's warnings carried some weight with the Indians for in

July the House received word that several families had fled and "the
rest are likely soon to follow if not Protected."

Shute took the

commissioners advice and decided to be conciliatory.

He addressed the

House and suggested that the colony set up a "few Truck-Houses,"

reminding the representatives that they were obliged to do so "by our
several Treaties...."

Rale's letter coupled with the Norridgewock's

attacks against the settlers deeply impressed the governor for he

asked that general boundaries be set up between the Indians and the
Engli sh.

Characteristically, the House held a more poignant view of
Massachusetts'

rights than those of the Indians.

trading houses would be effective.

It did not feel that

It asserted, to the contrary, that

they would arouse "Feuds and Animosities among the Indians...."

The

Representatives were equally adamant about the proposed boundary.

In

their opinion, the boundaries had already been settled "in the former

Treaties."

Finally, the House declared that the Indians would not be

’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7, 1720, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in
New England, p. 100.
This was what Lord called Rale's severe test of
the Abnakis.
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 122.
2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 19,
^Mass. Council, Mar. 3,

July 13,

1720,

I I, p. 236.

1720,

II, p. 249.

1719/20; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal,
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disturbed on the lands which "of Right belong to them."’

On July 10, the Indians threatened the people at Cork.

One of

the Norridgewocks told an Englishman that the Indians "had fought three
times for this land &...would fight Again for it was Never Sold to ye
English...."

2

Williamson found the contention an exhibition of "good

sense and a just regard for their rights."3

The Abnakis also sent a petition to the government of

Massachusetts.

They asked that boundaries be determined, and that a

trading house be built for them and the Council agreed.

The Councillors

pressed for immediate action on the request so that they might avoid

all "just cause" for complaint.21

But again, the House rejected their

motion.Barring concrete action, the Council advised the governor
to assure the settlers that Capt. Moody had been ordered to protect

them.&
In August, John Gyles made his intelligence report.

As usual,

the bearer of the letter was Bomazeen who, he found, was "very Desirous
to Go to Boston."

Gyles noted that the previously complacent Penob-

scots had received a shipment of gunpowder from Canada and that Thomas

Thorn had been convicted by Justice Penhallow for selling the Indians

rum.

Gyles hoped that "such meathods will Put a stop to Lickring...."^

’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 19,

1720,

II, p. 247.

^Belknap Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., 61 A. pp. 89-90.
3wil liamson, History of the State of Maine,

II, p.

^Ford., ed., Mass. House Journal, July 21, 1720,
51 bi d., July 22,

105.

II, pp. 255-57.

1720, p. 257*, p. 259.

^Mass. Council, July 20,

1720.

/Letter from Capt. John Gyles to Gov. Shute, Aug.
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 456-57.

10,

1720,
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Though the Indians had helped to convict Thorm, they were still

not placated.

On August 22,

it was said that "the eastern Indians

continue to insult the People in killing their cattle, and robbing

their Houses; They are all

in Garrison as far as York this way.11'

By this time the Council was almost as exasperated as the House.

calm the irate citizenry,

To

it resolved to demand "satisfaction of ye

Indians for ye damages they have done...."

2

They advised the governor

to write to Vaudreuil about how the "Priests & others" encourage them.

Opinion within the Council was not unanimous, however.

Samuel

Sewall, Edmund Quincy and Jonathan Belcher broke with the majority
and delivered a separate statement.

They advised the settlement of a

boundary not only because the Indians "have some Lands of their own,"
but also because they felt it was not "just for this Governmt.
encourage private persons to settle themselves,"

was decided.

to

unless the boundary

Nor did they agree with the government's policy of

constructing forts on the Maine lands.
Nevertheless, the Council went ahead in its plans to strengthen*2
3

'fhe Boston Gazette, Aug. 22,
2Mass. Council, Aug. 23,

1720.

3Mass. Council, Sept. 2,

1720.

1720.

94

the Kennebec and to chastise the Indians.’

In October, the Council

sent Colonel Walton to have a preliminary meeting with the Indians to
plan a conference for late that fall.

The Indians arrived with a

French flag but, when Walton refused to talk with them because of it,
they left it behind.

The Abnakis promised to confer with their villages

and to inform Walton when they would meet the commissioners.*2
When the House of Representatives read Walton's report it was

displeased.

It thought the Council's measures inadequate for bringing

the Kennebecs to terms.

The Representatives promptly resolved “That

it is deragatory to His Majesties Honour and very injurious to this

Province, that Monsieur Ralle a French Jesuit and Missionary should in
defiance of the Law, Reside in any part of this Province....1'

3

The

’The Boston Gazette, Sept. 5, 1720.
Nor did Massachusetts forget
the Indians. Their past relations with the Penobscots had been excel
lent. They sent gifts to the chiefs of that village and the policy
paid off. The Penobscots assured Gyles “of their peaceful inten
tions...." They added that they had "been to advise our brother
Narangawock Indians that hath a hunted you People, to Consider of
them Selves & do so no more." Gyles had assured Shute that his "Privet
informar" would warn him of "Enything Extrordenary." Mass. Council
March 25, 1719/20; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 21, 1720, II,
p. 255; Letter from the Penobscot Indians.
Sept. 16, 1620, Mass. Arch.
31:
pp. 65-69; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 87-89.
2lndian Conference at Georgetown, Oct. 12, 1720, Mass. Arch.
28;
pp. 64-65; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXI I I, pp. 94-96; Flynt,
Manuscript Commonplace Book, Mass. His. Soc., pp. 283-84.
^The House voted that John Leighton, Sheriff of York County,

should accompany the forces to apprehend Rale.
If the Indians refused
to "surrender up the Jesuit" the commanding officer was to take hostages
to be held until they did so.
Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 4,
1720; II, pp. 270-72.
Lord pointed out that this was the first time
that the "anti-priest" law of 1700 was applied to the Kennebec.
Prior
to this time the status of the territory was in doubt.
History of the
Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 125. As late as 1718 the Council of Trade
was unsure if Massachusetts' claims to the lands between the Kennebec
and the Penobscot should be granted.
Norridgewock was situated on the
east bank of the river.
"Council of Trade and Plantations to the King,"
May 21, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 254-55.
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House asked that the governor take "effectual Methods for his Removal"

and passed a resolution for two hundred and fifty men to be sent to

Norridgewock to apprehend him.

The Representatives decided that the

Indians should make immediate restitution for their "many wrongs,"'

and despite Walton's promises to the Abnakis, voted that they should
come to Boston to do so.

The Council disagreed with the House's strong-arm measures and
insisted that the commissioners be sent to confer with the Indians as

planned.

The Council

requested that "three Gentlemen of Distinction,

Ability and Integrity...be joined with Col. Walton in Seeing and Treat

ing with the Indians...."

The House refused and only military men

represented the government.*2
The conference opened on November 25,

1720.

The Indians at once

demanded "that the People may be removed from Merry Meeting" bay.3

The commissioners refused to discuss the issue until the Indians

assured them they would make restitution "for ye Wrongs done us...."
The Abnakis replied that they knew that their young men caused the dis
turbances but added that they had hindered them when they could.

"Then," the commissioners retorted, "you Ought...to punish them for

their insolence & If you can't restrain them you shou1d...have deliver'd

'Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 5, 1720, p. 272.
2

Mass. House Journal, Nov. 5, 1720, II, p. 273; Nov. 7; Nov. 8,
1720, p. 275; of. also McFarlane, "Indian Relations in New England,"
pp. 73-74.

Conference with the Indians at Georgetown, Nov., 1720, Mass.
Arch., 29: 65-74; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 97-108; the
conference is also mentioned in Flynt, Commonplace Book, Mass. His.
Soc., pp. 285-86.
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ym to us...."

The chiefs tried to explain that "If all those people

were removed from Merry Meeting Bay, all other Differences between us

would be easyly composed....11
Ignoring their statement, the Englishmen demanded:

"What

security will you give us...for we will take your words no longer."

After a long silence, the sachems asked "How many skins are we to pay...?"
Arguing to the last, the Indians agreed to pay 200 skins and to surrender
four chiefs within twenty-five days.

Not surprisingly, the House refused to accept the commissioner's
report.

Instead of sending the Indians to Boston to answer for their

behavior, they had "presumed to Enter into a Treaty" with them.

The

House did not approve of the innovation and insisted that it was not
in "the Honour or Interest of this Government, to have Persons retained

in their Pay and Service, that have no regard to the Orders of the
Government...."

Even though the commissioners met the Indians on

orders from the Council, the House decided to withhold their pay until

"the Indians duly comply with what is stipulated on their part."’
Meanwhile, the Council capitulated and decided thatL.200 should

be offered for Rale and that the government should provide another

minister for the eastern service.

o

A few days later a committee was

named to consider the best means for "the Removal or Apprehension of

Sebastian Ralle" and the Council found it opportune to send the

Penobscots t_43 of goods for their loyal behavior.3*2

’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Dec. 9,

2 lb id., pp. 338-39.

3|bid., Dec.

12,

1720, p. 341.

1720,

II, pp. 334-35.

97

The Indians had promised to surrender four chieftains to the
English, and they did so.

1721, Joseph Bean presented

On January 13,

the hostages to the Executive Council.’

In accepting the hostages

the Council jeopardized its own "honour" and authority.

The Abnakis

soon regretted their moment of weakness and demanded that their chiefs

be returned.

Such a concession on the part of Massachusetts would

have been a fatal sign of weakness.

Unwittingly, a few commissioners,

acting on their own authority, had created a major irritant between the
English and the Abnakis.

2

The conference was especially important because it was the
pro-English Indians who spoke with Walton.

the English leave Merrymeeting Bay.

Even they demanded that

To an important extent, then,

opposition to the English settlements was independent of Rale.

But

when the English wished, at the end of the conference, to discuss the

settlements, the Indians replied:
to say."

"We have said all yt we were ordered

Though they had been directed by the whole village to oppose

the settlements, their opposition was only nominal.

The commissioners

did not miss the opportunity, however, and reiterated English claims
to the Kennebec.
The conference and the surrender of the hostages has been much

remarked upon.

H. C. Schuyler correctly said that the Abnakis feared

"the English would use forcible means to obtain satisfaction for their

’Mass. Council, Jan. 13, 1720/21.
For a biographical sketch of
Joseph Bean (Bane) see:
Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, I, p. 85.

2Lord noted that "for a moment, however, it apparently served to
set aside another angry demand of the House for drastic military action."
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 126.
Later, when the Indians
grew angry at the government's retention of the hostages the colony had
to refuse to free them or lose their argument on the eastern settlements.
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recent forays....11'

Parkman mentioned Rale's "great chagrin"*2 at the

capitulation of the peace party.

Several historians have commented on

the election, sometime in the fall of 1720, at which "a well known
advocate of pacific measures" won.3

They failed to notice, however,

the reason for the election of the pro-English party in the first
place.

Events of the previous summer had shattered French-Abnaki

tions.

rela

There is no doubt that the Abnakis, and even the peace party,

opposed the English settlements on Merrymeeting Bay.
had the will to do something about it.

Some of these

They sent delegates to explain

to Governor Vaudreuil "the situation in which they were placed."

4

Vaudreuil's answer to their pleas for assistance was devastatingly
inept and completed the internal

rupture of Rale's mission.

Vaudreuil

assured the Abnakis that
he should never fail them, in time of need.
But what assis
tance, Father, will you give us? they asked. My children,
answered Mr de Vaudreuil, I shall secretly send you some
hatchets, some powder and lead.
Is this the way, then, the
Indians retorted, that a Father aids his children, and was it

’H. C. Schyler, "The Apostle to the Abenakis, Father Sebastien

Rasies, S. J.,
pp. 171-72.

1657-1724," Catholic Historical Review,
~

2Parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict,

I

(1915-16),

I, pp. 232-33.

3Wi 1 1 iamson, History of the State of Maine, II, p. 105; Baxter,
Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 106; Lord, History of the
Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 126.

^This is the misdated document in O'Callaghan under the title
Memoire respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia.
1718, New York Colonial
Documents, IX, pp. 878-81.
It is properly entitled Memoire sur les
Limites de l'Acadie, envoye de Quebec a Mgr le Due d'Orleans, Regent,
par le Pere Charlevoix, Jesuite, Oct. 19, 1720, Arch. Col. C 11 E,
vol. 2, pp. 76-85; Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 49-54.
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thus we assisted you? A Father, they added, when he sees his
son engaged with an enemy stronger than he, comes forward,
extricates his son and tells the enemy that it is with him he
has to do. Well, replied Mr de Vaudreuil, I will engage the
other Indian tribes to furnish you aid. At these words the
deputies retorted with an ironical laugh--Know, that we all
who inhabit this vast continent will, whensoever we please,
as long as we exist, unite to expel all foreigners from it,
by they who they may.’

Thus, Rale's policy of supporting the Abnaki claim to the land
was dangerously aborted.

Vaudreuil had lost,

in one slip of the tongue,

much of the influence he had had with the Norridgewocks.

The governor

and Intendant Begon feared that the Abnakis would capitulate to Mass

achusetts.

Begon did "not judge the Abenaquis of the present day,"

Charlevoix said, "by the Abenaquis of former times...."

2

The

Norridgewocks were obviously divided, even to the extent that Rale's

life was in danger.

3

Yet the task of reuniting the village was in

his hands.

Only the missionaries, Charlevoix contended, had "the power...to
persuade them

4
general."

the Abnakis

to submit to the will of the Governor

By that was not actually the case.

As subsequent events

’Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia,
New York Colonial Documents,

1718, O'Callaghan,

IX, p. 880.

^"Father Rale, Missionary at Naurantsoak, did, indeed, make
some efforts to prevent this settlement, the consequences of which he
foresaw, but he did not consider himself bound to make any stronger
demonstrat ions, because it would be an useless risk of his life....
He knew that a price had been set on the head of his confrere, Father
Aubry, for the same reason, at the beginning of the last war, but this
Father succeeded in removing the English, and had nothing to fear from
any of the Abenaquis, circumstances which no longer exist.''
Ibid.,
My italics.

1 b i d. , p. 879.
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were to indicate, Vaudreuil clearly followed Rale's lead.
wished to prevent Massachusetts'

The governor

settlement of the Kennebec, but it

is clear from Rale's previous actions, and letters that he was motivated

by what he considered Massachusetts'

injustice to the Norridgewocks.

Massachusetts had made a serious error in demanding that the
Rale used the incident to convince the

Indians surrender hostages.

Kennebecs that the English colony could not be trusted.

The Jesuit

was embarrassed that the Abnakis had voluntarily submitted.

He tried

to hide the truth about the incident by reporting that the Indians
were beguiled into sending emissaries to the English who then held

them against their will.’

He obviously knew differently.

Surviving

letters from Begon and Vaudreuil show that he understood the true cir
cumstances of the incident.

The letters show, moreover, that he was

using every means to convince the Indians of the folly of their
actions.

2

In doing so, he was not following orders from France.

The

policy is entirely consistent with his action since 1713, and it is
equally clear that Vaudreuil and Begon cooperated with him and not

’Rale to Nephew, Oct.

15,

1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

LXVII, p. 103.
Rale wrote this letter after the outbreak of the war.
He hoped that it would encourage aid from France for the Abnakis.
He
had an obvious reason, then, for hiding the fact that the Abnakis were
divided among themselves.

zBegon to Rale, June 14, 1721, and Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25,
1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 54-65.
These were printed
in the Mass. House Journa1, III, which also prints another letter of
Vaudreuil to Rale, June 15, 1721, pp. 189-92.
Oddly, Father Charlevoix
author of the document describing the incident, follows Rale rather
than his own document.
Nor does he mention the disruptive meeting
of the Abnakis with Vaudreuil in the summer of 1720 in his history of
New France.
Many French-Canadian historians, following, Charlevoix,
are likewise in error.
Charlevoix, History and General Description of
New France, V, pp. 271-72.
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vice versa.
Sebastien Rale was determined to drive the English from Merry-

meeting Bay.

He was aware that the English had ordered the Indians to

dismiss him and he resolved to use every means available to undermine

the pro-English Indians in his village.

The English planned to meet

the Abnakis to hear their answer on Rale's dismissal.

decided to "pack" the conference.

The Jesuit

He sent six Indians to invite the

Abnakis at St. Francis and Becancourt to join the Kennebecs against
the English.

At his behest, Vaudreuil hastened to those villages to

insure that they did so.'

Rale was desperate; many of the Indians of Norridgewock no

longer listened to his words.

He sent Vaudreuil a memoir on the senti

ments that the governor should impress on the Kennebecs.

Vaudreuil

complied, and delivered a long harangue against the English. "I think
you will find," Begon reported to Rale, that the governor's speech was
"in the Sense proposed by you."

the Kennebecs, then at Quebec.

Father LaChasse joined in to encourage
Likewise, after hearing from Rale

Vaudreuil decided against writing an angry note to Shute.

he accepted Rale's proposals:

Instead,

The Kennebecs must remain on their lands,

and they must unite in "Speaking Firmly to the Englishmen."*2
3

'Begon to Rale, June 14,

1721, and Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25,

1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 54-65; Vaudreuil to Rale,
June 15, 1721 ; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, III, pp. 189-92.
Williamson understood that Vaudreuil went to St. Francis and Becancourt
of his own initiative and that he excited the Indians and then informed
Rale.
His error is a result of a garbled translation of Vaudreuil's
June, 1721, letter to Rale.
History of the State of Maine, II, pp.
105-06.

2Begon to Rale, June 14,
p. 59.

3 lb id., pp. 55-57.

1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII,
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Vaudreuil and Begon found it easy enough to agree with the
Jesuit’s plans, but his intensity worried them.

The two administra

tors realized that nothing could be done to jeopardize the French

alliance with Great Britain.

Tactfully but emphatically, Begon told

Rale the importance of acting judiciously.

Three times he warned him

about "The prudence with which we Deem ourselves obliged To act toward
The English, so that we may not Commit ourselves."’

Governor Vaudreuil decided to send Rale's superior, Father
LaChasse, to the Kennebec, He would be able to enlist the aid of the
Penobscots, as well as the Indians of Canada.

ulterior motive, however.

The governor had an

LaChasse was to explain to Rale what the

governor resolved to do "until the Council of Marine has Explained
Whether The King's intention Is that the French should join the

Savages...or whether he will Content himself with supplying Them with
Munitions of War...."

2

Vaudreuil,

it seems, was taking no chances.

It may have been that he had learned that his conduct was under some

censure in France.3
Though a definite gamble, Rale's program was an unqualified

success.

Samuel Moody, sent to Arrowsic to learn if the Indians had

ousted Rale,

reported instead that their "design is to bring their

’Begon to Rale, June 14,
LXV 1 1 , P» 57 o

1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

^Begon to Rale, June 14,
LXVI1 , p. 55.

1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

3Memoi re secret de M. Dauteu i1 a M. le Due d'Orleans, Jan. 1720,
Arch. Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 69-75. McFarlane mistakenly noted that
the correspondence between Rale and Vaudreuil "indicated that French in
fluence was one of the chief causes for the Indian raids made on the
Maine frontiers in the years 1720-21." "Indian Relations in New
England," p. 134.
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Skins hither premptorily to demand their Hostages upon the Delivery of

them."’

The Abnakis had no intention of dismissing Rale.

they "insolently charge the Govern^

Moody said

Folly in makeing New Demands,

before the Matter is finished referring to the skins which they are to

pay."

In July, Moody added that Rale and the Indians were at Arrowsic

"Inquireing dayly after their Men,"3 and worst of all, the Penobscots

had joined the Kennebecs.

On the 28th of July, 200 Indians marched with Rale, LaChasse,
Castin the younger and a French officer to Arrowsic Island where they
accosted the English.

"The Indians," in Vaudreuil's words, "then threw

down two hundred beavers, which they had promised for the cattle that

had been killed, and demanded at the same time, where were the four
men they had conveyed to Boston as hostages for this payment."

h

When they were told that the governor would not surrender the
hostages, the Indians had Father LaChasse read their letter.

Abnakis demanded:

despite me?"

The

"Is it to live in peace with me to take my land

"Consider Great Captain," the Indians addressed Shute,

"that I have frequently told thee to retire off from my lands, and I

repeat it to thee now for the last time...It is not thine by gift; the
King of France, thou sayst has given it to me; but has he power to give

51:

1 Letter to the Gov. from Samuel Moody, June 5, 1721, Mass. Arch.
353; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 462-63.
^Letter from Moody to Gov. Shute, June 19,

1721,

Ibid., pp. 463-64.

3Letter from Samuel Moody to Gov. Shute, July 8, 1721, Ibid.,
pp. 464-65; For the order to the Indians for Rale's dismissal see:
Mass. Council, Jan. 24, 1720/21; May 6, 1721.

’’’Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Begon to Louis XV, Oct. 8,
O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents,

IX, p. 904.

1721,
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it to thee? am I his subject?

The Indians have given it to thee.

Some

Indians that thou has overreached by making them drink, have they the
power to give it to thee to the prejudice of all their nation...?11
with most of the petitions that Rale inspired, the Indians’
ended with a terrible threat.

As

letter

"I wait then," the sachems said, "thy

reply within three Sabbath days;

if within this time thou dost not

write me, that thou hast retired from my land,

I will not tell thee

i.1
again...."
Shute was thunderstruck.

tactful terms.

He wrote Vaudreuil at once, though in

He felt sure, he said, that the French governor intended

to live faithfully by the Treaty of Utrecht.

He felt justified in

asking Vaudreuil to censure the French officer and to recall Sebastien
Rale.

He added that if a war broke out between the English and the

Abnakis he expected Vaudreuil's "Friendship and Assistance therein."

2

Without waiting for Vaudreuil's reply, Governor Shute and his
Council

immediately dispatched men to the frontier and named commission-

ers to meet the Indians at Arrowsic.

The Indians' threat frightened*2
3

’Letter of the Abnakis to Governor Shute, Arch. Col., Se'rie F
3, Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 502-07; Baxter, Pioneers
of New France in New England, pp. 111-18; Also printed in Ford, ed.,
Mass. House Journal, Sept. 1, 1721, III, pp. 109-11.
cf. also Memoire
sur les Entreprises que les Anglois de Baston font sur les Terres des
Abenakis sauvages allies des francois, Dec. 28, 1721, Min. Aff. Etr.,
vol. 339, pp. 132-36; Mass. House Journal, Aug. 24, 1721, III, p. 89;
The Boston Gazette, Aug. 28, 1721.
2Govr Shute to the Canadian Governor, July 21, 1721, Baxter,
Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 298-99.

3Mass. Council, July 25,

1721.
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the governor and he hastened to calm them.

The English settlers, much

alarmed at the confrontation, fled the frontier.

Shute, after much

hesitation, took the Council’s advice and issued a Proclamation "to
Command and Require that all Persons by Law fit to bear Arms who have

deserted the Frontiers immediately and without Delay return to their
Habi tat ions...."’

Governor Phillips of Nova Scotia thought the incident was "no

more than a drunken inspiration,"

o

but Massachusetts was more alarmed.

Upon hearing that "the Indians refuse to treat with our Commissioners,"

the House began to consider "the best methods for securing the Eastern

Settlements."^

The House not only proposed to add 150 men to the 350

already on the Kennebec, but thought it necessary to send 300 of them
to Norridgewock.

The representatives angrily demanded that both Rale

and Castin be surrendered.

If the Indians opposed the invading force,

the troops were to "proceed to kill and destroy them by force of
Arms...."24'

Pains were taken to pass an act prohibiting trade with the

Indian rebels.

The Council quickly agreed and demanded that the

Indians "under pain of being prosecuted with utmost severity, to deliver

’The Boston Gazette, Sept. 23, 1721.

Aug.

^Governor Phillipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations,
16, 1721, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII, p. 388.

^The Boston Gazette, Aug. 28, 1721; Ford, ed., Mass, House
Journal, Aug. 28^ 1721, FT I, p. 94.

^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Sept. 7, 1721, p. 124; Sept.
8, 1721, p.

126.
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up the Jesuits and other Heads and Formentors of their Rebellion at
Boston by the first day of November....11’

Governor Vaudreuil was smugly satisfied with the outcome of the
march on Arrowsic.

that,

"For my part," he wrote to Rale, "1 Am of opinion

If they have taken a Sincere resolution not to allow The English

On Their Land,

they Must not hesitate to Drive them Therefrom as Soon

as possible...."

2

Though he told Rale he could not give the Abnakis

men, he said he would provide them with ammunition.

Vaudreuil‘s task was not made easier by the king and ministry.
The Governor received nothing more concrete than vague orders to en
courage them to oppose the English.

ent ideas.

"M. de Vaudreuil

Begon and Vaudreuil had differ

is persuaded," they wrote the king,

"that if his Majesty permit him to adjoin some French with the Abenaquis,
the English will be forced to abandon all their settlements on the
lands belonging to these Indians...."

Negatively, he warned the

king that if he did not do so he feared "that they will unite with the*2

’Ibid., Sept. 5,

1721, p.

117.

Only crusty old Samuel Sewall

objected to the Council's decision.
He said that "the Indians shewed
a great Reluctancy against Erecting Forts higher up the River; and
against the arrival of a Multitude of New Inhabitants;....
They also
desired the Running of a Line between the English, and them; and made
some Proposals on their part, which were rejected; but no Proposals
for fixing Boundaries, were offered to them." Samuel Sewall, "A
Memorial relating to the Kennebeck Indians," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect ions,
1st ser. (Portland: The Society, 1853), 111, PP- 351-53.
2

Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25, 1721.
vol. 67, p. 63; Mass. Arch. 51: 358-59.

Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

107
English against us....11’

Undoubtedly with Rale's encouragement, the Indians sent a
petition to the king.

They asked him to stop the English "or to enter

into the war which they are resolved to make for the defense of their

country."

2

Rale was determined to make it clear that the ministry could

no longer avoid a decision on the Abnakis, and a memoir was sent the
French Procurer for the Jesuit missions asking his aid.3
The English and the Abnakis could not have been closer to war.

English indecision, as well as that of the Abnakis', seriously hampered
mutual discussion of the issues.

No black and white relationship can

be drawn between Rale and the causes of the conflict.

Many of the

councillors, and even Shute himself, realized that Massachusetts bore
her share of the guilt.

From the political quarrel between the Council

and House a policy inadvertently emerged.

It was a product of the

House's militancy and the Council's wavering hesitancy.

Even more basic

was the inadequate and often presumptuous treatment of the Indians.

If

indeed they were subjects of the British Crown, their rights were only

^Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to Louis XV, Oct. 8,

1721,

O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 906; Arch. Col. C 11
A, vol. 4-3, p. 234; Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 61; Le Roy aux
Sieurs de Vaudreuil et Begon, June 8, 1721: The king said, it should
be noted, that he was pleased with Rale's opposition to the English.
Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 54; Arch. Col., F. 3, Collection
de Moreau St. Mery; vol. 10, part 1, pp. 170-72.
2Parolle des Abenakis au Roy, Oct., 1721, Arch. Col., Serie F. 3,
Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 499-501.

3Extrait de quelques lettres de Jesuites Missionaries de Canada,
au Pere Davaugour Leurs Procurer en france, depuis la fin d'aoust,
jusqu'au commencement de Decembre 1721, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124,
pp. 179-80.
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vaguely defined.

The importance of Rale's influence is undeniable.

His personal

distrust of the English, and to what they symbolized for his mission

is a key aspect of the conflict.

Much less well-defined was the role

of the government of New France.

Their attention to the Abnakis and

to Rale's irate missives was only cursory.

In 1716 they had assured the ministry that the construction of
chapels at Norridgewock and at Meductic would cement the alliance with

the Indians.

Those chapels were completed in 1720 but they hardly

attached the Indians to the French.'

Had Vaudreuil and Begon been

observant, the Indians would not have revolted against them and the
Jesuits, Had they been attentive, they would not have had to submit to
Rale's direction.

Vaudreuil and Begon did not tell the ministry how

they had dangerously ruptured the Abnaki alliance.

it would not have been important.
This was Rale's cause.

Even if they had,

The ministry, too, was indifferent.

As time went on it became clear that he would

succeed or fail, alone, with the Abnakis.

Rale said his chapel was "commodious and well adorned," and
Vaudreuil found it "well built."
In a letter to Shute, however, Rale
heatedly complained about its construction.
Financed by the king and
the Abnakis, Rale hired English workmen for the job.
He contended
that the laborers worked spasmodically and had overchared the Indians.
He claimed that the belfry was so badly done that "the two workmen
that covered it, not without fear, advised not to put a bell there,
asuring 'twould fall down as soon as ‘twas rung." Rale to Nephew,
Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, vol. 67, p. 87; Vaudreuil
at Begon au Conseil de Marine, Oct. 26, T720, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol.
42, pp. 27-28; Letter from the Indians to the Gov. Translated 1720,
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 89-93; Mass. Arch. 31: pp. 97100.
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CHAPTER V

SEBASTIEN RALE'S WAR

With the declaration of war in July,

1722, the Abnaki problem

took on new, specifically intercolonial overtones.

What had been,

essentially, a contest between Abnakis and Englishmen for control of

the Kennebec lands, became obscured

by what Governor Shute regarded

as unwarranted French interference.

Whatever legitimate claims the

Abnakis may have had were submerged by Massachusetts’ fear of French

intervention and Governor Vaudreuil's blustering threats increased the

tens ion.
Despite Massachusetts' conviction that Vaudreuil was, through

Rale, the sole cause of the conflict, the war remained a local one.
Vaudreuil did encourage the Canadian and Nova Scotian Indians to aid

the Abnaki cause.
their support.

He did procure guns, ammunition, and subsidies for

He could not, despite his personal

inclinations, openly

join the war effort.

Massachusetts’ determination to squelch the so-called rebellion
led,

inevitably, to Sebastien Rale.

As the most visible evidence of

French influence the Jesuit was singled out as responsible for
Massachusetts' frontier difficulties.
misplaced.

After 1722, their concern was

Though Rale encouraged the Indians'

resistance in the early

years of the conflict, once Massachusetts had declared war, control
of the situation passed out of his hands.
Indians guns, ammunition, or men.

Rale could not give the

Naturally, the Abnakis turned to

Vaudreuil and through him to the French king and ministry.

Massachusetts,

however, did not perceive the power shift and continued to demand Rale's

I 10

remova1.
The end came tragically for Rale.

With its hands tied by the

delicate European situation, the Council of Marine did not give the
Abnakis the aid the Jesuit had hoped for.

that the English would willingly retire.

Rale had not naively supposed
By 1722 it was clear that

house burning and cattle killing would not frighten the settlers from

the Kennebec.

Moved by Rale's initial persuasion the Indians decided

that they must fight to retain their lands.

unswerving support and cooperation.

Vaudreuil promised his

Though he was severely hampered

by the ministry's pragmatic caution, the governor stood firm in that

deci s ion.
Fannie Hardie Eckstorm has suggested that the defeat of the
Abnakis seriously embarrassed the officials of New France.'

She has

asserted that Vaudreuil and Begon invented the myth of Rale's valient
death and martyrdom to hide the loss of their most important outpost.

She never does explain just how such a fabrication would absolve them
of the responsibility; her conclusion is unwarranted when all the facts

are examined.

Events before that decisive attack show that Vaudreuil

had nothing to hide from his superiors.

his power to aid the Abnakis.
French soldiers in the effort.

directly involved.

Vaudreuil did everything in

Everything, that is, except involving
He was expressly forbidden to become

If the attack on Norridgewock was a drastic blow to

the security of the colony, the governor was not at fault.

moved independently of his control to that conclusion.

Events had

He tried,

unsuccessfully, to convince Massachusetts that she should leave the

Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 551ff

Ill

dispute to the arbitration of an international commission but the English

were determined to protect their self-declared rights.
In November, 1721, Massachusetts had still done nothing to

chastise the Indians for their march on Arrowsic the previous July.
When the House reassembled in the fall

it quickly demanded the Council's

reasons for the delay of the proposed attack on Norridgewock.

Provoked

by the Council's non-commital answer, the House drew up another resolve

against the Indians.

It named and ordered seven chieftains seized and

renewed the t.200 reward for Rale or any other priest found in the

After an amendment, the Council agreed to the measure.’

province.

Though the Indians threatened violent retribution at Arrowsic

and though they now had Vaudreuil's sympathetic support, they still

made no major move against the English.
Abnakis peace would have been assured.

Abnakis.

Had the English appeased the

Two incidents infuriated the

Not only did the English refuse to return the hostages,

they also captured Joseph D'Abbadie de St. Castin for his role in the

march on Arrowsic.

Castin was invited aboard a vessel which then "set

sail, and carried him to Boston."

The action completely alienated

the Penobscots, for Castin was a tribal member through his mother.

’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal,

Nov. 10, p.
156-59.

143; Nov.

15, p.

2Rale to Nephew, Oct.

150; Nov.

15,

III, Nov. 9,
16, pp.

1721, pp. 141-4-2;

152-53; Nov.

17, pp.

1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I,

pp. 109-11; Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council of Marine,
Oct. 17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 910;
Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 14-3-44; Collection de Manuscripts , III,
p. 85; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, No~ 17, 1721, III, j>. 156.
Mass. Council, Oct. 19, 1721; Robert LeBlant, Une figure legendaire de
l'histoire Acadienne;
LeBaron de St. Castin (Dax:
Editions P. Pradeu,
193^)» PP- ”3ff.

112

Equally explosive was the peacetime march on Norridgewock in

the winter of 1722.

Captain Westbrook's objective was simple:

seize Rale and the principal offending chiefs.

a better time.

He could not have chosen

Except for the Jesuit and the older Indians, the village

was almost deserted.
hunting.

to

The young men were scattered throughout the woods

Sebastien Rale, however, was warned of Westbrook's approach

by two young Indians.

The old Jesuit barely had time to consume the

Blessed Sacrament and to gather the sacred vessels before fleeing.
He made good his escape, but the next day the English followed, hot in

pursuit.

Rale raced to the snow-laden forests.

He could not run far

for he had to leave his snow-shoes behind, and he was encumbered by

his previously broken thigh and hip.

Rale later said that the English

came within eight steps of the tree which hid him.

Miraculously, the

soldiers did not discover his tracks and he escaped detection.

Return

ing to the settlements the English again stopped at Norridgewock to
plunder the Church and Rale's house.

and alarm, several

They found, much to their surprise

letters from Vaudreuil and Begon to the Jesuit .’

The letters startled the English.

They conclusively proved

Rale's connection with the administrators of Quebec.

The Council

immediately prepared and sent a letter to Vaudreuil castigating him for

"instigating the Indians to commit hostilities against the English."

^Rale to his Nephew, Oct.

15,

2

1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

vol. 67, LXVII, pp. 113-14; Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council
of Marine, Oct. 17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX,
p. 910; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, pp. 285-86; Col lection de
Manuscripts, III, pp. 85-86; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, March 6,
1721/22, III, p. 163; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England,
p. 120; The New England Courant, February 12, 1721/22.

2Mass. Council, Feb. 9,

1721/22; Feb.

19,

1721/22.
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Shute despatched copies to Great Britain,

reasserted Massachusetts'

claim to the Kennebec and maintained his contention that the Abnakis

were subjects of the British Crown.’
iastic as before.

But the House was not as enthus

The representatives undoubtedly feared a confronta

tion with the French, for they refused to pass a resolve of the joint
committee for Rale's apprehension and the enlistment of the Five

Nations against the Abnakis.

Moderately, the house considered it best

to name another committee to consider the problem.3

Governor Shute thought that Vaudreuil was the key to the conflict.
The letters had, unfortunately for the Abnakis, convinced the English
that it was the French who must be dealt with.

Shute conveniently

forgot the Abnakis1 continual protests as well as the reasons for their
forays on the frightened Kennebec settlements.

He thought the protests

were only a smokescreen to cloak the French influence.

He did not

realize that Vaudreuil had not caused the conflict and he absolutely

refused to recognize the Abnakis as French allies.

Shute wrote Vaudreuil and demanded that Rale be removed from
English territory without further "abusing his character and profession."

4

"Is it thus," the governor queried, "that we follow the example*2
3

’gov.

Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, March 13,
1722, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXIII, p. 27; Baxter, Pioneers of New France
in New England, pp. 303-04.

2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, May 30,
3 I b i d., June 22,

1722,

IV, pp.

101-02.

1722, p. 41.

^Lettre du Gouverneur Shute a Monsieur Le Marquis de Vaudreuil,
March 14, 1722, Collection de Manuscripts ,
Same," April 3, 1722, Ibid., pp. 74-77.

III, pp. 70-72; "Same to
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of our masters who live in peace?11
to Vaudreuil.

Self-righteousness came as easily

He suggested in his reply that the territory be considered

neutral until their kings had decided its status.

He reminded Shute

that like it or not the boundaries had not been settled.
was not on English territory, or on French land either.

Father Rale

He was spiri

tual guardian, and though Vaudreuil did not describe the role, temporal
advisor to a sovereign nation.

He reiterated his counter-claim that

the Abnakis were French allies and were under the protection of France.’

There was nothing new or innovative in Vaudreuil's reply.
December,

1721,

In

the Council of Marine had responded in much the same

vein to Vaudreuil's request for military aid for the Abnakis.

ministry expressed its view at the British court:

The

the Abnakis were

allies, and if the English harassed them, Louis XV could not refuse
them his protection.

The borders must be settled and the English

settlements abandoned, the ministry had continued.

The British, none

theless, were not inclined to complacently accept the French demands
or to settle the dispute.

At the end of May, they had still not

replied though the French had asked to be informed of their decision

before March.

On June 6,

1722, the British made their attitude clear.

The Council of Trade wrote to Governor Burnet that "as there is at
present no great prospect of settling the boundaries...you will do

well to extend our settlements with proper precautions as far as you*

’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Gouverneur Shute, June 7,
1722, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 78-84.

H5

can.
Unlike the Council of Marine, the Abnakis were not hampered
by international considerations.

They were infuriated by the attempt

to seize Rale and by the arrest of Castin.

cattle until they had planted their fields.

They continued to kill

That finished, they

descended on the lower Kennebec where they captured sixty-five terrified

Englishmen.

They released them all except for five held in ransom

for their chiefs in Boston.
fishing boat.
several

The following week six Indians attacked a

Trying to save themselves, the English defenders killed

Indians.

The House of Representatives thought the incident

serious enough "to suspect that the Eastern Indians will take the first
opportunity of falling upon"

the English settlements.

Despite their stand the previous winter, however, the House

refused to use force against the Indians.

The Council also rebuffed

the joint committee's advice to send another expedition against
Norridgewock.

The councillors suggested that one officer with two or

three soldiers be sent to demand the release of the English hostages.

After deciding to mend relations with the Five Nations, the House even
suggested that the Indian hostages be swapped for the English prisoners.

’Le Conseil a Monsieur le Cardinal DuBois, Dec. 22,

1721,

Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 67-68; Pour etre porte a Monsiegneur
le Due d'Orleans, May 28, 1722, Arch. Col. C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 210;
Council of Trade and Plantations to Governor Burnet, June 6, 1722,
Cal, of St. Pap., XXXIII, pp. 83-84.

^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Mar. 7, 1721/22, III, p. 68;
Gov. Shute to Mr. Popple, June 18, 1722, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII1, pp.
89-90; Mr. Cummings to Mr. Popple, June 20, 1722, Ibid., pp. 90-91;
The New England Courant, June 18, 1722; Mass. House Journal, June 22,
1722, IV, p. 42.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, June 28, 1722, IV, pp. 54-55;
June 29, pp. 60-61; July 5, pp. 68-69; July 6, pp. 72-73; July 7, p. 78.

3
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Unfortunately for all concerned, the House’s pacifying measures

were much too late.

By the end of July the Kennebecs had burnt

Brunswick and Johnson Harmon had killed eighteen Indians.

Governor

Shute could not evade the issue and, submitting to pressure,

issued a

declaration of war against the Eastern "rebels, Traitors and Enemies."'

A hundred more men were sent to the frontier and when the House met,
it approved the governor's policy and set a bounty on Indian scalps.
After the English had declared war, the Abnakis were led and

inspired by Governor Vaudreuil.
years of political

Oddly, Sebastien Rale, after his long

intrigue, was left out of the picture.

were limited to writing two autobiographical

French public against the English.

His efforts

letters to arouse the

But Vaudreuil was no longer bound*3

’The war has had various names. Most popular and most misleading
is 'Lovewell's War1 after the colorful scalp hunter who unwittingly be
came the hunted.
But that did not happen until 1725.
Better, though
still imperfect, is 'Dummer's War.' But the victorious lieutenantgovernor did not declare the conflict.
Quite unexpectedly he was inun
dated with executive responsibility when Shute fled the divisive factions
of the General Court.
zThe New England Courant, July 16, 1722; The Boston Gazette, July
23, 1722, and July 30, 1722; Mass. Council, July 24, 1722; The New
England Courant, July 30, 1722; and August 13, 1722; Mass. Arch. 31: PP.
106-08; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, August 8, 1722, IV, p. 81; Moody,
"The Maine Frontier," pp. 348-4-9.
Hutchinson interestingly noted that
the English "chose to call the proceedings against them a prosecution
for rebellion but, if a view be taken of all the transactions between
the English and them from the beginning, it will be difficult to say
what sort of subjects they were, and it is not certain that they under
stood they had promised subjection at all." History of MassachusettsBay, II, p. 203.
3Rale to Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, and Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723,
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 84-119.
For the controversy on
their composition see Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," pp. 541-78;
and Henri Bechard, "A propos de deux lettres du Pere Sebastien Rasies,
S. J.," Sciences Ecclesiastiques, II (1949), pp. 191-218.
Bechard's is
the most trustworthy account for Eckstorm's article is marred with
many serious errors of fact and interpretation.
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by the Jesuit's representations,

if indeed, he made any.

After the

summer of 1722, the Abnakis could be better served by the administra

tors of New France.
The Abnakis did not stop asking Vaudreuil for munitions or for
French soldiers to help them.

and avoided a direct reply.

to plead their cause.

The governor could not commit himself
Instead, he sent Father Loyard to France

Indeed, the implication is, that until he had

explicit orders from France, he actually restrained the Abnakis from

open warfare.’

He did not do so from any concern for the English of

His sole objective was to avoid direct involvement by New

course.
France.

Father Loyard did his best to prod the cumbersome royal bureaucra
cy.

Through lengthy memoirs he stressed the importance of the Abnaki

alliance to the future of New France.

if France wished to retain

Canada, Loyard warned them, they must aid the Abnakis.

"...It seems

at least necessary that £the CourQ complain loudly of the English

violations of the Treaty of Utrecht..."

the Jesuit argued.

He thought

it especially important to increase the annual gratuity to each Abnaki

village.
The king, not surprisingly, agreed that the English were violating

’Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council of Marine, Oct.
17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 911; Lettre
de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil de la Marine, Oct. 22, 1722,
Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 88-89.
2Memoire sur les pretentions des Anglois dan la partie meridionale
de la Nouvelle France, s. d., Arch, des Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 214-27;
Memoire de P. Loyard:
Sur I'Etat Present des Abenauis, 1722, Thwaites,
Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 120-25.
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the treaty of peace.

Time and again the royal officials stated that

the Abnakis were French allies and that their interests must be pro
tected.

Finally, their resolves resulted in inane orders to Governor

Vaud reu iI.

As early as June,
Abnaki

1723, the king had ordered Vaudreuil to protect

interests, without however, giving them men.

Vaudreuil was

warned to observe the keystone of French foreign policy:

peace must

be preserved with the British crown, regardless of cost.

The ministry

did not think it too dangerous to the peace to give the Abnakis a
special grant to support their families while they engaged in war.
Later, the Council of Marine elaborated its view.

It directed Vaudreuil

to explain to the Indians of New France that the British intention was
to make themselves masters of the whole continent.

Since the English

could not attack the French, Vaudreuil was to say, they had resolved

to destroy the Indian allies of France.’

The declaration of war, and the open hostilities between the

English and the Abnakis, occasioned a passionate exchange of notes
between Quebec and Boston.

Both Vaudreuil and Shute took uncompromising

positions and neither accepted the advice of the other.

On October 28,

1723, Vaudreuil wrote Shute a heated plea to leave the Abnakis in

peace.

He told the English governor what Shute knew only too well:

settlement of a boundary depended on an international

commission.

the

The

Abnakis were allies of France and Utrecht had provided that both France

’Copie du Memoire du Roy a Mrs. de Vaudrail et Begon cy devant
Gouverneur general et Intendant en Canada, June 9, 1723, Min. Aff. Etr.,
vol. 7, part 1, pp. 312-16; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 45, pp. 75-78;
La Ministre a Vaudreuil et Begon a propos de la guerre des Abenaquis,
Oct. 14, 1723, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 45, pp. 5-6.
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and Great Britain respect the native alliances of each nation.

Unfor

tunately for the Abnakis Shute would not accept Vaudreuil’s claim of an

alliance.

In fact, the English went further and asserted that the

Abnakis were unquestionably subjects of the British crown, albeit

rebellious ones.

Nor was the situation eased by Vaudreuil's threats

of open warfare in support of the Abnakis.’
Vaudreuil's letter was called "Insolent."

Governor Burnet of

New York added that Vaudreuil was frightened by the declaration of

war by the Iroquois.

2

Actually, Vaudreuil had assured the ministry

that the Five Nations would maintain their neutrality.

Dummer also found Vaudreuil's letter preposterous.

Governor

He immediately sent

a return note to Quebec asserting that he and his government had lived

according to the terms of Utrecht and that the war was instigated by

Vaudreuil and Sebastien Rale.

He closed by reiterating his request

for Vaudreuil's support in getting the Abnakis to submit to English

author i ty.
Dummer was too crafty a politician to be deluded by hopes for

French aid.

He encouraged,

instead, a second march on Norridgewock

which was made by Captain Harmon in the winter of 1723.

Harmon failed

’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Gouverneur de Baston, Oct.

28, 1723, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 89-91; Baxter, Baxter
Manuscr i pts, XXI I I, pp. 158-59; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New
England, pp. 334-36; Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct.
6, 1723, Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 91-93.
2The New England Courant, Nov. 25, 1723; Gov. Burnet to Charles
Delafaye, Dec. 16, 1723, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXIII, pp. 392-93.

3Governor Dummer to Vaudreuil, Dec. 20, 1723, Baxter, Pioneers
of New France in New England, pp. 337-38; Cal, of St. Pap., cf. also
Address of Lt. Governor, Council and Representatives of the
Massachusetts Bay, Dec. 26, 1723, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII I, pp. 405-06.
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to reach the village, for the winter was warm and the river was open.

The whole campaign was badly handled because of the weather, and even

the Indians were uncommonly quiet.

however,

Captain Westbrook was successful,

in reaching and burning the Penobscots* village.’

Massachusetts also had recourse to a further expedient against

the Abnakis which seemed to promise success.
1722,

Early in the fall of

the Five Nations had agreed to mediate the conflict between the

English and the Abnakis.

Actually, Dummer did not expect to settle the

conflict peacefully; he realized, nonetheless, that the Iroquois might

frighten the Abnakis into their senses.

The delegates sent one of their

number with some Englishmen to Norridgewock.

They met no Indians,

however, for they had gone to Quebec for the winter.
stead, a note on the chapel door written by Rale.

They found,

in

He warned the

English not to burn the deserted village for if they did he could

assure them violent retaliation.

Though the note surprised the Iroquois

by its arrogance, they refused to ask the Abnakis to dismiss Rale.
Later, the Iroquois sent several delegations to the Abnakis in

One group went to St. Francis to win the Canadian Indians by

Canada.

'fhe New England Courant, Feb.

11,

1722/23 and April

The Boston Gazette, March 4, March 11, June 3,
2

1,

1723;

1723.

Journal of the Proceedings of Delegates of the Six Nations,
Oct. 10--0ct. 27, 1722, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts , XXIII, pp. 110-27;
Mass. Arch. 29:
pp. 75-98; Journal of Alexander Hamilton, Baxter,
Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 322; The Boston Gazette, Nov.
12, 1722; Nov. 19, 1722.
Baxter mistakingly reported that the letter
had been left by Rale the previous winter when Norridgewock was attacked
by Westbrook, On that occasion Rale had fled and had no time for a
lengthy note.
Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 120-23;
Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct. T4~ 1723, Arch. Col., C I 1 A,
vol. 45, pp. 8-9.

121

threats and promises.

The Iroquois invited them to take their families

to the lands of the Five Nations.

They warned the Abnakis that if they

united with the Kennebecs, “the Iroquois £wou1 d] declare equally against
them...."’

Frightened, the Indians of St. Francis replied that they were

willing to make peace but only on condition that the English returned

the Abnakis*

land and prisoners.

Those terms were repeated in the

presence of Alexander Hamilton, an English prisoner, whom the Abnakis
proposed to send to Boston as their messenger.

2

Hamilton reported to the House of Representatives on August 13,
1723.

Vaudreuil's letter which Hamilton delivered was received with

hostility, for the returned hostage told them that Vaudreuil had
supplied the Indians with arms.

He surrendered his journal to the

government as a graphic description of several

French conduct.

instances of unneutral

The previous May, for example, the Indians had con

sidered taking the initiative by returning their prisoners to the

English.

In Hamilton's words, Vaudreuil told them:

“I

think it a

piece of Inadvertency of you to Trust the English Generosity by sending

these Captives to them unless you first have yours Delivered here....*11
Vaudreuil realized that the Abnakis were alarmed by the Iroquois
threats.

He was correct in soothing their fears for by September the

’Abstract of Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon's Despatches, with

the report of the Minister thereupon, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial
Documents, IX, p. 934.
^Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct. 14,
11 A, vol. 45, pp. 9-12.

1723, Arch. Col., C
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Five Nations were less eager for war.’
With or without the Five Nations, Massachusetts stepped up her

campaign against the Indians.

Another expedition set out for

Norridgewock in the winter of 1724.
Moulton,

Under the command of Captain

the troops were again unsuccessful.

Though the Abnakis had

retired to Canada, Rale's house was ransacked and more papers and books
Surprisingly, Moulton did not destroy the village, though the

taken.

Penobscots' village had been burned the previous winter.

Williamson,

following Hutchinson, suggested that Moulton was a "discreet" man who

thought the Indians would treat the English with like charity.

Neither

commentator noticed the peculiarity of this manner of thought in a

mi 1i tary man.

2

Much more controversial was the successful attack in the summer

of 1724.

Characteristically, historians have divided into two camps

on the question.

The English have followed the sworn reports of the

English attackers, or actually, the sworn testimony of Captain Harmon.
Most writers have supplemented Harmon's two accounts by carefully look

ing at Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay, which critically
examines Captain Moulton's version as well.

The French view rests

with three men, Governor Vaudreuil and Fathers LaChasse and Charlevoix,

who in turn followed the surviving Kennebecs.

’The New England Courant, Aug.

19,

Fannie H. Eckstorm has

1723, Alexander Hamilton's

Journal, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 325-26;
Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Aug. 13, 1723, V, p. 113; The New
England Courant, Sept. 9, 1723.
2

Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts-Bay, II, p. 231; Williamson,
History of the State of Maine, II, pp. 124-25.
For a biographical sketch
on Col. Jeremiah Moulton see:
Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, II, p. 499.
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modified these two older views.

Eckstorm reports that Rale was forewarned that the English were
on the way to Norridgewock.

While she attributes the warning he

received to the prophetic mutterings of an Indian shaman, or witch
doctor, Rale's last letter suggests otherwise.’

Returning from their

latest expedition, the Indians told the Jesuit that 200 men were coming
to "drive them out of their camp...."

Rale thought, with some justifi

cation, that the possibility was remote:
But I said to them, how could that be, seeing we are daily
surrounding and making inroads upon them....
Besides, in all
the war you have had with them, did you ever see them come
to attack you in the spring, summer, or in the fall, when they
knew you were in the woods.2
Rale's statement was correct, the English did avoid campaigns in the
summer when the troops were susceptible to disease.

3

The most serious error Eckstorm made was her claim that Rale

"need not have lost the mission if he had taken a warning given him in
ample time."

But Sebastien Rale neither ridiculed the Indians' fear

of an invasion nor convinced them to stay at Norridgewock.

He told

Father LaChasse that the Indians
hearken to all my reasons aforegoing, but follow their own.
They design to quit the village for a fortnight, and to go five
or six leagues up the river, they proposed it to me, and I have
given my consent.

’Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 574.

^Father Ralle* to another priest, Aug.

12/13,

1724, Cal. of St.

Pap., XXXIV, p. 429; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England,
p. 251.
“
................

3Hilton to Lt. Gov. Dummer, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts ,

IX, p.

142.
Hilton said:
"This is what Offers upon this Expedition and I
humbly conceive that the winter time is the onely time ever to march
against the Indian Enemy...."
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Rale wrote the letter on the afternoon the English attacked.

Indians'

The

retreat was only hours too late.’

Five days before, on August 19th, four companies of soldiers

under Captains Harmon, Moulton, Brown and Lieutenant Bean had left
Richmond Fort near the upper end of Swan Island.

Arriving at Ticonic

Falls on the 20th, they proceeded by land on the 21st,

leaving behind

Lieutenant Wright with forty men to guard the seventeen whaleboats.

2

On the first evening of the two and a half day march to

Norridgewock, the English surprised the old chieftain Bomazeen with his
family.

His daughter was killed and his wife taken captive.

was of no small

importance.

The New England Courant reported Harmon's

testimony that Bomazeen escaped from the troops.
himself, however.

The event

3

Harmon contradicts

He says that the sachem was killed on the evening

of the 23rd, after the fight, at some distance from the village.*2*

Later

he reported that Bomazeen's body was found among the chieftains slain

that afternoon.5

My italics.
Father Ralle^ to another Priest, Cal. of St. Pap.,
XXXIV, 12/23 August, 1724, pp. 429-31; Baxter, Pioneers of New France
in New England, pp. 252; Mass. His. Soc., Collect ions, 2nd ser., VIII,
pp. 245-49; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 566.
2The Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27,

Wars of New England, p.

1724; Penhallow, Hi story of the

102.

3fhe New England Courant, Aug. 24, 1724; Hutchinson, following
the Boston News-Letter , Aug. 27, 1724, doesn't mention Bomazeen's
presence at all.
Both news accounts come from Harmon.
Hutchinson,
History of Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 235.
4New England Courant, Aug. 24,

1724, said that when some of the

troops left the village to gather their packs they met the sachem and
killed him.

^Hutchinson again follows the News-Letter and says Bomazeen's

body was found among the slain.
237.

History of Massachusetts Bay,
‘
~
............

11, p.
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To complicate matters further, another tradition says that Bomazeen
was shot in the river as he attempted to ford it.’

versions answer some of the underlying questions.

But none of these
If indeed he did

escape, as the English documents would seem to indicate, why didn't he
warn the village?

The English were led, though Eckstorm denies it,

to the village by Bomazeen's wife.

her spouse had warned the defenders?

Did she do so while hoping that
2

Nearing the village around noon of the 23rd, the attackers
decided to divide their forces.

Captain Harmon, commander-in-chief

for the expedition, oddly did not actually lead the attack but preferred
to scout the corn fields, leaving the task,

the glory to Captain Moulton.
directly to the village.

obscure.

responsibility, but not

The commander by default proceeded

At this point, the ensuing attack becomes

Moulton's account, as given by Hutchinson, contradicts one

of Harmon's two accounts to the Boston newspapers.
At question in this conflict of the English sources is the pro
blem of the stockade, despite the fact that Eckstorm confidently
asserted its existence.
Both Governor Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse reported that the

’Penhallow, a contemporary, reports that Bomazeen was "shot in

the river, as he attempted to make an escape. They afterwards killed
his daughter and took his wife captive...." History of the Wars of
New England, p. 102.
2 lb id., Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," fn. 36, p. 554.

3

Harmon did not explain the division to the General Court. The
officials and newspapers reported that the victory was due to his
leadership,
cf. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 235.
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village was not enclosed,’ though there is still extant a map drawn by
Joseph Heath in 1719 with a written description of the fort as being

Built with Round Loggs nine foot Long one end set into the
Ground:
is 160 foot Square with 4 Gates but no Bastions;
within it are Twenty Six Houses Built much after the English
manner, the Streets reguler, that from west Gate to the East
is 30 foot wide; their Church stands 4 perch without the East
gate, and their men able to Bear Arms, are about Three Score.*2

Interestingly, Harmon's accounts in two Boston newspapers and

Hutchinson following Moulton make no mention of the stockade.
states that the New-England Courant mentions the east gate.
paper actually said,

Eckstorm
The news

less substantially, that the plan for the offense

was to place the troops in such a way that the Indians "could in no

way avoid them but by running into the River."
was not essential to that stratagem.

Certainly a stockade

Sylvester, probably using French

sources, reports that "the old stockade had disappeared."3
Even the other English version does not solve the problem.

According to Harmon's other story, action immediately ensued after

their "approach within Pistol Shot" of the Indian town.

But Hutchinson

says that the village

Letter from Father de la Chasse, Superior-General of the
Missions in New France, to Father***, of the same Society, Oct. 29, 1724,
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, p. 233; Lettre de Monsieur le
Marquis de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct. 25, 1725, Collection de Manu
scripts, III, p. 109. There is nothing unusual about the date of these
letters.
Like all official papers, they were written in October just
before the ship left for France.
2

This map may be found among the papers of the Pejebscot
Proprietors at the Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.
3New England Courant, August 24, 1724; Eckstorm, "The Attack on
Norridgewock," fn.75, p. 5^9; Herbert Mil ton Sylvester, Indian Wars of
New England (Boston: W. B. Clarke Company, 1910), III, p. 234.
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about 3 o'clock suddenly opened upon them. There was not an
Indian to be seen, being all in their wigwams.
Our men were
ordered to advance softly and to keep a profound silence. At
length, an Indian came out of one of the wigwams and, as he
was making water, looked round him and discovered the English
close upon him.
He immediately gave the war whoop and ran in
for his gun.
The whole village, consisting of about 60 warriors,
besides old men, women and children, took the alarm, and the
warriors ran to meet the English, the rest fled to save their
1ives.’
Though the two accounts are diametrically opposite, neither makes pro

vision for the stockade in the advance.

It would seem,

that the Indians would have had time to close the gates.

in either case,
It cannot

be proven that the gate was left open so that Rale might flee to

Eckstorm only supposed that his house was outside the “en

safety.

closure" as it was at Penobscot.But there is no substantial evidence
of that and Heath's map does not mention it.

Even if we accept

Moulton's account we cannot establish the stockade's existence.
Eckstorm has emphasized the issue because she believed that Vaudreuil
and LaChasse had much to hide in the loss of the most important Abnaki

village.

But they had not evaded the loss of Penobscot though it

was as important as Norridgewock.

3

They did not hide the fact that the

Abnakis had fled to Canada at the beginning of the war.

How could the

ministry hold Vaudreuil responsible for a defeat in which their denial

of aid had played so vital a part?
However the battle was touched off, a terrible slaughter followed

It was a warm, sultry August day.

Rale was relaxing in his house

’Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27,

Massachusetts Bay,

1724; Hutchinson, History of

11, p. 236.

^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 568.

^Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct.
A, vol. 45, p. 7.

14,

1723, Arch. Col., C 11
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writing a letter to his superior,

Father LaChasse.

escaping the heat, slumbering in their cabins.

by surprise.

The English took them

Rale rushed from his letter and the savages panicked.

They fled to the river in confusion.
getting,

The Indians were

Some took to their canoes for

in their haste, their paddles.

Others tried to swim the river,

not much more than sixty yards wide at that time of year.
relentlessly pursued, firing upon them.

The English

They judged that about 50 men,

women and children made the opposite shore, though Vaudreuil and

LaChasse report that at least 150 made good their escape.’

The English then returned to the town, where meanwhile Rale was
valiantly defending himself in his house.

Lieutenant Jaques broke

down the door and found the Jesuit reloading his gun.

Jaques shot him

when the doughty old priest shouted he would neither give nor take
quarter.

Moulton, who had given orders to take the man alive, always

doubted Jaques' word.

The suspicion is highly significant, for the

erstwhile lieutenant was Moulton's son-in-law.

Harmon, however, dis-

played no such doubt in his oath before the Executive Council.

2

There was a young English boy in the cabin whom Rale shot and

stabbed in his fury at being caught unprepared.

Though Eckstorm's

account is admittedly conjectural, and she erroneously believed that

’Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724; The New-England Courant, Aug.

24, 1724; Boston Gazette, Aug. 24, 1724; Hutchinson, History of
Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 236; Letter from Father de la Chasse, Thwaites,
Jesuit Relations, vol. 67, LXVII, p. 233; Lettre de Monsieur le Marquis
de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct. 25, 1724, Collection de Manuscripts, III,
p. 109; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 573.
^Boston Gazette, Aug. 24,

1724; Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27,

1724;

New-England Courant, Aug. 24, 1724.
The latter contended that both Rale
and the sachem Mogg refused to surrender.
Hutchinson, History of
Massachusetts Bay, II, pp. 236-37.
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Rale was infuriated by his holding of the Indians at the village at

this of all times,

it is a tenable one;

"There was no deliberate

malice in the act, no deep-seated moral obliquity, only the unreasoning

madness of a tempest of emotions, rising cyclonic from profound calm."’

There will always remain, nevertheless, at least some suspicion of the
incident.

It is asking too much of English and French alike to accept

It should be said, too, that the story

such an action of a priest.

rests only with Harmon, who swore to its truth before the Council and

who gave the story to the Boston newspapers.

if the man's testimony could be trusted.

He did, after all, give two

varying accounts of the encounter that day.

he was not present at the action.

It could be justly asked

He did not explain that

Hutchinson only says that the story

rests with Harmon, the implication being, moreover, that Moulton had

been silent on the incident.

2

French historians have never fully accepted the English version
of the disaster.

inaccessible.

3

In the first place, the English documents have been

The French also distrusted those secondary accounts

lEckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 575.
^Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts Bay,

II, pp. 236-37.

3A few have accepted part of the narrative.
Goyau, for example,
said that not all of LaChasse1s account was true.
Lauvriere repudiated
the claim that 1000 men attacked the village.
Religious historians
have also questioned the French story.
H. C. Schuyler, in the single
paragraph given the incident, said Rale "remained in a cabin defending
himself." Shea is also critical,
cf. Georges Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien
Racle," pp. 193-95.
Emile Lauvriere, "Les Jesuites en Acadie,"
p. 208.
Schuyler, "The Apostle of the Abenakis," p. 173.
Shea,
History of the Catholic Missions among the Indians Tribes of the United
States, 1529-1854 (New York:
Charles Dunigan & Brother, 1855), p. 150;
It is notable that the acceptance of the English account does not
follow national ties.
Kingsford, for example, rejected the French
sources and accepts Hutchinson.
Kingsford, History of Canada, III, pp.
190-91.
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which sketch Rale as a religious bigot.

Nor has there been any clear

acceptance of the whole story by the English themselves.

Bancroft,

whom the French widely cite, accepted LaChasse1s account of the attack.’

Then too, they had their own sources to rely upon.

It is clear that the French view is no mere fabrication.

Eckstorm's over-reaction to the inconsistencies in the French documents
needlessly ignores the nature of the accounts.

Furthermore, she fails

to notice similar inconsistencies among the English accounts.

Father

LaChasse was not "making history" as Eckstorm declares when he wrote
Rale's eulogy.

Nor,

it needs be said, was he writing it either.

Seen in the tradition in which the letter properly belongs,
really quite innocuous.

it is

As Eckstorm notes, the letter was intended

for publication but that fact is not extraordinary.

The Jesuits had

been writing chronicles of their missions for over a hundred years.3
LaChasse reported what he heard from the |ndians--but he did so

with embellishments.
literary device.

His technique was not malicious but only a

Certainly a eulogy is not the place to seek a dis

passionate review of the case.

LaChasse's enthusiasm did not stem from

a desire to conceal the facts; there was no need to do so.

There was,

however, a real need of inspiring support in France for the sorely*III,

’George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery

of the American Continent,
III, pp. 336-37.

(Boston:

Little, Brown and Company,

1868),

r\

zEckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 567.

3(Jn
Jesuit and
refutation
Rasies, S.

the nature of the Jesuit Relations see:
J. H. Kennedy,
Savage in New France, p. 78. Also see Henri B^chard's
of Eckstorm:
"A Propros de deux lettres du Pere Sebastien
J.," pp. 191-218.
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beleagured Abnaki nation.

Pious support for the missions in France

was much less than it had been in previous years.

Jesuits were not in

vogue at the court and the superior-general's pleas since 1713 had
fallen on deaf ears.

In Rale's death the superior-general had an issue to fire the

He did not invent a "myth" about Rale's life.

popular imagination.

He had known, admired, and loved Rale since his arrival

in New France.

In diplomatic endeavours for the Abnakis the two had been comrades-in-

a rms.

Eckstorm asserts but does not conclusively prove that Vaudreuil
and LaChasse "knew that there were not eleven hundred English and

Indians involved in the fight...."’

It is not improbable that the

Indians invented the number to salve their own pride.

impression on their part necessarily infantile.
and chaotic retreat was obviously confusing.

Nor is the

The precipitate attack

It is true that LaChasse

knew the village had been enclosed; he was there in July,

1721.

But

the stockade's existence cannot be proven and LaChasse had no reason
to disbelieve the Indians.

Eckstrom's claim that the English plan of attack was consistent
with the plan of the village while "the French account is not"
wholly supportable.
occurred.
did.

In the first place,

2

is not

it is not known how the attack

Governor Vaudreuil did not romanticise the account as LaChasse

He described the sudden attack without exaggeration.

The Indians

who survived the first volley tried to hold the English while the women

’Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 551.
2 Ibid., p. 552.
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and children raced for the river.

Without dramatic effect, he described

Rale rushing from his house only to be immediately cut down by an

English volley.'

It is this account from the Abnakis that has inspired

the popular view of the Jesuit's unselfish death.

Eckstorm was reacting

not only to the inconsistencies in the French sources but also to their

uncritical acceptance.

2

Vaudreuil's account is not surprising.

When the Indians returned

the following day they found Rale's body with the dead chieftains in
the center of the vi1lage--hence, the story of the Jesuit’s heroic
death.

3

Eckstorm thought it improbable that there were any remains left

to be mourned as the village was burnt by the retreating forces.^

the English slept in the village.
men to bivouac,

But

With a hundred and twenty-eight

it is likely that the English removed the bodies from

'l_ettre de Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct.

25,

1724, Collection de Manuscripts,

III, p.

109.

2

For various versions of this popular acceptance of the French
account of Rale's death see: William Allen, The History of Norridgewock
(Norridgewock:
Edward J. Peet, 184-9), p. 40; Rufus King Sewall, Ancient
Dominions of Maine (Bath:
Elisha Clark and Company, 1859), p. 249;
Henrietta Danforth Wood, Early Days of Norridgewock (Skowhegan: The
Skowhegan Press, 1941), p. 3; Henrietta Tozier Totman, "Sebastien Rale,"
in Maine, My State (Lewiston: The Maine Writers Research Club, 1919),
p. 150; A. J. Coolidge and J. B. Mansfied, History and Description of
New England.
Maine (Boston: Austin J. Cooli dge, i860), p. 233; John
S. C. Abbott, The History of Maine (Boston:
B. B. Russell, 1875), p.
314; Sprague, Sebastien Rale, p. 41; Charles E. Nash, "The Indians of
the Kennebec," Illustrated History of Kennebec County, Maine, Henry D.
Kingsbury and Simeon L. Deyo, eds. (New York:
H. W. Blake & Company,
1892), p. 62.
3 Ib i d.; Charlevoix, History and General Description of New France,

V, p. 279; Letter from Father de la Chasse.
vol. 67, p. 235.

Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,

^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 571.
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the cabins into the center of the village.

The returning Indians under

standably concluded that Rale died surrounded by the village sachems.

New England happily learned of Norridgewock's destruction.
Captain Harmon arrived in Boston to "great Shouting and Triumph."
Crusty old Samuel Sewall muttered "The Lord help us to rejoice with

Trembling."’

The Reverend Colman preached that

in a special manner, the wonderful victory obtained August 12,
1724, over the bold & bloody tribes at Norridgewa1k, and their
sudden destruction that memorable day, was the singular work of
God;--And the officers and soldiers piously put far from them
selves the honor of it.
The plain hand of providence and not
their own conduct, facilitated and quickened their march...And
he, who was the father of the war, the ghostly father of those
perfidious savages, like the son of Beor, was slain among the
enemy, after his vain endeavours to curse us.*2
Testifying before the Council, Captain Harmon was made a
Lieutenant-Colonel for the good services of Captain Moulton.

The

General Assembly happily resolved.
to pay unto the said Co 1 10 Johnson Harmon the...sc’ sum of One
Hundred pounds for his service in the destruction of the s^
Sebastien Ralle, the s^ sum to be divided among the Officers &
Soldiers....3

In retrospect it seems incredible that Rale's death has aroused
such intensity of feeling.
was an extraordinary man.

Admirers and detractors alike agree that he
Shrouds of infamy and sanctity alike have

been thrown upon him though either claim is extreme.

But it is prepos

terous to say that he was motivated by an inveterate hatred of the

English.

It is equally absurd to lay at his feet the burden of war

’sewall, "Diary," VII, pp. 342-43.

2Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p.
3Mass. Council, Aug. 22,

1724; Mass. Arch., 52:

11.

34.
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The record speaks for itself.

guilt.

He encouraged no atrocities.

Not one Englishman was killed before an Abnaki was.
were abducted until,

No Englishmen

in Abnaki eyes, four of their chieftains were.

Nor were the settlements harassed until they had passed an explicitly

declared line--a line of which the English were quite aware but chose
to ignore.

It cannot be said that Sebastien Rale was a French agent.

His

nationality was incidental to the commitment he had made to the Abnakis.
He feared, but willingly accepted, the Abnakis trading with the English.
Though he opposed the continual English encroachments on the Kennebec

he remained a realist.

He accepted the existence of Brunswick,

Topsham, and Georgetown but barred further expansion.

He was no sly

intriguer in his opposition--he described his point of view to Governor

Shute who promptly rejected it, time and again.
hardly deliberately attract such attention.

A French agent would

The causes of the war

were thus complex and the "villain theory" must be discarded as simplistic.
The very readiness of the English to attribute the Abnakis1 mischevious-

ness to his influence is,

in itself, enough to discredit that view.

The widely divergent views of Rale stem not from any deviousness
in his actions.

Rather, the conflict of interpretations has come from

a polarization of secondary sources.

The English hastened to condemn

what they saw as a mad, Jesuitical plot against their dynamic fore-

bearors.

The French were no more impartial.

They supported the martyr

myth because Rale had opposed the English heretics.

The French view

was written primarily by clerics; the English by secularists.

Thus,

Sebastien Rale emerged not as a man, but as a shadow of two cultural

fictions.
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Religion had little to do with the actual conflict.
truthfully, an exacerbating circumstance.

It was,

But it was the conflict

between the Abnakis and the English for the land that was endemic;

English missionary efforts were sporadic in the extreme.

Rale and the

Abnakis were the tragic victims of an overly cautious Council of Marine

and the unswerving determination of Massachusetts.

Rale had attempted

to protect the Abnakis from themselves as well as from the English

settlers.

He was neither a religious fanatic, nor a political schemer.

Themselves victims of their accelerating expansion and contradictory
view of the Indians, the English could not compromise with Rale.
conflict mushroomed and he became a marked man.

The

Sebastien Rale was

a daring man, confronting and checking every English move.

He remained

on the Kennebec throughout the war though the Indians pleaded that he
return to Quebec.

Sebastien Rale died in the way he lived;

his Indians and defying the English to the end.

protecting
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CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE:

DEFEAT AND SUBMISSION

Rale's death resulted in another barrage of letters between

Vaudreuil and Dummer.

The latter made himself clear enough:

"I

cannot but esteem it an open Violation of the Treaty of Peace...for you
to Commissionate Qebastien Ral^j to reside amounghst" the Abnakis.’

Not to be outdone in verbal warfare the crusty French governor replied
that he would leave the settlement of the "Cruelty Committed by your

Order on the Person of ffather Ralle" to their respective kings.

2

The Abnakis were, of course, extremely angered by the loss of

Norridgewock.

But they were exhausted by the war.

To avert their

total collapse, Vaudreuil told Dummer that he would not refuse his

"Mediation to you to bring the Abenakis Indians & their Allies to
Peace...."3

Eckstorm thought that Vaudreuil was in an untenable position.

Surprisingly, Norridgewock's loss did not mean the immediate end of the

war.

The Indians did move to Canada but continued their regular forays.

’Letter Lt. Gov. Dummer to Mons. Vaudreuil, Sept. 15, 1724,
Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 106-07; Mass. Arch. 52: 48-4-9;
William B. Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook and others
Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine, 1722-1726 (Boston:
George E.
Littlefield, 1901), pp. 74-75.

2M. de Vaudreuil to Lt. Governor Dummer, Oct. 29, 1724, Mass.
Arch. 52:
80-83.

77-84; Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp.

3m. de Vaudreuil to Lt. Governor Dummer, Oct. 29, 1724, Mass.
Arch. 52; 77-84; Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp.
80-83.
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The English believed, as John Schuyler put it, that Vaudreuil was "very
sory and weary of that warr...."

Eckstorm, following Schuyler's lead,

overlooked similar English sentiments.'

Dummer's draft instructions for the Commissioners to be sent to

Vaudreuil show his quandary.

With the usual demand for the return of

the English captives and for Vaudreuil's neutrality, the English con
sidered resorting to two blatantly false threats.

The Commissioners

were to warn Vaudreuil that their alliance with the Five Nations could
prove dangerous to New France and that all the British colonies would

unite to "prosecute and pursue them to the Uttermost...."

2

Both the Iroquois and the other colonies refused to aid
Massachusetts.3

New York, for example, denied her help in "Committing
h.

of Hostilities within the territory of the french King...."

Governor

Burnet even warned Dummer that Vaudreuil would discover their "feeble

ness" if he ignored Massachusetts' strong threats.

Restrained,

Letter John Schuyler to Lt Gov. Dummer, Nov. 21, 1724, Baxter,
Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 233-34; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridge
wock," p. 565.
2

Instructions for the Commissioners for Canada, Baxter, Pioneers
of New France in New England, pp. 346-47.
3Governor Burnet to the Duke of Newcastle, Cal, of St. Pap.,

XXXIV, p. 270. Massachusetts complained to the king in June, 1725,
that she had "not been able to prevail
on the other gov'ts to furnish
their respective quotas
...in case of a war." Address of the Lt.
Governor, Council and Representatives of the Massachusetts Bay to the
King, June 25, 1725, Ibid., p. 400.
^At a Council held at Fort George in New York, Dec.

16,

1724,

Mass. Arch. 4;
90-95; Letter, Gov. Wm Burnet of N. Y. to Lt. Gov.
Dummer, Dec. 16, 1723, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 234-35.
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Massachusetts'

instructions to her Commissioners contained no threats.’

Meanwhile Dummer sent Vaudreuil a staunch defense of English
rights.

The Indians were subjects of the British Crown, he noted, saying

that they had admitted the fact in their many treaties with Massachusetts

They had "quitted claimes to the Lands bought & possessed by the

English..." in a treaty with the then governor,
1693.

Sir William Phips,

in

Dummer claimed all territory south of the St. Lawrence, forgetting

the often admitted necessity of a settlement by commissioners.

Par

ticularly remarkable was his feigned amazement at the Abnakis' "deceit

fullness & self contradiction" in contesting Massachusetts' title to

the Kennebec.
the war points,

Even a cursory examination of the tensions leading to

inevitably, to the Indians'

ignored claims.

the Lieutenant-Governor replied with dignity:

the Indians with Sincerity...."

Finally,

"We have alwaies treated

2

Mr. William Dudley, Colonel Samuel Thaxter and Mr. Atkinson

carried Dummer's letter to Governor Vaudreuil.

As official Commissioners

they demanded Vaudreuil's neutrality and the return of the English
prisoners.

If the English had hoped that Vaudreuil would be convinced

by reason, they were sorely disappointed.
a single point.

Vaudreuil refused to concede

He asserted his own innocence and encouraged the

Abnakis not to compromise with the English.

’copie de la Commission donne par le Gouverneur de Baston aux

Deputes par luy envoy^s au Canada, Arch. Col., F 3, Collection Moreau
St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 535-36.
^Letter Lt. Gov. Dummer to Mons. Vaudreuil, Jan. 19, 1724/25,
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 175-78; Mass. Arch. 52:
106-09; Trask
ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp. 88-91.
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When the Commissioners met seven Abnaki sachems, at Vaudreuil's
suggestion, they were discouraged.

The Abnakis required that the

English "quit their lands, restore their prisoners, rebuild their

church, and indemnify them for...kiling Father Rasle, and for the ex
pense of the war."

The Commissioners were displeased with the confron

They rightly attributed the Abnakis continued hostility to

tation.

Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse.’

Their mission was a total failure.

The Abnakis would not submit and Vaudreuil was convinced that the
English were exhausted by the war.

He wrote the Council of Marine

that though Dummer expressed "Himself with much haughtiness, M. de

Vaudreuil

is persuaded that he is extremely anxious for peace...."

In the end,

materialized.

it was Vaudreuil's and not Dummer's fears which

Despite their past promises to Vaudreuil, the tepid

Penobscots submitted,

death, was disgusted.

to the English.

Vaudreuil, close to his own

The Penobscots declared themselves "subjects

of the Crown of England."

They agreed that all forts might remain and

finally bound themselves to "make all the other Indians, even those

domiciliated in Canada, parties to this peace."

The new French

governor, de Longueil, hoped that the Indians of Canada as well as the

Kennebec might convince the Penobscots to renew the war.

’m.

Begon to Count de Maurepas, April 21,

Longueil

1725, O'Callaghan,

New York Colonial Documents , IX, pp. 941-45; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol.
4-7, pp. 203-11; Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 117-23; Abstract
of M. de Vaudreuil's Despatch, August 7, 1725, O'Callaghan, New York
Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 947-49; Vaudreuil au Ministre, May 22,
1725, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 47, pp. 83-88; Journal of Commissions
to Canada, May 28, 1725, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England,
pp. 350-53.

Abstract of Letters respecting the Abenaquis, April 24,
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 945.

1725,
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accused Father Gaul in of inducing the Penobscots and the Micmacs to

"make their peace."

The ministry, not surprisingly, was furious and

ordered Gaulin "to stir up hosti1ities...against the English."’

In their preliminary discussions with the English the Penobscots

claimed that "the Snt Johns, and Cape Sable Indians have agreed to
But not all

abide by what the Penobscot Indians shall agree to...."

the Abnakis were so anxious for peace.
a truce in July,

1725,

When the Penobscots agreed to

the area included only that "Eastward of Kennebeck

River."2
In November, 1725, the Indians went to Boston to conclude the

peace.

The Treaty's noteworthy provisions, that the Indians were

guaranteed "all their lands...not by them conveyed and sold," and that
"all trade and commerce...shaI 1 be under such management and regula
tions as the government of Massachusetts province shall direct," was

meant to correct two grievances that had caused the war.

3

The English clearly recognized the true causes of the war.

"It's my Oppinion," said John Minot, that "some measures

should be

tacken to Assure them that some Considerable part of that Country

should allwayes remaine to them & their children...."

"And, as I

remember," he noted significantly, "at the last treaty, they had no

’Abstract of Messrs, de Longueil and Begon's Despatches, Oct. 31,
1725, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents,
Col., C 11 A, vol. 47, pp. 23-29.

IX, pp. 955-56; Arch.

2From John Stoddard & John Wainright, June 28,

ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, p.
Westbrook," July 31, 1725, Ibid., p. 132.

1725, Trask,

121; and "From Col.

3The Submission and agreement of the delegates of the eastern
Indians, Dec. 15, 1725, Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England,
pp. 119-23.
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assurance that their planting fields at Nerigwa1k...shou1d allwayes

QbeJ

injoyed by them."’

The confirmation of the treaty, postponed from May, was concluded

in July,

1726.

Dummer was pleased with the result but feared that the

Kennebecs would refuse to submit to it.

"We mean," the sachem Loron

assured Dummer, "in case any of the tribes should rise against us, or
resist us, we will take effectual means to set them down by force."
Though undoubtedly disgruntled, the Kennebecs did acquiesce.

the sachem Toxas signed the document in July,

resigned themselves to the situation.

Finally,

1727, and the Kennebecs

After thirty-nine years, peace

was again a reality on the northern frontier.

Let there be no mistake about it.

The conflict that Massachusetts

had termed a rebellion, the opposition of the Abnakis to the pressures
of an expanding frontier, was the inspiration of Sebastien Rale.

evidence stands for itself.

The

From 1714 the moderate expressions of

hostility against the new settlements were ignored.

The Abnakis

complaints against the colonists were not regarded as legitimate.

It

became evident to Rale that if discussion was unsuccessful, then force
must be used to prove to the English that the Abnakis opposed their

’To Coll. Stephan Minot from John Minot, Oct. 4,

ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, p.

1725, Trask,

146.

^Loren's statement, as given by Penhallow, must be questioned.
In December, 1725, the Penobscots agreed that if any of the tribes
refused "to confirm and ratify" the treaty they would "join their young
men with the English in reducing them to reason." Later, they claimed
that they had been misquoted.
"I told you," Loren wrote, that "we
would do on our side all we could to bring them back butt I have give
you notice att the same time that I did not understand that we should
strike on them, or that we should joyn our forces to yours to march
against them" Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England, p. 122;
Indian's Letter, Jan. 26, 1726, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXI 1 I, p. 209.

142

continued presence on the Kennebec.

The aftermath of Rale's death

goes far to illustrate his importance to the Abnakis' enthusiastic war

effort.

Left without leadership, and again split into pro and anti

English factions it was inevitable that the Kennebecs would be forced
to submit to Massachusetts overtures for peace.

Rale's persuasion and determination,

Without Sebastien

the Abnakis could no longer

present a united front against colonial expansion.
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